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Abstract 
 
 
 
Most previous scholarship has asserted that the Qing Empire neglected the sea and 
underestimated the worldwide rise of Western powers in the long eighteenth century. By the 
time the British crushed the Chinese navy in the so-called Opium Wars, the country and its 
government were in a state of shock and incapable of quickly catching-up with Western 
Europe. In contrast with such a narrative, this dissertation shows that the Great Qing was in 
fact far more aware of global trends than has been commonly assumed. Against the 
backdrop of the long eighteenth century, the author explores the fundamental historical 
notions of the Chinese maritime world as a conceptual divide between an inner and an outer 
sea, whereby administrators, merchants, and intellectuals paid close and intense attention to 
coastal seawaters. Drawing on archival sources from China, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and the 
West, the author argues that the connection between the Great Qing and the maritime world 
was complex and sophisticated. The evidence reveals beyond doubt that the Manchu 
administration indeed never lost sight of the harsh strategic and logistical realities of 
managing, if not ruling, a vast maritime landscape. In summary, this dissertation provides 
new insights into the East Asian maritime world, China’s regional links on the eve of the 
modern age, and the area’s deepening role in the development of an increasingly global 
history. It also has an obvious topical relevance, with the People’s Republic of China’s 
increasing efforts to extend its control over natural resources and seaways in the Western 
Pacific. It might be seen as the largely overlooked maritime counterpart to that covered by 
Peter Perdue’s impressive volume: China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central 
Eurasia, which looks at the history of imperial China’s western landward expansion in the 
late seventeenth and the eighteenth century. 
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Introduction 
 
 On March 19, 1840, exactly a year after the outbreak of the First Opium War, the 
Qing navy was introduced to the London public in a local daily newspaper The Standard, 
 
The following details of the army and navy of China are 
extracted from the work on that country, by M. Gützlaff, a 
missionary, who resided in it many years: The total number 
of Chinese troops, including those of the navy, but not the 
militia nor the Mongul auxiliaries, amounts to 785,222. 
China has two fleets, one for the river, and the other for the 
sea. The first comprises 1036 ships, the second 918. The 
river fleet has crews to the amount of 9500 men, and that 
for the sea 98,421, making an aggregate of 107,921 
sailors…The officers and men are equally ignorant of 
navigation. Many sailors of their merchant vessels belong 
to the navy. Their war junks differ in nothing from those 
employed in trade; the largest do not exceed 300 tons in 
burden.1 
 
The above commentary was written by Father Karl Gützlaff (1803-1851), the German 
missionary who traveled and worked in China and Asia for altogether twenty-five years. 
Between 1838 and 1842, he served as an interpreter for the Jardine & Matheson Company 
and later the British diplomatic mission in China. He was one of the first Protestant 
missionaries to record in detail the Chinese naval forces at that time. His above short piece 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “Multiple Commerce Items: China,” in The Standard (London, England), issue 4913, Thursday, March 19, 
1840. 
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excerpted in The Standard was soon reprinted and circulated widely in other newspapers 
across England such as the Blackburn Standard,2 the Devizes and Wiltshire Gazette,3 The 
Newcastle Courant,4 and the Salisbury and Winchester Journal.5 As observed by Father 
Gützlaff, the Qing navy, despite the sizable number of its soldiers, was undertrained and 
disorganized; while the officers were equally ignorant of navigation in the 1840s. True or 
not, it was well known that the Royal navy eventually defeated the Qing forces after the 
occupation of Shanghai in August 1842, followed by a peace settlement held aboard the 
HMS Cornwallis, a British third-rate battleship.6  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 “News: China,” Blackburn Standard (Blackbrn, England), issue 271, Wednesday, March 25, 1840. 
 
3 “News: China,” Devizes and Wiltshire Gazette (Devizes, England), issue 1263, Thursday, March 26, 1840. 
 
4  “London March 25: China,” The Newcastle Courant (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, England), issue 8627, Friday, 
March 27, 1840.  
 
5  “China,” The Salisbury and Winchester Journal (Salisbury, England), issue 6150, Monday, March 30, 1840.    
 
6  As argued by Bryant Avery, “the Opium War was many things.” John King Fairbank, Hsin-pao Chang, 
Peter Ward Fay, Jack Beeching, and others have written of the diplomatic and cultural confrontations. See 
John King Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842-1854 
(Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1953); Hsin-pao Chang, Commissioner Lin and the Opium War 
(Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1964); Peter Fay, The Opium War, 1840-1842 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1975); Jack Beeching, The Opium Wars in China, 1834-1860 (London: 
Hutchison, 1975). On the Qing side, Arthur Waley and Frederic Wakeman’s accounts of the impact of the war 
on the Guangdong gentry and peasantry remain two of the classics. See Arthur Waley, The Opium War 
through Chinese Eyes (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958); Frederic Wakeman, “The Canton Trade 
and the Opium War,” in Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank (eds.), The Cambridge History of China 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 163-212. Another illuminating study is the one written 
by J.Y. Wong. Wong examines British and Chinese intentions, perceptions, and reactions, their diplomatic and 
economic agendas, the impacts of personalities, popular opinion, as well as the roles which other powers 
played in the Arrow Incident, an incident that lead directly led to the First Opium War. See J.Y. Wong, 
Deadly Dreams: Opium and the ‘Arrow’ War (1856-1860) in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998). Even until recently, the Opium War continues to be studied as a keynote event in Chinese history. W. 
Travis Hanes III and Frank Sanello, for instance, go into great detail about the negotiations and behavior on 
both sides during the Opium War periods. The author also make some analogies between the economics and 
empire of the nineteenth century, and the twentieth-first century forms of money, politics, and war. See W. 
Travis Hanes III and Frank Sanello, Opium Wars: The Addiction of One Empire and the Corruption of 
Another (Illinois: Sourcebooks, Inc., 2002). Julia Lovell, in turn, makes a lucid account of the First Opium 
War by studying the war from a global perspective. See her The Opium War: Drugs, Dreams and the Making 
of China (London: Picador, 2011). In my opinion, the Opium war would remain its importance in the craft of 
contemporary history and the patterns of the ever-shifting global market.  
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 Eighteen years after the Qing forces were defeated in the First Opium War, Father 
Gützlaff was once again proved right about the Qing navy. The Qing was in no position to 
resist the British and the French in the Arrow War that lasted from 1856 to 1860. The result 
of the war was even described flatly as a “distinguished success of the British” by a 
Yorkshire reporter. 7  Thirty-four years later in 1894, the Qing experienced another 
humiliating defeat at sea. Almost the entire Northern Ocean Fleet, the dominant navy of the 
Qing, was severely crushed by the Imperial Japanese Navy in the Battle of the Yalu. The 
remnants of the Beiyang Fleet retired into Lüshunkou for repairs, but it was later destroyed 
by an amphibious attack during the Battle of Weihaiwei in 1895.8 With hindsight, for 
almost six decades after the outbreak of the First Opium War, the Qing regime faced its 
gravest maritime threat ever and these clustered defeats demonstrated the failure of the Qing 
navy to master the ocean. As James Bell in the nineteenth century concluded,  
The navy of the Chinese is very contemptible. Their 
trading-vessels are ill-built, and however safe in their rivers 
and canals, are unfit for the open sea. With a square bow, 
no keel or bowsprit, thick masts of one piece, single sails of 
bamboo-matting, folded like a fan, heavy and 
unmanageable, and a moveable and unsteady rudder, these 
crescent-shaped vessels, adorned with dragons’ mouths, 
frightful heads, and goggle eyes, are almost ungovernable 
in boisterous weather, and it is inconceivable the number of 
souls who annually perish with them.9 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7  “The Lord Mayor’s Banquet,” in The Huddersfield Chronicle and West Yorkshire Advertiser (West 
Yorkshire, England), issue 557, Saturday, November 17, 1860. 
 
8 The First Sino-Japanese War has long been considered the earliest significant conflict between Asian nations 
in modern times. The War also set the pattern for later wars in which Japan took on other rivals with greater 
powers such as Russia and the United States. For detailed studies on this significant event in English, see for 
example S.C.M. Paine’s The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002); Makito Saya, David Noble (trans.), The Sino-Japanese War and the Birth 
of Japanese Nationalism (Tokyo: International House of Japan, 2011); and Stewart Lone, Army, Empire, and 
Polities in Meiji Japan (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000); and Seiji Hishida, Japan Among the Great 
Powers (New York: Longmans Green & Company, 1940). 
 
9 James Bell, A System of Geography, Popular and Scientific: A Physical, Political and Statistical Account of 
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 No one could claim that the Qing defeats briefly mentioned above have been 
ignored. Every textbook mentions them. This dissertation is therefore not an attempt to 
recover a series of familiar events. Yet the problem lies with the fact that there has been a 
strong tendency to accentuate the lack of maritime awareness of the Manchu Empire by 
overemphasizing its failure in nineteenth century sea battles. The imperialist intrusions of 
Great Britain and other naval powers beginning with the First Opium War appear in this 
persistent view as a perhaps rude but long overdue wake-up call for a land-focused empire 
reluctant to embrace the opportunities, and guard against the dangers, of the wider world 
beyond its neglected coastlines. In the word of Benjamin A. Elman,  
 
the image of China as a sick man who is irrevocably weak 
and backward, in contrast to a powerful and industrialized 
Europe and a rapidly industrializing Japan, has been 
dominated by the incontrovertible fact that China was 
defeated in most wars in the nineteenth century.10 
 
Under the influence of such a dominant narrative, many scholars have depicted these 
defeats as clear representations of reality. They not only provided a tumultuous ending to 
the prosperous high Qing period (ca. 1683-1839)11 but also indicated that the Manchu court 
was unable to engage properly and willingly in maritime militarization. Manchu warriors 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the World and its Various Divisions (London, Edinburgh, and Dublin: A. Fullarton & Co., 1849), vol. 5, p. 
117.  
 
10 Benjamin A. Elman, “Naval Warfare and the Refraction of China's Self-Strengthening Reforms into 
Scientific and Technological Failure, 1860-1895” (paper presented at the conference “The Disunity of Chinese 
Science” organized by the University of Texas, Austin; May 10-12, 2002), p. 34 (Cited with permission). 
 
11  The term “high Qing” is applied to the period when the Qing Dynasty was at its peak of expansion and 
ranked among the most powerful polities in the world. On a succinct discussion of the high Qing, see Frederic 
Wakeman, Jr., “High Qing: 1683-1839,” in James B. Crowley (ed.), Modern East Asia: Essays in 
Interpretation (Harcourt Publishers Group Ltd., 1970), pp. 1-28. 
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and the ruling elites, presumably unprepared by their past for either imperial or commercial 
seafaring, were stereotyped as a group of landsmen who regarded the sea as an alien 
platform for warfare. The Qing Empire was thus characterized as the victim of Western 
imperialism according to a “Mahanian sea power paradigm,” 12 as the result of its crushing 
military experiences, mostly on the seas, in the nineteenth century.  Edward L. Dreyer had 
this to say about the Qing and its failure at sea,  
China’s nineteenth-century humiliations were strongly 
related to her weakness and failure at sea. At the start of the 
Opium War, China had no unified navy and no sense of 
how vulnerable she was to attack from the sea; British 
forces sailed and steamed wherever they wanted to 
go……In the Arrow War (1856-60), the Chinese had no 
way to prevent the Anglo-French expedition of 1860 from 
sailing into the Gulf of Zhili and landing as near as possible 
to Beijing. Meanwhile, new but not exactly modern 
Chinese armies suppressed the midcentury rebellions, 
bluffed Russia into a peaceful settlement of disputed 
frontiers in Central Asia, and defeated the French forces on 
land in the Sino-French War (1884-85). But the defeat of 
the fleet, and the resulting threat to steamship traffic to 
Taiwan, forced China to conclude peace on unfavorable 
terms.13 
 
Bodo Wiethoff, a specialist in Qing history, even defined the sea space embracing China as 
the “third frontier,” metaphorically meaning that the Qing court was disinterested in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The “Mahanian sea power paradigm” is referring to the theory founded by Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-
1914), the navy admiral of the United States. As argued by Mahan, “the history of sea power is largely, though 
by no means solely, a narrative of contests between nations, of mutual rivalries, of violence frequently 
culminating in war. The profound influence of sea commerce upon the wealth and strength of countries was 
clearly seen long before the true principles which governed its growth and prosperity were detected.” 
Therefore, the Mahanian sea power paradigm, while embraces in its broad sweep all that tends to make a 
people great upon the sea or by the sea, is largely a military history related to confrontations, conquests, and 
expansions at sea. See Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence Of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (Newport, 
R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1991). I will have an extended discussion of this paradigm in the subsequent 
section. 
13 Edward L. Dreyer, Zheng He: China and the Ocean in the Early Ming Dynasty, 1405-1433 (New York: 
Pearson Education Inc., 2007), p. 180.  
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incorporating the sea space into its empire.14  
 
 The above analyses seem to contain some measure of truth; however, are we to 
suspect that the Qing court was ignorant of the ocean throughout its long history simply 
because of its numerous failures at sea during the nineteenth century? Is it fair enough to 
say that the Qing rulers in the nineteenth century largely inherited a long-term negligence 
towards the ocean, intensified by their seminomadic origins and their preoccupation with 
the empire’s inland frontiers in the north and northwest during the high Qing period? This 
study is intended to tell a story less structured by later outcomes. It is short-sighted to rely 
on an analysis based on nineteenth century experiences to draw conclusions about the 
attitude of the Qing to the maritime world. In fact, the high Qing emperors, namely Kangxi 
(r. 1661-1722), Yongzheng (r.1722-1735), and Qianlong (r.1735-1795), emphasized and 
propelled political-administrative control across the maritime frontier by establishing a 
strong navy and consolidating a customs structure that better prepared the empire for 
(potential) crises from the sea. Thanks to their efforts, the Qing court was able to maintain 
its superiority across the maritime space in East Asia for almost a hundred years. Similar to 
Queen Elizabeth I (r. 1558-1603) who asserted national control over the seawaters 
surrounding England and Ireland, high Qing monarchs were aware that for security reasons 
a strong military presence was required across their domestic sea zone. The Kangxi emperor, 
for instance, once mentioned that  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Bodo Wiethoff, Chinas dritte Grenze: Der traditionelle chinesische Staat und der küstennahe Seeraum 
(Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1969), p. 79. Paola Calanca also shared similar view in her thesis: “Piraterie 
et contrebande au Fujian: L’administration face aux problèmes d'illégalité maritime (17e-debut 19e siècle) 
“ (Unpublished PhD dissertation, Paris: EHESS, 1999), vol. I, pp. 32-33. 
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Our Great Qing is embraced by the ocean. We have a long 
coastline. If we want to maintain the stability of our empire, 
we cannot ignore the vast maritime frontier. In order to rule 
the maritime frontier properly, we have to make sure that 
our navy is strong enough to patrol and police the maritime 
territory.15 
 
Kangxi’s edict provides a piece of evidence that the Qing in the early eighteenth century did 
not ignore its maritime frontier. It instead paid considerable attention to the political-
administrative control of the watery world and considered the immediate sea space a 
frontier that required political domestication by means of control and surveillance.  
 
 My overarching goal in this study is to investigate high Qing maritime policies in 
order to restore the nature and significance of Qing management of the China coastal littoral 
and the “inner” East Asian Sea that bounds the Chinese maritime frontier from the 1680s to 
1800. It explores, first of all, the fundamental, historical notions of the Chinese maritime 
world as a conceptual divide between an inner and an outer sea, whereby Qing 
administrators paid close and intense attention to coastal seawaters. Second, I move on to 
analyze the Qing placement of coastal guard posts and the deployment of naval fleets in a 
holistic context that includes the four commercialized southeastern as well as the more 
strategically important northeastern coastal provinces. Thirdly, I will introduce the role of 
the maritime customs stations and examine the way they managed and facilitated sea trade 
along the inner sea perimeter. This dissertation argues that the high Qing strategic approach 
to its maritime frontier was important, coherent, and successful in pacifying and stabilizing 
the inner ocean, thereby leading to a close partnership between the Qing state and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Da Qing Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu 大清聖祖仁皇帝實錄 [Complete records of Emperor Kangxi] (Taipei: 
Xin wenfeng chuban gongsi, 1978), dated to “Kangxi liunian (1667) dingwei jiuyue, renyin shuo.” 
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commercial organizations that sparked dramatic commercial development across the East 
Asian Sea, a novel term recently used by the United Nations Environment Program and 
some maritime historians and political analysts such as Chua Thia-Eng, Danilo A. Bonga, 
and David Cyranoski.16 
 
 To rediscover the connection between the Qing and the ocean, one should broaden 
the spectrum of analysis by studying the evolving sense of Chineseness and the maritime 
world. Over the past few decades, there has been a wealth of literature concerning topics 
such as “China and the sea” and “maritime China in transition.” Much attention has been 
especially paid to the importance of foreign incursions, maritime commerce, nautical 
technology, and overseas diasporas. The “Fairbank School,”17for instance, has long been 
directing interest towards diplomatic relations with maritime powers in the West.18 The 
influence of G. William Skinner’s regional model of China19 led scholars to turn towards 
intensive socioeconomic studies of macro-regions covering the Western and Northern 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See the “United Nations Environment Program” (http://www.unep.ch/regionalseas/regions/eas/ 
eashome.htm); Chua Thia-Eng and Danilo A. Bonga (ed.), Safer Coasts, Living with Risks: Selected Papers 
from the East Asian Seas Congress 2006 (Oxford: Elsevier, 2009); David Cyranoski, “Angry Words over East 
Asian Seas: Chinese Territorial Claims Propel Science into Choppy Waters,” Nature, vol. 478 (2011), pp. 293-
294. I will further discuss the term by the end of this introduction. 
 
17 The term “Fairbank School” applied to the research inspired by John King Fairbank. This term has been 
used by scholars such as Kelly Boyd, Chihyun Chang,Mary G. Mazur, and Wang Hui.  
 
18 See for instance Akira Iriye, Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967); Benjamin Schwartz, In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the 
West (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1964); Ssu-yu Teng, John K. Fairbank 
(eds.), China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839-1923 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1982); Ssu-yu Teng, The Taiping Rebellion and the Western Powers: A Comprehensive 
Survey (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1971); Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell (eds.), Imperial China: The 
Decline of the Last Dynasty and the Origins of Modern China: The 18th and 19th Centuries (New York: 
Random House, 1967), to name but a few.  
 
19 See G. William Skinner, “Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China Part I to III,” (Association Journal 
of Asian Studies, Inc.; reprint from the Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 24 [November, 1964]).   
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frontiers, China Proper, as well as the coastal region.20 The studies of Wang Gangwu,21 in 
turn, stimulated research on the patterns and processes of Chinese diasporas in Southeast 
Asia.22 In terms of periodization, most studies have concentrated on the age of the Opium 
Wars (1839-1860), the Restoration Era (1861-1875), and the last few decades of the Qing 
rule (1875-1912).23 Even if the recent significant research conducted by Gang Zhao and 
Yangwen Zheng has successfully moved the Qing maritime experience in the eighteenth 
century from a marginal position to the center of attention, their studies primarily focus on 
sea trade in response to the period of early globalization in general and the process of East 
Asian integration in particular rather than the “official mind”24 and conceptualization of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Skinner provides an analytical tool to study the economic and cultural development of coastal China within 
a regional system. For details, see William Skinner, “Introduction”, and Sow-Theng Leong and Tim Wright, 
“Hakka Migrations in Lingnan and the Southeast Coast,” in their edited volume, Migration and Ethnicity in 
Chinese History: Hakkas, Pengmin, and their Neighbors (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), pp. 1-18; 
39-68; Joseph Tse-Hei Lee, The Bible and the Gun: Christianity in South China, 1860-1900 (New York : 
Routledge, 2003), pp. 5-20; Ivy Maria Lim, Lineage Society on the Southeastern Coast of China: The Impact 
of Japanese Piracy in the Sixteenth Century (Amherst, N.Y.: Cambria Press, 2010), pp. 1-12.   
 
21 See for example Wang Gungwu, Don’t Leave Home: Migration and the Chinese (Singapore: Eastern 
Universities Press, 2003); China and the Chinese Overseas (Singapore: Time Academic Press, 1991); 
Community and Nation: China, Southeast Asia and Australia (St Leonards, Australia: Allen & Unwin for the 
Asian Studies Association of Australia, 1992); Wang L. Ling-chi and Wang Gangwu (eds.), The Chinese 
Diaspora: Selected Essays (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1998).  
 
22 To name a few example: Yow Cheun Hoe, Guangdong and Chinese Diaspora: The Changing Landscape of 
Qiaoxiang (Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2013); Wanning Sun (ed.), Media and the Chinese 
Diaspora: Community, Communications and Commerce (London; New York: Routledge, 2006); Laurence J. 
C. Ma, Carolyn L. Cartier, The Chinese Diaspora: Space, Place, Mobility, and Identity (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2003).  
 
23 See Chi-Kong Lai, “The Historiography of Maritime China since c. 1975,” in Frank Broeze (ed.), Maritime 
History at the Crossroad: A Critical Review of Recent Historiography (St. John’s, Newfoundland: 
International Maritime Economic History Association, 1995), pp. 53-80.  
 
24 Leonard Blussé used the term “official mind” in his remarkable Visible Cities. He mentioned that John King 
Fairbank and his students have studied the connection between China and overseas community from a 
viewpoint of the “official mind” of the Ming and Qing governments based on the tribute system framework. 
Blussé found this approach problematic because the overreliance of the tribute system framework is a very 
one-sided view of the past. For details, See Leonard Blussé, Visible Cities: Canton, Nagasaki, and Batavia 
and the Coming of the Americans (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 11-12. For the 
problem of the overreliance of the tribute system, see Hans Bielenstein, Diplomacy and Trade in the Chinese 
World, 589-1276 (Leiden: Brill, 2005).  
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Qing administration towards its maritime frontier.25 Despite the significant contributions 
these scholars have made, there has yet to be undertaken an in-depth examination in English 
on the interrelationships between the imperial projection of power of the maritime world as 
well as the way in which the high Qing government conceptualized the maritime world 
before the 1840s. As such, this research aims to foreground the indigenous dynamism of 
high Qing maritime policies so as to substantiate the history of frontier and maritime studies 
in East Asia. 
 
In trying to encourage greater recognition of the maritime awareness of the Qing 
empire, I am not suggesting that the “continental expansion” achieved by the Qing was 
insignificant. There is no doubt that the Qing, by the middle of the eighteenth century, was 
at its peak of aggressive expansion and ranked among the most powerful polities in the 
world.26 In addition to governing the traditional territories of China and the northeastern 
homelands of the Manchu ruling house, the high Qing monarchs expanded their territory to 
include Tibet, Xinjiang, Mongolia, and the vast tracts of Inner Asia through a protracted 
process of strategic alliances and military conquests.27 In his landmark volume China 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 See Gang Zhao, The Qing Opening to the Ocean: Chinese Maritime Policies, 1684-1757 (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai’i Press, 2013) and Yangwen Zheng, China on the Sea: How the Maritime World Shaped 
Modern China (Leiden: Brill, 2011). But it has to be emphasized that Zhao and Zheng have provided a very 
appropriate platform for revisiting the Qing from a maritime perspective, my project will therefore align with 
their critical and analytical enterprises. 
 
26 For details, see Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 2005); Lawrence Kessler, K’ang-hsi and the Consolidation of Ch’ing Rule, 
1661-1684 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), pp. 1-17; Jonathan D. Spence, Emperor of China: 
Self Portrait of K’ang Hsi (New York: Vintage, 1974), pp. 105-106; Harold L. Kahn, Monarchy in the 
Emperor’s Eyes: Images and Reality in the Ch’ien-lung Reign (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 
1971); Pamela Kyle Crossley, “Review Article: The Rulerships of China.” American Historical Review, vol. 
97 no. 5 (1992), pp. 1468-1483; and David M. Farquhar, “Emperor as Bodhisattva in the Governance of the 
Ch’ing Empire,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, vol. 38, no. 1 (June, 1978), pp. 5-34.  
 
27 Several scholars have examined the special characteristics of Qing rule in Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet. 
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Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia, Peter C. Perdue forcefully explains 
how the Qing Empire considerably expanded its frontier to the West.28 Except for the Pan-
Asian Pax Mongolica,29 the expansive Great Qing Empire was by far the largest political 
entity ever to govern what is known today as Central Eurasia.30 Due to a series of 
continental triumphs achieved by the Qing armies, most historians and social scientists 
tended to focus on these Inner Asian conquests in the long eighteenth century, 31 thereby 
describing the Qing as one of the most successful and expansive powers throughout the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Great Qing was, arguably, similar to other Euro-
Asian empires such as the Muscovite-Russian, the Mongolian Zunghar, the Ottoman, and 
the Habsburg, in patterns of “administrative centralization, deliberate multinational 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
See Pamela Kyle Crossley, Orphan Warriors: Three Manchu Generations and the End of the Qing World 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Evelyn S. Rawski, “Reenvisioning the Qing: The Significance 
of the Qing Period in Chinese History,” Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 55 (1996), pp. 829-850; Ann Waltner 
and Thomas A. Wilson, “Forum: Four Books on the Manchus in China and in Greater Asia,” Journal of Asian 
Studies, vol. 61 (February 2002), pp. 149-177; Peter C. Perdue, “A Frontier View of Chineseness,” in 
Giovanni Arrighi, Takeshi Hamashita, and Mark Selden (eds.), The Resurgence of East Asia: 500, 150, and 
50-Year Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 51-77. See also Jürgen Osterhammel, China und die 
Weltgesellschaft. vom 18 Jahrhundert bis in unsere Zeit (Müchen: C. H. Beck Verlag, 1989), pp. 86-105. For 
some Chinese and Japanese scholarship, see Wu Cengqi, Qingshi gangyao 清史綱要 [Summary of the Qing 
history] (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshu guan, 1934), pp. 39-41; Xiao Yishan, Qingshi 清史 [History of the Qing] 
(Taipei: Zhonghua wenhua chubanshe, 1952); Naitō Torajirō, Shinchō shi tsūron 清朝史通論 [Treatise on the 
Qing history] (Tōkyō: Kōbundō Shobō, 1944), pp. 20-23; Zheng Tianting, Qingshi 清史 [History of the Qing] 
(Taipei: Yunlong chubanshe, 1989), pp. 12-18; Abe Takeo, Shindaishi no kenkyū清代史の硏究 [Researches 
on Qing history] (Tōkyō: Sōbunsha, 1971), p. 11.  
 
28 Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia.  
 
29 Michael Prawdin, The Mongol Empire: Its Rise and Legacy (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2006), p. 347.  
 
30 The Qing conquests towards the heart of Eurasia formed part of a global process in the late modern era, in 
which Western European historians tend to typify this historical conjuncture as that of the “seventeenth-
century crisis of state formation” followed by “eighteenth century stabilization.” See William T. Rowe, 
China’s Last Empire: The Great Qing (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009), pp. 1-10. See also 
Piper Rae Gaubatz, Beyond the Great Wall: Urban Form and Transformation on the Chinese Frontiers 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1996); Laura Hostetler, Qing Colonial Enterprise, Ethnography 
and Cartography in Early Modern China (Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 2001). 
 
31 Generally, the “long eighteenth century” spanned from Kangxi’s final consolidation of Qing rule, around 
1680, to the death of the Qianlong emperor in 1799. See Susan Mann, Precious Records: Women in China’s 
Long Eighteenth Century (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1997). 
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inclusion, and aggressive land settlement.”32 Contrary to the conventional understanding 
that the Qing was an exception to imperialistic power in world history, the “Inner Asian 
focus” has rightly provided an illuminating angle for studying the Qing in ways that counter 
the conventionally held understanding that the Great Qing was an exception to imperialistic 
power in world history which is similar to other ambitious powers in the “Great Game.”33 
Yet this focus has been overwhelmingly structured in terms of the Westward, territorial 
expansionism of the Great Qing that it announced. The focus gives us an impression that the 
Qing court, especially before the First Opium War, paid exclusive attention to its central 
Eurasian frontier while ignoring that of its maritime coastline. Some historians even 
conclude that the Qing court expanded the territorial borders of the empire but deliberately 
decided to “turn away from its maritime frontier” since the sea only had a limited influence 
on the high Qing administrative body.34 However, as demonstrated by Palmira Brummett, 
“empire building was depended upon the ability to mobilize irresistible armies and 
navies.”35 What if we try to reject the dichotomizing view of “the land-sea relationship,” in 
which the expansion on land has to be predicated on the negligence of the ocean, or vice 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 For instance, see Victor Lieberman (ed.), Beyond Binary Histories: Re-imagining Eurasia to c.1830 (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), “introduction”; Lynn A. Struve (ed.), The Qing Formation of 
World-Historical Time (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004).  
 
33 The idea of “Great Game” here refers to the geopolitical rivalry over Central Eurasia between different 
powers in the nineteenth century. For details, see Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in 
Central Asia (New York: Kodansha, 1992); Karl E. Meyer and Shareen Blair Brysac, Tournament of Shadows: 
The Great Game and the Race for Empire in Central Asia (Washington D.C. Counterpoint, 1999). Moreover, I 
side with those who do not find a distinctive contrast between the Qing empire and the European state system 
until the mid-eighteenth century. The high Qing was not an isolated, stable “Oriental empire (words used by 
Peter Perdue),” but an evolving state structure engaged in mobilization for expansionist warfare. See Peter 
Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia, pp. 524-532.  
 
34 C.K. Woodworth, “Review Article: Ocean and Steppe: Early Modern Empires,” Journal of Early Modern 
History, vol. 11 no. 6 (2007), pp. 505-506. 
 
35 Palmira Brummett, Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1994), p. 7.  
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versa? What if we pay closer attention to the maritime consciousness and the naval 
awareness of the Qing court in the long eighteenth century, during its greatest years of 
expansion? Another purpose of this research, therefore, is to break through the “land power 
- sea power” dichotomy that has animated much of the discussion of high Qing maritime 
politics.  
 
Many scholars would resist thinking that the Qing was a sea power. “For the greater 
part of its long history,” as John K. Fairbank puts it, “Chinese naval power in the modern 
sense of the term remained abortive.”36 The American admiral Bernard D. Cole who 
commands the Destroyer Squadron 35 also remained determined that “China historically 
has been a continental rather than a maritime power, despite its more than eleven thousand 
miles of coastline and six thousand islands.”37 Even for contemporary China, a Chinese 
analyst explains in a similar fashion that “for a power like China, possession of strong sea 
power can only become a component part of China’s land power.”38 Such resistance to 
consider the Qing or China a sea power is in part formed by an ingrained conception 
conditioned by the binary logic that a particular country/empire can only be either a land-
power or a sea-power. To restore a more faithful picture of the geopolitics of the Great Qing, 
which has long been colored by the reductive and binary logic, which divided along the line 
between the land and the sea, this dissertation thus challenges the above resistance, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 John King Fairbank, China Perceived; Images and Policies in Chinese-American Relations (New York: 
Knopf, 1974). p. 25.  
 
37 Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy in the Twenty-First Century (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 2010), p. xvi.  
 
38 Ye Zicheng, “China’s Sea Power Must be Subordinate to its Land Power,” Xiandai guoji guanxi, vol. 20 
(April 2008), pp. 53-60. 
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describes and explains the maritime awareness of the Qing empire, and argues that there 
existed a close link between Qing policies for land and sea. Even while the Great Qing was 
often believed to be a continental power, it engaged considerably with the sea in terms of 
political vision, military deployment, and administrative practices. Based on a variety of 
imperial archives, I argue that in many respects the Qing court was a composite part of the 
maritime world before the advent of Euro-American battleships in the East Asian Sea. 
Although the Manchu bannermen were keen on conquering adversaries by means of horse, 
bow and arrow,39 the imperial court was practical and conscious of stabilizing the coastal 
region and keeping their inner sea space under tight supervision and effective control. What 
the Qing court wanted to achieve was to maintain a sustainable balance between naval 
management and westward inland expansion in governing its land and sea borders – which 
is similar to the People’s Republic of China’s “one road - one belt” (yidai yilu) policy, while 
the “road,” the Silk Road region, is referring to the development of the Northwestern 
frontier and the “belt,” the maritime Silk Road sector, to the Southeast Asian body of 
seawater. Even though its success varied over time, the Qing persistent efforts on maritime 
management showed that the Qing state, as an Asian empire in the eighteenth century, 
neither neglected nor ignored the maritime frontier between the time after Taiwan was 
annexed in 1684 and the outbreak of the First Opium War in 1839. This study is important 
because it not only examines high Qing maritime policy as an integral part of China’s land 
and coastal frontier management, but it also revises current approaches to the topic which 
have hitherto emphasized the Eurocentric definitions of Qing maritime policy and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Mark C. Elliott, The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China (Stanford, 
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 89-132; Franz Michael, Origin of Manchu Rule: Frontier and 
Bureaucracy as Interacting Forces in the Chinese Empire (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1942), 
p. 119.  
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binary approach in dealing with land and sea power. 
 
 
Sea Power 
 
 As one of the key concepts in this study, sea power merits more explanation here. 
Sea power, according to the Encyclopedia Britannica, means by which a nation extends its 
military power onto the seas. The classic exposition of the role of sea power as the basis of 
national power was the theory established by Alfred Thayer Mahan’s (1840-1914), which 
has been frequently examined and restated by admirals, politicians, and even national 
leaders such as Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925) in China, Theodore Roosevelt (1858-1919) in the 
United States of America, and Wilhelm II (1859-1941) in Germany.40 In his The History of 
Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, Mahan theorized naval strategy and the commercial 
expansion backed by sea power – “mercantilist imperialism,” in the words of maritime 
historians Margaret and Harold Sprout. Like Smith for political economy and Darwin for 
natural selection, Mahan strove to discover those “considerations and principles [which] 
belong to the unchangeable, or unchanging, order of things, remaining the same, in cause 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Influenced by Mahan’s sea power theory, Sun Yat-sen advocated prioritizing the establishment of the navy 
for national defense, as he wrote “the navy is the basis for strength and prosperity. As is often said by people 
in Britain and the US, whoever dominates the sea dominates world trade; whoever dominates world trade 
dominates the Golconda; whoever dominates the Golconda dominates the world…Boost the shipping industry 
to expand the navy, let our national navy keep pace with the big powers and get into the rank of first-class 
powers. The only way for China to become prosperous is to develop its military arms.” Sun Yat-sen, Guofu de 
guofang xueshu sixiang yanjiuji (Taipei: Zhongguo wenhua yanjiusuo, 1996), p. 321 [translation extracted 
from Andrew Erickson and Lyle Goldstein, China, the United States, and 21st-Century Sea Power: Defining a 
Maritime Security Partnership (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2010), p. 479]; Kaiser Wilhelm II also wrote 
in 1884, “I am just now devouring the book (The Influence of Sea Power upon History) and am trying to learn 
it by heart.”  
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and effect, from age to age.”41 His central thesis was elaborated chiefly in the first chapter 
of his book entitled “Discussion of the Elements of Sea Power,” which is well enough 
known to need only a brief summary here. Writing in both a descriptive and analytical way, 
Mahan sought to demonstrate that in wartime international struggles were often affected by 
command of the sea, and that in peacetime, sea commerce was of profound influence upon 
the strength and wealth of nations. It was sea power that fostered European imperialism in 
the eighteenth century, whereby strong monarchs exported the products and people of their 
kingdoms, in the numerous vessels of their national merchant marines, protected by their 
large navies, to overseas colonies that were designed to function as closed, monopolized 
markets. Sea power, in Mahan’s view, was pervasive wherever large warships could operate 
and mobilize. It meant that the feats of an empire no longer marked the outer limit of 
imaginable conquest.  
 
 Expanding Mahan’s theory to include imperial China is no easy task, for one 
immediately runs into an assumption that China was by no means a sea power. Scholars, 
both in China and the West, frequently argued that “Chinese strategists and leaders did not 
articulate a commitment to, or even a firm grasp of, sea power in the classical sense.”42 
Unlike the Atlantic seafaring empires, “China had not elevated sea strategy to the level of 
grand strategy.”43 Fundamentally different from a sea power, China “was not a seafaring 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Alfred Mahan, The History of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, p. 88.  
 
42 Gang Deng, Maritime Sector, Institutions, and Sea Power of Premodern China (Westport: Greenwood 
Publishing Group, 1999), p. xvi.  
 
43 Daniel M. Hartnett and Frederic Vellucci, “Toward a Maritime Security Strategy: An Analysis of Chinese 
Views since the Early 1900s,” in Phillip C. Saunders, Christopher Yung, Michael Swaine, and Andrew Nien-
dzu Yang ed., The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles? (Washington, D.C, National 
Defense University, 2014), pp. 8-10. 
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nation in the mold of the United States, Great Britain, Japan, Spain, and France.”44 Jeanette 
Greenfield even stated that “in the past, China did not need to consider the sea or sea power 
as it was irrelevant to the maintenance of a great land empire.”45 Nevertheless, the notion of 
sea power, principally derived from Mahan’s theoretical insight, is itself problematic. 
Historians and political scientists such as Paul Kennedy and J.R. Jones have shown that 
there is no single model of sea power: what control of the sea meant to Great Britain and 
Japan in the Second World War was totally different from what it meant to the Soviet 
Union, just as the influence of sea power upon the history of the Ukraine, in the sixteenth 
century, was far less than it was upon the history of Portugal.46 Theorists of strategy in the 
United States and England have also long been concerned with the limitation of the 
Manhanian insight. They have questioned the influence of sea power and challenged its 
significance in the modern and pre-modern era. In 1935, for instance, Tyler Dennett (1883-
1949), a distinguished expert on Far East politics and history, sharply criticized Mahan for 
overestimating the influence of sea power.47 Julius W. Pratt (1888-1983), in 1937, noted 
that there was nothing original in Mahan’s influence on sea power that “it was narrowly and 
unacceptably mono-causal, and that it was interpretatively superficial.”48 R.B. Wernham 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
44 Andrew S. Erickson, “Can China Become a Maritime Power?” in Toshi Yoshihara, James R. Holmes ed., 
Asia Looks Seaward: Power and Maritime Strategy (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2008), p. 70.  
 
45 Jeanette Greenfield, “China and the Law of the Sea,” in James Crawford, Donald R. Rothwell ed., The Law 
of the Sea in the Asian Pacific Region: Developments and Prospects (Norwell: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
1994), p. 21.  
 
46 Paul Kennedy, “The Influence and the Limitations of Sea Power,” The International History Review, vol. 10, 
No. 1 (Feb, 1988), pp. 2-17.  
 
47 Tyler Dennett, “Mahan’s ‘The Problem of Asia,’” Foreign Affairs, April (1935), pp. 464-472. 
 
48 Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1898: The Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins Press,. 1936), pp. 3-28. 
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and Garrett Mattingly (1900-1962) also called attention to the limitations of maritime force, 
not only because of the amateurish nature of navies at that time, but also because the 
struggle between the Habsburgs and their enemies for the mastery of Europe took place 
chiefly on land. Edward Ingram, representing the British navalist school studying in the 
Nelson era (1974-1977), roundly attacked those who “cling to the mythology of the 
Mahanian blue-water school.”49 Sir Hew Strachan even questioned the efficacy of the 
Mahan’s theory in conquests and battlefields in his famous article entitled “The British Way 
in Warfare Revisited.”50 Manhan’s theory received criticism and censure in twentieth 
century scholarship, but, as Philip Crowl has pointed out, Mahan as the premier theorist of 
sea power will “rise as well as decline, refreshed by the recollection that he asked his nation 
and his navy some very difficult and pertinent questions, questions still relevant, questions 
each generation must ask and answer anew.”51 In light of Crowl’s observation, I argue that 
it would make more sense to admit that the Mahanian sea power model has had its influence 
and limitations. It largely depends upon the historical and geographical context of the 
period and war in question.  
 
 The concept of sea power itself, furthermore, was not exclusively a western concept. 
An intriguing statement made by a seventeenth maritime writer, Zhang Xie (1574-1640), 
demonstrated that there were Chinese literati who employed the notion of “extending 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Edward Ingram, “Illusion of Victory: The Nile, Copenhagen, and Trafalgar Revisited,” Military Affairs, vol. 
xlvii (1984), pp. 140-143. See also his In Defense of British India: Great Britain in the Middle East, 1775-
1842 (London: Cass, 1984), chapter 5 and 7.  
 
50 Hew Strachan, “The British Way in Warfare Revisited,” Historical Journal, vol. 26 (1983), pp. 447-461. 
 
51 Philip Crowl, “Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian,” Peter Paret ed., Makers of Modern Strategy 
from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 476-477. 
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military control onto the sea.”52 Joseph Needham called our attention to the nature of sea 
power that “naval armed might meant something very different indeed in the Chinese and 
the Portuguese interpretations.”53 David Kang also rightly sounded a note of caution about 
the problem using Mahan theory derived exclusively from the European experience to 
analyze maritime history in Asia. The analytical model of sea power, as stated by Kang, 
should be applied to Asia with due respect to the differences in European and Asian 
historical experience of the sea as a substantial factor in maritime management.54 My use of 
the term sea power therefore rests on the premise that it is a complex and multivalent 
conception which refers to a variety of historical and regional experiences, ranging from 
imperialistic overseas expansions to the consolidation of political power across a body of 
strategic water such as a maritime frontier.55 Acquiring sea power or becoming a sea power 
does not necessarily mean having and using power over the sea. To quote David C. 
Gompert, sea power is “the ability to exert power over what occurs at sea – or power of the 
sea.”56 The historical and contemporary variations of sea power point to real processes 
which have to be studied on their own terms. To this end, I apply the conception of sea 
power in this study to refer to the Qing control of vast tracts of its domestic sea space 
through military force, as well as the ruling mechanism of its maritime frontier from an 
imperial center. More fundamentally, I use “sea power” to denote the set of maritime 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 See Zhang Xie, Dongxiyang kao (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985), “Zhou shi kao.” 
 
53 Joseph Needham, Mansel Davies (ed.), A Selection from the Writings of Joseph Needham (London: 
McFarland & Company, 1994) p. 175.  
 
54 David C. Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” International Security, 
vol. 27, no. 4 (Spring, 2003), pp. 58. 
 
55 I will provide a detailed examination on maritime frontier in the subsequent chapter.  
 
56 David C. Gompert, Sea Power and American Interests in the Western Pacific, p. 6.  
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practices and policies through which the Qing court fashioned and maintained. I argue that 
sea power also means the practice, conceptualization, and attitudes of a dominating center 
ruling a vast body of seawater. As a concept, moreover, sea power can serve as a platform 
that we can begin to find the common ground on which “European, Mahanian sea power,” 
and “Qing sea power” can be discussed. This is not to deny the historical specificity of late 
nineteenth century European imperialistic experience or of Qing experience in the 
eighteenth century. Nor is it a plea for a return to the general or Mahanian definition of sea 
power. Rather, it is an attempt to extend the ground on which historical, particular, and 
localized accounts of sea power can be delineated. It is at the same time an attempt to 
initiate a dialogue between the maritime experience in East Asia and the European sphere. 
Seeing the Qing experience within a broader framework of sea power studies rather than 
confining it within the perimeter of area studies, I believe, allows us to see China in the 
context of global historical processes rather than as a unique and timeless power unto itself. 
57 
 
The East Asian Mediterranean? 
 
 Although the primary focus of this study is the Qing conceptualization of the ocean 
and its maritime policies in the eighteenth century, in writing this introduction I also hope to 
draw my readers’ attention to the prevailing academic trend of modelling the East Asian 
Sea as the East Asian Mediterranean. The presumption of naming the body of seawater in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 In this I follow the discussion of Qing colonialism introduced by Peter Perdue. He emphasized the 
importance to position Chinese experience of colonialism within a broader and global context. See Peter 
Perdue, “Boundaries, Maps, and Movement: Chinese, Russian, and Mongol Empires in Early Central 
Eurasia,” The International History Review, vol. 20, no. 2 (1998), pp. 263-286.  
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East Asia as the East Asian Mediterranean is inspired by the magisterial research conducted 
by Fernand Braudel (1902-1985), the godfather of maritime studies. In his La Méditerranée 
et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II (The Mediterranean and the 
Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II), Braudel defined and depicted the 
Mediterranean in its broadest geographical context, inclusive of the great civilizations of 
Iraq and Egypt, the steppes of Russia, the forests of Germany, and the deserts of the Sahara. 
He saw the Mediterranean as a body of water that facilitated rather than prevented trade and 
contacts between its surrounding nations. As a key geographical space, the Mediterranean 
hub was, Braudel suggested, a “circulation space of trade,” a “contact zone of cultures,” and 
a maritime landscape which many political, economic and cultural interactions took place. 
He further made the essential point that “the Mediterranean has no unity but that created by 
the movements of men, the relationships they imply, and the routes they follow.” 58   
 
 This analysis, widely known as the “Braudelian Mediterranean structure” has 
inspired many subsequent maritime studies, in which the classic model itself is readily 
employed. W. Blockmans, Lex Heerma van Voss, Ralph Kauz, and Paul Gilroy, for 
instance, have written a cultural history of the areas around the North Sea and the Baltic Sea 
using the classic Braudelian model.59 Likewise, in the maritime research project led by 
Angela Schottenhammer in Munich, 60  the East Asian Sea is examined within the 
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1972), pp. 17-24. 
 
59 W. Blockmans and Lex Heerma van Voss, “Urban Networks and Emerging States in the North Sea and 
Baltic Areas: A Maritime Culture?” in Juliette Roding and Lex Heerma van Voss (eds.), The North Sea and 
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terminological framework of the Mediterranean – the “East Asian Mediterranean” – with 
the assumption that it is, or ought to be, in many ways comparable to the Mediterranean 
world, particularly in the aspects of economic and cultural exchange.61 In a similar vein, 
Christine Moll-Murata also argues that the “East China Sea” is analogous to the 
Mediterranean because the two oceans are both “specific economic, political and cultural 
contact zones.” She further validated the model by asking, “why should China, the Middle 
Kingdom of the Chinese (zhonghua), not possess a dizhonghai (the Mediterranean in 
Chinese) that lies in the middle of the earth?”62 Lyman van Slyke even ruminated over the 
Yangtze region in Braudelian terms. He further developed a view of Northwest China 
between the Gobi desert in the North and the Himalayas in the West as an economic and 
cultural contact zone with similarities to the Mediterranean. In Roy Bin Wong’s description, 
van Slyke replaced “camel caravans with ships on Mediterranean waters.”63 Indeed, Braudel 
also believed in the possibility of fitting all oceans, including the Baltic, the Atlantic, the 
North Sea, the Indian Ocean, as well as the China Seas into the Mediterranean framework 
as regional maritime spaces.64 
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61 Angela Schottenhammer, “The Sea as Barrier and Contact Zone: Maritime Space and Sea Routes in 
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 Braudel’s model, written in the late 1940s, is so hegemonic that it has become the 
academic custom to define, examine, and re-evaluate every single piece of seawater in the 
world in relation to it. It goes without saying that the conceptions of maritime spaces like 
the East Asian Sea need to be aware of the perspective. However, as Craig A. Lockard 
suggested, not all historians find the “Mediterranean analogy” a compelling one, especially 
because the empirical data shows that the geographical, cultural, and historical settings of 
Asia are not exactly the same as the Mediterranean.65 Contrary to Braudel’s observation, 
John H. Pryor, for instance, argued that the Mediterranean was neither a barrier nor a 
highway but a complicated, seasonally varying, combination of both.66 In an edited volume 
Testing the Limits of Braudel’s Mediterranean, contributors like Ottavia Niccoli, Henry 
Kamen, and Jack A. Goldstone also point out that the Braudelian model is in many respects 
flawed or at least open to criticism.67 Kirti Narayan Chaudhuri and John E. Wills, in turn, 
asked with resonance, “does the history of the civilizations around and beyond the ocean 
exhibit any intrinsic and perceptible unity, expressed in terms of space, time or structure, 
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66 See John H. Pryor, Geography, Technology, and War: Studies in the Maritime History of the Mediterranean, 
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which allows us to construct a Braudelian framework?”68 In my opinion, the Braudelian 
model is not effective enough to be widely adopted in a global historical context because 
the differences between the aforementioned maritime spaces are vast and significant. First 
of all, regarding the difference of scale, one may realize that the Baltic covers 
approximately 414,000 km2, the North Sea 520,000 km2, and the Mediterranean 2, 516,000 
km2. The East Asian Sea, in the largest definition, going down to the coast of Indonesia, 
covers no less than 12,378,796 km2, which is nearly five times larger than the 
Mediterranean. In addition to its smaller size, the Mediterranean is more manageable and 
topographically enclosed than the East Asian Sea. Cultural and economic ties across the 
Mediterranean are weaker than those across some oceans that were larger in size and more 
open-ended. Oceanic passages of the East Asian Sea, from east to south, from Tianjin to 
Makassar, and from Singapore to the Birds Head coast of New Guinea, connect people from 
very distant places; by definition passages across the Mediterranean, as highlighted by 
Michael Person, do not.69 The East Asian Sea is not only larger in size, it also has a 
fundamentally different history. The Mediterranean was always been dominated by peoples 
along its littoral; the North Atlantic was the creation of people from one of its coasts, the 
Pacific arguably was constructed by the Europeans; but a significant portion of the East 
Asian Sea was firmly linked to a major empire, China, and was bordered by the Korean 
peninsula and the islands of Japan. In a sense, applying a Braudelian framework to 
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construct Asian maritime history might be considered narrowly Eurocentric.  
 
 Heather Sutherland, Maurice Aymard, Roy Bin Wong, O.W. Wolters, and Rene 
Barendse, to name but a few scholars, have reconfirmed the need for a more sensitive 
understanding of the asymmetrical maritime settings in Asia. All of them advocate 
approaching Asian maritime history with fewer Braudelian (European) elements. To 
Heather Sutherland the Braudelian model was not suitable enough for us to refer to the East 
Asian Sea as the “East Asian Mediterranean.”70 She maintained that even though “Braudel’s 
prose and intellectual ambition are justly seen as inspiring, conceptual confusion and 
analytic evasion limit his contribution.”71 Likewise, Roy Bin Wong disagreed with the idea 
of a Chinese Mediterranean in the South China Sea, proposing that the seas off China’s 
shores were much more open culturally and economically than the Mediterranean Sea.72 
Maurice Aymard found the only possible way to read Braudel is to receive inspiration for 
exploring unknown fields, not to try to imitate or repeat him. In exploring the sea’s 
influence on shaping history in Southeast Asia, O.W. Wolters rejected viewing the 
Mediterranean “as a fitting analogy for the region’s sea.”73 Rene Barendse also reminded us 
to avoid negatively contrasting the Asian oceans with European sea space.74 In agreement 
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with the above scholars, I would argue that the stereotype, which is based on the Braudelian 
framework, to investigate Asian maritime histories make the European experience of the 
ocean into the normative standard against which others are measured. It also by and large 
assumes that external factors with relations to the Europeans play a more dominant and 
decisive role than internal historical experience in shaping East Asian understandings of the 
maritime world. Therefore, if an uncritical adoption of the Braudelian model must be 
problematized, then why shouldn’t we examine the various ways in which Asian peoples 
have conceptualized their “own” oceans and have modeled the maritime world? 
  
Sources 
 
This thesis closely considers the central government’s role after Kangxi’s 
annexation of Taiwan in 1684.75 Because the central state was the prime protagonist in 
shaping and maintaining the stability across specific sea spaces, such a topic must take into 
consideration factors beyond the local and provincial levels. This study, therefore, draws 
extensively on governmental documents, including the palace memorials (zouzhe), imperial 
edicts (shangyu), routine memorials (tiben), official books (dangce), and the 
correspondence between the central authority, the grand council, and the provincial and 
local officials. Many of these materials are familiar to historians, but the entries which are 
of the greatest importance to the present study, those relating to maritime affairs, have not 
been fully examined. In addition to these materials, this study also employs a private corpus 
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Ming Dynasty. We will discuss in detail “the importance of 1683” in due course.  
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of poems, diaries, letters, and chronologies (nianpu), authored by ruling elites who settled in 
coastal provinces. These materials, like those government documents pertaining to maritime 
affairs, have not been explored in great depth prior to this research. Other lesser known 
governmental archives used in this study include reports, minutes, surveys, and statistical 
data compiled by Governor-generals (tidu), such as the Governor generals of the nine gates 
(jiumen tidu), the Navy commanders (haijun tidu), and the Generals of frontiers (zhufang 
dachen ) in coastal prefectures. These records contain valuable sections relating to transport, 
hydrology, fishery, piracy, and natural maritime resources. In my attempt to paint an 
accurate and balanced picture, I have also consulted local gazetteers, private anthologies, 
and some imperial accounts written in Manchu (e.g. the Manwen zhupi zouzhe [Palace 
memorials written in Manchu]). I have also relied upon Western language primary accounts 
stored in Germany, England, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. 
 
Structure of the Dissertation 
 
I organize this dissertation into five chapters framed by an introduction, a conclusion, 
and a bibliography. Chapter 1 Setting the Scene. Starting with Owen Lattimore’s frontier 
theory, I define the maritime frontier as a multi-layered, transcultural region that can be 
understood in both physical and cultural terms. Rather than a static boundary, a maritime 
frontier is a dynamic canvas of interaction, whose conceptualization shapes imaginaries, 
policies, and patterns of behavior. By reconstructing Qing views of the maritime blue 
frontier, I suggest that we can obtain a deeper understanding of their governments’ 
changing aims and motivations in dealing with the maritime world. One aspect shaping 
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conceptualizations of this frontier are the physical features of the East Asian seascape. In 
reviewing these features, I highlight the multiple ways in which geography, ecology, 
climate, winds, and tides contributed not only to shaping trading and travel patterns but also 
gave rise to an awareness of the East Asian Sea.  
 
Chapter 2 Modeling the Sea Space. The formation of a maritime space, according to 
Philp E. Steinberg, entails a complex process of social construction based on three 
interacting mechanisms: external utilization, internal perception, and regulatory 
representation. Hence any in-depth analysis of the sea space requires not only an 
examination of its natural geography, or as Michael Pearson calls it “deep structure,” but 
also a history of how it was used and conceptualized. Therefore I turn to analyze in this 
chapter the nuanced conceptualizations of the maritime world by the high Qing emperors 
and their advisors. I show that in the high Qing a distinction between an “inner” (nei) and 
an “outer” (wai) sea space emerged that framed many of the policies adopted throughout the 
three emperors’ (Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong) reigns. In this model the “inner” sea 
was conceived as an integral part of the Qing empire whose governance and control 
demanded undivided attention, while the outer ocean was seen as a territory beyond 
administrative governance and economic extraction. This hierarchical distinction mirrored 
the classification of tribute states into inner and outer polities: the former dependent on 
Qing military protection, whereas the latter were not directly subordinated to Qing rule. 
This inner-outer model could significantly corroborate my argument that there existed a 
close link between Qing policies for land and sea.  
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Chapter 3 The Dragon Navy and Chapter 4 The Sea Passes are designed to illustrate 
how conceptualizations of an inner and outer sea space shaped concrete, actual policies. 
Chapter 3 is devoted to a reconstruction of high Qing coastal defense. Based on a series of 
historical archives written in Chinese, Manchu, Korean, and Japanese, I review the 
measures to strengthen and maintain the military defenses of the seven coastal provinces 
bounded by five interconnected strategic sea zones, namely the Guangdong sea zone, the 
Taiwan Strait, the Zhejiang sea zone, the Jiangsu sea zone, and the Bohai area. I paint a 
complex picture of the strategic problems the high Qing emperors faced along their 
extensive coastlines and of the policies they adopted to resolve them. Many pre-modern 
states maintained a rather modest standing army and instead recruited and trained soldiers 
and sailors as military campaigns demanded. The Qing also has the reputation of having 
kept a rather thin layer of bureaucracy and a limited military in relation to its population 
size. This chapter shows recurrent attempts at rebuilding bases and ships of certain kinds 
and sizes. In the high Qing era there was no emergence of something like a central British 
Admiralty and main state navy dockyard investing in innovation and working 
systematically to improve technology. The overarching fear of the Qing court seems to have 
been more with assembling a domestic military force that could threaten the throne than an 
awareness of external changes in maritime warfare and a new balance of power on the high 
seas.  
 
Organized in a chronological way, Chapter 4 The Sea Passes, offers an analysis of 
the maritime customs office, a neglected branch of the high Qing administration, that 
underlines its significance for the Qing imperial enterprise. Well aware of the intimate 
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connection between military defense and economic growth, the high Qing government 
spent considerable energy to establish an efficient customs regime along their entire coast. 
Periodic shifts between more open and more restricted maritime trade policies reflected 
changing strategic exigencies in a framework of guarded management rather than hint at 
ignorance or irrational swings in attitudes toward the maritime world. Enriched by a wealth 
of statistical and geographical data and fruitful comparisons, I detail and examine in this 
chapter the institutional development and investment of the Qing state into this customs 
organization, such as its personnel recruitment and management strategies.  
 
Chapter 5 Writing the Waves returns from the realm of policy to a more conceptual 
level. To bolster my case for the significance of the maritime world to the Qing imagination, 
I excavate three non-official texts composed by Chen Lunjiong (?-1751), Wang Dahai, and 
Xie Qinggao (1765-1821), which dedicated to the maritime world and China’s place within 
it. In responding to Chinese geographical traditions and contemporary intellectual trends, 
such as the turn toward “evidential scholarship (kaozhengxue),” this chapter offers an 
overview of scholarly treatments of the sea and the countries with which it connected the 
Qing empire. Although the surviving non-official materials dedicated to the maritime world 
is smaller than the official record, it is no less significant. In fact, a more complete 
understanding of the meaning that the maritime world had for the Qing can be gained by 
examining these maritime writings in conjunction with a series of imperial official 
documents.  
 
The conclusion recapitulates the study’s main arguments and findings and relates 
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them to maritime histories and global studies. It shows that Qing’s maritime management in 
the eighteenth century can be understood in terms of the empire’s multifaceted strategies 
towards the maritime world. The sustainability of the empire and the growth of international 
as well as domestic sea trade propelled the Qing court to initiate a series of moderate, 
decisive, pragmatic, and highly interventionist policies in managing a variety of maritime 
issues (haiyang zhi shi). It is in this sense that the Qing court in the eighteenth century 
played a positive and proactive role in the East Asian sea space. Furthermore, this research 
highlights the fact that high Qing maritime policies changed over time from the Kangxi to 
the Qianlong reign. The high Qing, which is traditionally regarded as a hallmark of 
impressive and prosperous development (shengshi), was in fact burdened by short-term 
crises and long term intractable problems. Even though Max Weber (1864-1920) saw Asian 
history as stagnant and as lacking the spark that produced dynamic, self-motivated 
change,76 this dissertation suggests that high Qing maritime management had been driven 
by a series of remarkable crises that constitute a transformative aspect of its seemingly 
stagnant tradition. Those crises such as the shortage of rice production, piratical violence, 
and the problems with foreign traders, provided a set of key catalyst for the Qing court to 
alter, modify, and refine their maritime policies within different temporal and spatial 
contexts.  
 
Maritime History and the Great Qing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Max Weber, Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen: Konfuzianismus und Taoismus (Tübingen: Mohr, 
1922). Weber's theses are quoted by many Western sociologists and political scientists writing on China. For 
instance, Richard Solomon, Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1971); Marion Levy et al., The Rise of the Modern Chinese Business Class (New York: 
Institute of Pacific Relations, 1979); and Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: 
M.I.T. Press, 1968).  
   
 
	  
38	  
 
Before ending this introduction, a few paragraphs highlighting the way how 
maritime history (might) shape the history of East Asia in general and the Qing Empire in 
particular is in order. Water covers 360 million square kilometers of the earth and 
constitutes seventy-one percent of its surface area, it was the only spatial medium that 
connected dislocated landmasses before the development of air transportation. As suggested 
by Jerry H. Bentley,  
 
most of the interactions between cultures were transmitted 
from shore to shore……an increasing density and scale of 
interregional interaction had led to the forging of a single 
world system, and oceans, namely the Baltic, the Atlantic, 
the Indian and the East Asian, were major sites in which 
that processes played out.77  
 
Echoing what Bentley identifies as a frequent neglect of maritime history, the sociologist 
Philip E. Steinberg has pointed out that the East Asian sea spaces, which embrace China, 
Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam served as highways of trade, routes of migration, 
lifelines of empires, and venues of opportunity for pirates and smugglers.78 However, 
historians have only recently begun to chart the history of maritime regions around Asia.79 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Jerry H. Bentley, “Sea and Ocean Basins as Frameworks of Historical Analysis,” Geographical Review, vol. 
89 (1999), pp. 215-224.  
 
78 Philip E. Steinberg, The Social Construction of the Ocean (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
pp. 11, 32; Wang Gungwu and Ng Chin-keong (eds.), Maritime China in Transition 1750-1850; Jerry H. 
Bentley, Renate Bridenthal, and Kären Wigen (eds.), Seascapes: Maritime Histories, Littoral Cultures, and 
Transoceanic Exchanges (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2007), pp. 1-17; J.L. Anderson, “Piracy and 
World History: An Economic Perspective on Maritime Predation,” Journal of World History, vol. 6 (1995), pp. 
175-199.  
 
79 The sea, as Gesa Mackenthun and Bernhard Klein have suggested, tends to have no history: “Like the desert, 
the ocean has often been read as an empty space, a cultural and historical void, constantly traversed, 
circumnavigated and fought over, but rarely inscribed other than symbolically by the self-proclaimed agents of 
civilization.” Extracted from the “Call for Papers for the conference ‘Sea Changes: Historicizing the Ocean, 
c.1500- c.1900’ (University of Greifswald, Germany, July 20-24, 2000).” 
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As Himanshu Prabha Ray and Jean-Francois Salles concluded in general terms from their 
research on the Indian Ocean,  
 
[h]istorians have too often neglected the role of sea in 
world history, in which will produced skewed, incomplete 
histories of human kind.80  
 
One of the reasons why maritime studies were overlooked for a long time is, as Ian 
K. Steele suggested, that history has “tended to become overwhelmingly about lands.”81 
The material, cultural, and intellectual constructs that inform and explain historical 
experiences of maritime Asia, especially during the seventeenth and the eighteenth 
centuries, have only begun to receive attention in the past two decades. While sinologists 
interested in the spatial and political history of regimes have focused largely on questions 
related to international territorial borders and frontiers and the making of state power in 
provinces, historians have tended to focus either upon highly commercialized or urbanized 
regions that were centers of intellectual, artistic, and commercial exchange or, less often, 
places at the peripheries of the empires’ terra firma. In contrast, historians have not 
explored in detail the processes by which the sea space became an integrated territory that 
could be apprehended and ruled, nor have they analyzed what the sea space can reveal 
about politics and policy. It was not true that the Asian Sea before the middle of the 
nineteenth century was an “empty maritime zone” disconnected from the ruling mechanism 
of the Asian empires. In the introduction to The Geography of Border Landscapes, David 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
80 Himanshu Prabha Ray and Jean-Francois Salles (eds.), Tradition and Archeology: Early Maritime Contacts 
in the Indian Ocean (New Delhi: Manohar, 1996), pp.1-2. 
 
81 Ian K. Steele, The English Atlantic, 1675-1740: An Exploration of Communications and Community (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. vi. 
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Knight states that  
 
the cultural landscape – the physical landscape as modified 
by international and unintentional human action – has long 
been the focus of study by geographers…..[yet] one old 
theme that still demands exploration is the impact on 
landscape of political decision making and actions which 
may reflect ideological commitments.82  
 
Knight’s idea applies also to the study of the maritime landscape during the high Qing 
period. As mentioned earlier, the Qing maritime strategies should demand historians’ 
attention as much as those carried out on land. It is thus important to enrich the 
understanding of late imperial China’s political history by articulating a maritime 
perspective, aimed at complementing the land-based focus, and, as Kären Wigen has aptly 
underscored, “[moving] the seas from the margins to the center of interdisciplinary 
academic inquiry, as a new construct and meta-narrative.”83 
 
 This study, in sum, aims at leveraging historical documentation and contextual 
information so as to illustrate the ways and strategies high Qing leaders conceptualized and 
governed the maritime territory. Contrary to an overriding conception of withdrawal from 
the ocean, the Qing court in the eighteenth century, which it is usually seen as a continental 
empire, did not regard the sea as the third frontier or a space of indifference. Even if there 
were differential relations between the natures of land power and sea power, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
82 David Knight, “Introduction,” in Rumley and Mingli (eds.), The Geography of Border Landscapes (London: 
Routledge, 1991), p. xvii. 
 
83 Kären Wigen, “Introduction,” in Jerry H. Bentley, Renate Bridenthal, and Kären Wigen (eds.), Seascapes: 
Maritime Histories, Littoral Cultures, and Transoceanic Exchanges (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
2007), p. 17.  
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associations between them were not unidirectional. The Qing Empire did not see the land-
sea relationship in such a dichotomy –  the expansion of land territory predicated on their 
negligence of the sea, or vice versa. Instead, the Qing in the eighteenth century intended to 
balance its control between naval management and Westward expansion while maintaining 
its power over specific geographic settings, either on the land or in the sea. As a result, the 
connection between continental governance and maritime control was never as clear-cut as 
has been commonly assumed.  
 
A question of the term: East Asian Sea 
 
In the course of my dissertation, I employ the term “(East) Asian Sea” rather than 
more traditionally used the “China Sea,” the “Japan Sea,” or the “Sea of Korea.” I do so 
because these latter terms “nationalize” East Asian seas, placing China and Japan at the 
center of their periphery. Indeed there have been similar discussions among historians about 
whether the Indian Ocean region had ever had any real coherence and unity, and what this 
extensive sea space should properly be called.84 Many maritime historians have suggested 
that the term “Indian Ocean” is a somewhat misleading designation, doing scant justice to 
the interlocking regional maritime systems that have stretched from East Africa to the 
Indonesian archipelago during early modern times.85 In view of these discussions, it is 
appropriate to use the wider geographic term East Asian Sea so as to avoid assuming the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 For a brief discussion which sets the scene very effectively, see K.N. Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilisation in 
the Indian Ocean: An Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985), pp. 1-33.  
 
85 See Michael Pearson, The Indian Ocean (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 13-26.  
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Chinese centrality as implied in the term “China Sea,” the Japanese dominance as in the 
“Japan Sea,” or privileging the position of India in the “Indian Ocean.” The maritime 
historian Michael Pearson introduced the term “Afrasian Sea,” as a way of including the 
often ignored area of the East African coast: Chandra de Silva questioned the suitability of 
using this “invented term” to signify the body of seawater across Asia. Silva argued the 
term “Afrasian” is unnecessarily divisive, and it fails to imply the dominance of any one 
area around the shore.86 Hence, I have decided to restrain myself and try not to use various 
terms (unless in some specific situations) but to apply the term East Asian Sea throughout 
this study. After all, my aim has been to alert the reader to the assumptions, arguably invalid, 
in the use of some of the specific terms to label particular seawaters across the globe.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 See Chandra Richard de Silva, “Indian Ocean but not African Sea,” Journal of Black Studies, XXIX no. 5 
(May 1999), pp. 684-694.  
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Chapter One 
Setting the Scene 
  
Abstract 
Starting with Owen Lattimore’s frontier theory, in this chapter I define the maritime frontier 
as a multi-layered, transcultural region that can be understood in both physical and cultural 
terms. Rather than a static boundary, a maritime frontier is a dynamic canvas of interaction, 
whose conceptualization shapes imaginaries, policies, and patterns of behavior. By 
reconstructing Qing views of the maritime blue frontier, I suggest that we can obtain a 
deeper understanding of their governments’ changing aims and motivations in dealing with 
the maritime world. One aspect shaping conceptualizations of this frontier are the physical 
features of the East Asian seascape. In reviewing these features, I highlight the multiple 
ways in which geography, ecology, climate, winds, and tides contributed not only to 
shaping trading and travel patterns but also gave rise to an awareness of the East Asian Sea. 
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Introduction 
 
Owen Lattimore (1900-1989), the renowned expert on Eurasia, once noted that a 
frontier is not the same as a boundary. In his remarkable monograph Inner Asian Frontiers 
of China, he explained that a boundary represents the intended limit of political power, “the 
farthest extent to which a state or empire is able to exert its will on geographical space,” 
whereas a frontier is a zone of active interaction that “exists on both sides of the 
boundaries.”87 Within the frontier region, one might identify distinct communities of 
“boundary-crossers,” which transgress the physical borders between polities and 
environments as well as the sociological borders between ethnicities, religions, and 
languages.88 It is also a zone of contention across which competing ideas of civilization 
come into contact and conflict. Richard White has added to this idea the notion that the 
“zone of frontier is a middle ground where people following radically different ways of life 
adapted to one another and to the environment.”89 Building upon this research, I argue that a 
frontier is in essence a multi-layered trans-cultural region that can be understood in both 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China (New York: American Geographical Society, 1951), 
chapter 8. This definition developed by Lattimore in the 1950s is still largely accepted in contemporary 
scholarship. Scholars like Peter C. Perdue, William T. Rowe, Hugh R. Clark, and Craig A. Lockard still make 
use of Lattimore’s observations to explicate their own argument about the nature and significance of “a 
frontier zone.” See Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005), 41–44; William T. Rowe, “Owen Lattimore, Asia, and Comparative 
History,” The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 66, No. 3 (Aug., 2007): 759–786; Hugh R. Clark, “Frontier 
Discourse and China’s Maritime Frontier: China's Frontiers and the Encounter with the Sea through Early 
Imperial History,” Journal of World History, vol. 20 no. 1 (March 2009): 1–33; Craig A. Lockard, “The Sea 
Common to All": Maritime Frontiers, Port Cities, and Chinese Traders in the Southeast Asian Age of 
Commerce, ca. 1400–1750,” Journal of World History, vol. 21, no. 2 (June 2010): 219–247. 
 
88 See Richard Wright, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 
1650–1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
 
89 Richard Wright, The Middle Ground, ix–xvi. 
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physical and cultural terms.90 Physically, the frontier refers to the geographical setting of a 
landscape or seascape that is shaped by a number of cosmological and ecological factors. 
Culturally, a frontier is the product of the different ways in which certain groups of people 
conceptualize and model a space. Peoples with varied politico-social backgrounds (such as 
emperors, government officials, traders, seamen, educated elites, or pirates in a specific 
time-space) may understand the nature and significance of a particular frontier differently. 
Some may conceptualize it as a canvas of interaction, a cosmopolitan gateway for the 
import and export of people, goods, and ideas or as a barrier that divides the earth among 
civilizations. Different conceptualizations of frontiers will (in)directly affect diplomatic 
strategies, political dynamism, trading patterns, and the consciousness and identity of 
nations. Furthermore, because a frontier is by nature a contact zone, it also links with 
questions that center on the antagonistic relationship, or interaction, between two binary 
opposing forces. This usually takes the shape of a more civilized, and economically superior 
power subordinating what it conceives of as “barbaric” and inferior natives (consider 
Captain Cook and Hawai’i or Commodore Perry and Japan, to name two examples).  
 
Since they allow the interactions and movements of people who carry goods, 
technologies, fashions, and ideas, oceans, as suggested by Fernand Braudel (1902-1985), 
can certainly form a frontier that provides the dynamics for sociopolitical and cultural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 In his study of the history of Bangladesh, Williem van Schendel suggests that Bangladesh is a region of 
“multiple frontiers” including a “land-water frontier,” “the ancient cultural ‘Sanskritic’ frontier,” the agrarian, 
state, Islamic and Bengali language frontiers. See Williem van Schendel, A History of Bangladesh (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), xxv–xxvi. To a certain extent, my attempt to argue that a frontier is a 
multi-layered region is very similar to Schendel’s conception. 
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development across different spatial levels.91 However, as Hugh R. Clark has pointed out, 
maritime frontiers stand apart from all other frontiers in imperial times.92 One of the 
differences between watery and land frontiers hinged on the difference in the transportation 
costs they incurred. Travel by sea in the pre-modern period was usually “cheaper in human 
terms.”93 As Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell have observed,  
 
…incidental hazards of negotiation, protection money, 
willful obstruction, and downright violence at sea were much 
rarer than in the carrying of goods across region and region, 
through settlement after settlement, by land.94  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 In his compelling La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II (The Mediterranean 
and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II), Braudel analyzes the Mediterranean as a body of water 
that facilitates rather than constrains trade and contacts between its surrounding geographies. As a key frontier, 
the Mediterranean hub is, Braudel suggests, a “circulation–space of trades,” a “contact zone of cultures,” and a 
virtual canvas upon which many political, economic and cultural interactions unfold. See Fernand Braduel, 
The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (London: Collins, 1972), pp. 17-24. 
This idea, widely known as the “(Braudelian) Mediterranean model,” has inspired many subsequent maritime 
studies. For instance, scholars like W. Blockmans, Lex Heerma van Voss, Ralph Kauz, and Paul Gilroy have 
written a cultural history of the areas around the North Sea and the Baltic Sea using the classic Braudelian 
model. See W. Blockmans and Lex Heerma van Voss, “Urban Networks and Emerging States in the North 
Sea and Baltic Areas: A Maritime Culture?,” in Juliette Roding and Lex Heerma van Voss (eds.), The North 
Sea and Culture (1550-1800) (Hilversum: Verloren, 1996), pp. 10-20. Likewise, in the maritime research 
project led by Angela Schottenhammer in Munich, the East Asian Sea is examined within the terminological 
framework of the Mediterranean – the “East Asian Mediterranean” – with the assumption that it is, or ought to 
be, in many ways comparable to the Mediterranean world, particularly in the aspects of economic and cultural 
exchange. See Angela Schottenhammer, “The Sea as Barrier and Contact Zone: Maritime Space and Sea 
Routes in Traditional Chinese Books and Maps,” in Angela Schottenhammer and Roderich Ptak (eds.), The 
Perception of Maritime Space in Traditional Chinese Sources (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz Verlag, 2006), 
p. 4. In a similar vein, Christine Moll-Murata also argues that the “East China Sea” is analogous to the 
Mediterranean because the two oceans are both “specific economic, political and cultural contact zones.” She 
further validates the model by asking, “why the Middle Kingdom not possess a dizhonghai 地中海 (the 
Mediterranean in Chinese) that lies in the middle of the earth?” Christine Moll-Murata, “Sundry Notes on the 
Zhoushan Archipelago: Topographical Notation and Comparison to Braudelian Islands,” in Angela 
Schottenhammer and Roderich Ptak (eds.), The Perception of Maritime Space in Traditional Chinese Sources, 
p. 123. 
 
92 Hugh R. Clark, “Frontier Discourse and China’s Maritime Frontier: China’s Frontiers and the Encounter 
with the Sea through Early Imperial History,” Journal of World History, vol. 20, no. 1 (March 2009), pp. 1–33. 
 
93 Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giraldez, “General Editors’ Preface,” in The Pacific World: Land, Peoples and 
History of the Pacific, 1500-1900, volume VI: Science, Empire and the European Exploration of the Pacific, 
ed. Tony Ballantyne (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2004), p. xiii. Alfred Mahan also pointed out, 
“travel and traffic by water have always been easier and cheaper than by land.” See Alfred Mahan, Influence 
of Sea Power upon History, p. 88.  
 
94 Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History, vol. I 
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Sea travel was also cheaper because of its low energy and technological requirements. Even 
before the age of the steamship (circa 1840s), sea traffic was far more cost effective than 
overland trade. H. Neville Chittick has calculated that one needed more or less the same 
energy to move 250 kg on wheels, 2,500 kg on rails, and 25,000 kg on water.95 Moreover, it 
has been estimated that one dhow could travel the same distance as a camel caravan in one-
third of the time, and that each boat could carry the equivalent of 1,000 camel loads. 
Furthermore, only one dhow crew-member was needed for several cargo tons, as compared 
with two or more men for each ton in a camel caravan.96  
 
Since seaborne travel was by and large more cost-effective before the age of air 
transportation,97 cross-border sea trade experienced a stupendous growth in both scale and 
complexity from the fifteenth century on.98 The Western Europeans began to expand 
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95 H. Neville Chittick, “East Africa and the Orient: Ports and Trade before the Arrival of the Portuguese,” in 
Historical Relations across the Indian Ocean, ed. C. Mehaud (Paris: UNESCO, 1980), p. 13. 
 
96 Ralph Austen, African Economic History: Internal Development and External Dependency (London: James 
Currey Press, 1987), 58. However, it may also be the case that, at least on some routes, land travel was faster 
than by the sea. For example, when an empire like the Ottoman or Tang China, set up secure and highly 
accessible road networks, people chose to travel by land even though they would have traveled via the ocean. 
 
97 Daniel R. Headrick, Power over Peoples: Technology, Environments, and Western Imperialism, 1400 to the 
Present (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), pp. 302–328. 
 
98 See for example, Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450–1680 (New Heaven, Conn.: 
Yale University Press, second edition published in 1993); “An ‘Age of Commerce’ in Southeast Asian 
History,” Modern Asian Studies, vol. 24 no. 1 (1990): 1–30; John E. Wills, Jr., “Contingent Connections: 
Fujian, the Empire, and the Early Modern World,” in Qing Formations in World Historical Time, ed. Lynn A. 
Struve (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), 167–203; Yokkaichi Yasuhiro, “Chinese and 
Muslim: Diasporas and the Indian Ocean Trade Network under Mongol Hegemony,” in The East Asian 
Mediterranean: Maritime Crossroads of Culture, Commerce and Human Migration, ed. Angela 
Schottenhammer (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz Verlag, 2008), 91–93; Geoff Wade, “Engaging the South: 
Ming China and Southeast Asia in the Fifteenth Century,” Journal of Economic and Social History of the 
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previously known boundaries and to extend their reaches into the so-called New World, 
where societies were particularly vulnerable to the guns, germs, and steel of invading 
Europeans. During the period between the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries,99 
Western sea traders even expanded their established shipping routes across the Atlantic to 
America and Africa, and across the Indian Ocean to India, Southeast Asia, and the Far East. 
A large volume of consumer commodities, including sugar (from the West Indies), coffee 
(from South America), tea (from China), tobacco (from Chesapeake), fish (from 
Newfoundland), and spices (from the East Indies) flowed to Europe from different corners 
of the world.100 By the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the extent of commerce and cultural 
interactions across the ocean was truly global. As Michael Geyer and Charles Bright have 
demonstrated, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries represented a decisive turning point 
in the history of globalization, not only for the evolution of the world system in general but 
for the role of oceans in particular.101 
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Orient, vol. 49, no. 4 (2006): 454–481. Moreover, it should be noted that some scholars also see the period 
from 1400–1800 as an era of “proto-globalization” in the broadest sense; in other words, as a world with more 
international connections than the earlier period. See, for instance, Geoffrey Gunn, First Globalization: The 
Eurasian Exchange, 1500-1800 (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003); C. A. Bayly, The Birth of the 
Modern World (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2004); and Dennis Flynn and Arturo Firaldez, “Born with a Silver 
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99 Timothy Brook termed these centuries as the age of improvisation, when “the age of discovery [was] largely 
over, and the age of imperialism [was] yet to come.” See Timothy Brook, Vermeer’s Hat: The Seventeenth 
Century and the Dawn of the Global World (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2008), p. 21. 
 
100 Prior to 1830, however, the so-called “inter-continental market integration” was very limited, although the 
volume of spices, precious metals, porcelain, sugar, tobacco, slaves, and cloth traded soared, and the shipping 
costs on some inter-continental routes fell dramatically even before the advent of steam. Early modern market 
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and Jeffery Williamson, “After Columbus: Explaining the Global Trade Boom, 1500-1800,” in “National 
Bureau of Economic Research (Working Paper),” no. 8186 (March, 2001), pp. 9-49. 
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 Although oceans were understood in the twentieth century as trans-national watery 
frontiers fostering “[the] global flow of commodities and ideas,”102 the question remains 
whether the Qing authority in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries also 
conceptualized them as a contact zone where international trade and cultural interactions 
could be forged. If not, in what ways did the views of Qing emperors differ from the 
Western powers? How did the Qing court model the ocean at a time when trans-oceanic 
interaction was frequent and vibrant? Yet before proceeding to these discussion, I shall first 
give a brief introduction to the “deep structure”103 of the East Asian Sea such as its 
geographical boundaries, climatology, and topography, so as to provide some background 
information for readers and set up the scope of our study.  
 
Geography and Ecology 
 
 Martin W. Lewis and Kären E. Wigen contend that the “ancient” division of the 
Earth’s landmasses and sea spaces are “in fact recent human constructs.”104 They believe 
the “social constructions of physical spaces” are imprecise and full of biases.105 But at the 
same time, geographical divisions and the specifications of their properties provide a useful 
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104 Martin W. Lewis and Kären E. Wigen, The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1997), pp. 1-20. 
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framework for exploring the geography across the globe in general and East Asia in 
particular: its land, water, and people. They also inspire a simple set of questions into the 
study of maritime Asia such as what is the (East) Asian Sea? And where is it? As Ronald G. 
Knapp once puts forward, the “division of the world in spatial terms” helps us not only 
visualize spatial patterns and associations across the Earth’s surface, but also constitutes a 
useful background for understanding histories, civilizations, and even contemporary 
events.106  
 
The East Asian Sea is a vast body of water which covers some thirty seven percent 
of the maritime surfaces of the world (The East China Sea 1,249,000 km², the South China 
Sea 3,500,000 km², the Bohai Bay 78,000 km², and the Sea of Japan 1,300,000 km²). Its 
average depth is about 3,478 feet (1,060 m). The deepest part is called the China Sea Basin, 
with a maximum depth of 16,457 feet (5,016 m).107 A broad, shallow shelf extends up to 
150 miles (240 km) in width between the mainland and the northwestern side of the basin 
and includes the Gulf of Tonkin and Taiwan Strait. To the south, off southern Vietnam, the 
shelf narrows and connects with the Sundra Shelf, which is one of the largest sea shelves in 
the world. The Sundra Shelf covers the area between Borneo, Sumatra, and Malaysia, 
including the southern portion of the South China Sea.  
 
 Wang Dahai, the native of Fujian, once illustrated in his The Records of Island that 
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it is impossible to measure the full extent of the sea in the eighteenth century, 
except with the eye of fantasy, no one will ever delve to the 
bottom of that sea except by plunging into the waves of his 
wildest dreams. We were surrounded by a limitless desert 
of water. The days were white and the nights were black. 
You could not spy a single speck afloat on those fields of 
water, only the dark blue of the heavens reflected on the 
blue black of the sea.108  
 
Wang was right to point out that it was almost impossible to contour the limit of the ocean, 
even though a series of sailing techniques were well developed in the Ming Dynasty;109 
however, it is perhaps possible to delineate the extent of oceans if we utilize contemporary 
topographic measurements to set up the scope of the present research. According to the 
United Nations Oceans Atlas (UNOA) and the International Hydrographic Organization 
(IHO), the two leading maritime geographical centers, the longitudes of the East Asian Sea 
are roughly 120 oE to 140 oE. If we include the Sea of Japan, the island Sakhalin is the 
northern limit, and then we go around the coast, passing through the gulf between Korean 
peninsula and Shikoku, past the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea and the South China Sea, 
and so to what geographically is the southern limit, that is the Malay peninsula and the 
Sunda Island.  
 
Some other international geographical organizations may go past Northern Australia 
to around the Arafura Sea and the Arnhem Land, Mackay, Brisbane, the east coast of 
Tasmania, and then down to Antarctica. Nonetheless, this sketch of geography is too vast 
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and coarse, especially when we refer to how Alan Villiers (1903 – 1982) explicates the 
problem of geopolitical congruency.110 In his book The Western Ocean: Story of the North 
Atlantic, Villiers evocated how geopolitics conditions empire, trade, and people in an 
unsymmetrical way in the North and South Atlantic.111  What Villiers has rightfully 
contended also is applicable to the maritime seascape of East Asia. The intricacies of 
particular coastline, the distribution of islands, the variety of marine resources, and the 
location of port cities shape not only the pattern of shipping circuits, fisheries, and piracy, 
but also the maritime strategy of the High Qing authority. For instance, Emperor Kangxi 
and his meritocratic bureaucracy kept refining the blueprint of empire’s coastal 
administration. He ordered government-officials to “scale the mountains and navigate the 
littorals” in Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong on a regular basis. Soon 
after their surveys were completed, officials submitted memorials to the emperor providing 
detailed analysis to harness dissimilar seascape. Kangxi’s grandson Qianlong even launched 
a series of “grand projects” to thoroughly examine the coastline so as to practice his 
maritime policies. Therefore, detailed and precise sea charts were officially produced 
between the 1750s and the 1780s. Examples like the “Maritime map of Shandong, Zhili, 
and Shenjing (Shandong, Zhili, Shengjing haijiang tu),” the “Complete maritime map of 
the seven provinces (Qisheng yanhai quantu),” the “ Strategic map of the maritime frontier 
(Haijiang yangjie xingshitu),” and the “Pictorial study of the Zhejiang sea (Zhejiangsheng 
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quan hai tushuo)” were all famous maritime diagrams (haitu) composed by scholar-officials 
and geographers under imperial supervision in the long eighteenth century.  
 
Furthermore, the attempt to include the eastern part of Australia into the East Asian 
Sea is not very helpful because most of the commercial and maritime activities between 
Asia (China in particular) and the rest of the world did not happen in the Eastern coast of 
Australia in the eighteenth century. By that time, the people who inhabited Australia only 
had marginal contacts with China, India and Southeast Asia. It was until the mid-nineteenth 
century that the east coast of Australia was visited by foreign merchants, while its 
aboriginal peoples seldom ventured beyond shallow coastal waters. Therefore, instead of 
extending our scope to Australia and Antarctica, I incline to stop at the South China Sea, 
and go no further south. One way to visualize what I think of as the East Asian Sea is to see 
it as an outstretched belt embracing the Eastern part of Asia. The starting point is slightly 
above the tropic of Cancer, that is 50 oN. The belt then goes south, including the Bohai Bay, 
the Liaodong peninsular, the Shandong peninsular, the Hainan Island, up to the east coast of 
Vietnam, and then down from the apex through Malaysia and the Strait of Malacca. 
 
The topography of the East Asian Sea obviously varies from place to place, being 
quite different in the bays which are more enclosed, for example the strategic Bohai Gulf, as 
compared with the coastal area exposed to the wide, open ocean. Some shores along the 
Russian seaboard are uninhabited regions perpetually covered by snow and ice since the 
early ages,112 some cut off from the interior by mountains which are hardly penetrable. But 
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most of the shores of the East Asian Sea are not quite as inhospitable as these “Russian 
examples.” On the western shore of the East Asian Sea, close to South Korea, the North 
China Plain, and the Southeastern part of China, the coastal fringe is a large area of fertile 
and productive region. Ancient Chinese had long been favored by the pleasant environment 
since the Warring State period.113 Yet such topography does not only abet the Chinese, but 
the Koreans and the Japanese. Even though some landscapes in Cholla-Namdo, Kyongsang-
Namdo and Honshu are backed by high mountain ranges, these were nowhere completely 
impassable.114 
 
Meteorology and Climatology 
 
Meteorological and climatic factors posed directions and constraints for many, if not 
all, seafaring activities in the age of oars and wind. These factors profoundly influenced the 
designs of the ships, the periodical cycle of seasonal voyaging, the choices of routes, 
fisheries, harbor control, as well as naval policies. For instance, the evolution of ship design 
in both the North Sea and the Bohai Bay were affected by the patterns of tides and the level 
of fathom.115 Mariners in the Black Sea had long been warned to beware of crossing the 
chokepoint between Cape Sarych in Crimea and Cape Kerempe in Anatolia because of the 
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sea-storms there.116 Even until very late in the Middle Ages (1031-1350), there was great 
difficulty for shipping to exit from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic because of the 
formidable ocean currents.117 Naval bases, in addition, were often established in deep water 
ports with moderate climatic conditions, such as Tianjin, Amoy, Baltimore, Canaveral, 
Portsmouth, Devonport, and Ryojun.118 Obviously, the sociological and cultural history of 
the maritime world during “the age of sail” was strongly affected by oceanic climatology. 
And these meteorological phenomena include the patterns of prevailing winds, the set of 
currents and waves, and the configuration of the coasts.  
 
Winds and Currents 
 
From ancient times to the age of exploration, shipping routes and schedules were 
highly determined by the patterns of winds – including scorching winds and seasonal 
monsoons. As Felipe Fernanadez-Armesto observes, what really matters in pre-modern 
maritime history is the wind system, especially the difference between monsoonal patterns 
and those with year-long prevailing winds. He explicates,  
 
[b]efore the age of steam, wind determined what man could 
do at sea: by comparison, culture, ideas, individual genius 
or charisma, economic forces, and all the other motors of 
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history meant little.119  
 
It was the wind system which largely regulated when people could, and could not, sail to 
where. Sailors in imperial times learned by experience that in order to cross the sea as 
expeditiously as possible, the best route did not necessarily follow the shortest line recorded 
on sea charts. Rather, it depended on whether they could “catch a proper wind patterns.” 
For instance, because of the strong northerly winds prevailing in winter, the Greeks and the 
Romans left their shipping in port from October to April.120 In Muslim Egypt of the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries, the sea was also closed from November to March because of 
the same reason.121 In the High Qing, Emperor Kangxi also realized the importance of wind 
pattern in the mission to conquer Taiwan.122  
 
 In simple terms, monsoons are generated by the rotation of earth and governed by 
the interaction of continental pressure systems and the watery surface. The East Asian Sea 
is affected by the East Asian monsoonal system (EAMS) that carries moist air from the 
Indian Ocean and the Pacific to East Asia. According to the report released in the 2009 
Copenhagen Climate Conference, the EAMS affects approximately one-third of the global 
population, influencing the climate of Japan, Korea, and much of the coastal region of 
China. The EAMS is divided into (i) the warm and wet summer monsoon and (ii) the cold 
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and dry winter monsoon. In summer, considerable heat warms the Asian continental land 
mass. Hot air rises and creates a low pressure zone, moisture-laden air from the East Asian 
Sea then moves in to this low pressure area, rises in the upward air current, cools, and 
finally produces clouds and rain. In winter the reverse occurs, as the sea cools more slowly 
than the land, offshore winds thus flow out from China to the East Asian Sea. Because of 
the EAMS, monsoons in East Asia follow a quite regular pattern: in the East China Sea 
essentially southwest from May to September, whereas northeast from November to 
March.123 In comparison with the Atlantic, where there is also a regular pattern of trade 
winds year-round, both seawaters have a predictable wind system. Yet, it is much easier to 
complete a round trip along the East Asian Sea than in the Atlantic, as it used to be said “the 
mariners always have to beg Neptune’s forbearance while they passed through the Atlantic 
Ocean.”124 The East Asian Sea, in contrast, offers favorable conditions for shipping – such 
as clearer skies and warmer temperature – for many more months a year. Also because of 
the smaller size of the sea, the huge rollers which make Atlantic navigation so dangerous in 
storms are not to be found that frequently in East Asian seawaters.125  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
123 In most years, the monsoonal flow shifts in a very predictable pattern, with winds being southeasterly in 
late June, bringing significant rainfall to the Korean peninsula and Japan (in Taiwan and Okinawa this flow 
starts in May). This leads to a reliable precipitation spike in July and August. However, this pattern 
occasionally fails, leading to drought and crop failure. In the winter, the winds are northeasterly and the 
monsoonal precipitation bands move back to the south, and intense precipitation occurs over southern China 
and Taiwan. For more details, see P.D. Clift, R. Tada and H. Zheng (eds.), Monsoon Evolution and Tectonic: 
Climate Linkage in Asia (London: Geological Society, 2010). 
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Navigation under oars and sail was highly influenced by the set of monsoonal 
patterns mentioned above. If a sea-merchant successfully caught the wind pattern, his 
expedition would not be overly challenged. Those who ignored the monsoons, or were 
ignorant to them, would experience difficulties to cross the ocean. For example, if a 
merchant decided to make his way from Shanghai to Makasar in June via a junk, sailing 
against the summer monsoon, his voyage would take a minimum six weeks, which is 
roughly twice the time taken by the same vessel making the crossing earlier in the season.126 
Similar to Asian sailors, Atlantic shipmen were also restrained by formidable monsoons 
across the Asian Sea. In 1541, for instance, a Portuguese marauding vessel departed the Red 
Sea to India in early July. The audacious, yet headstrong, captain refused to listen to the 
advice of his experienced Muslim pilots who told him that no ship by that time could 
navigate in the Arabian Sea without the trade winds. Those “Muslim advices,” of course, 
turned out to be correct.127 Likewise, in 1980, Tim Severin, sailing on his Sindbad voyage 
from the Persian Gulf to China, refused to listen to the voyagers who advised him to better 
catch the monsoonal winds. Severin was finally becalmed east of Sri Lanka on his dhow for 
thirty-five days in March and April.128  
 
Apart from the wind pattern, sea voyages in East Asia were conditioned by many 
other climatic factors such as ocean currents and breaking waves. These two geographical 
factors also alter how and when one travelled and departed. In the most general terms, an 
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ocean current is a continuous, directed movement of ocean water driven by waves, winds or 
differences in density. The effect on the movement of ships was known to most captains 
and sailors. Seafarers either choose to avoid a course that would oblige them to sail against 
the current or one that enabled them to pick up additional speed by sailing with the current. 
In other words, ocean currents can either be an opportunity or a problem. Ever since the 
ninth century BC, Chinese made use of water currents to speed up their voyages. They 
learned that sea currents would enable them to sail from point to point efficiently like “a 
man traveling on horseback without any friction.”129 Nearly around the same period, the 
Greeks also utilized ocean currents for navigation in the Black Sea. They could travel from 
Odessa to Istanbul “without hoisting a sail only in one day” if they met an appropriate 
current pattern.130 Yet, as I have mentioned, water currents can also be detrimental. When 
traveling to the East in the 1270s, Marco Polo (1254-1324) recorded that the Muslim sailors 
never went south of Madagascar, or even Zanzibar, because of the Lagullas or Agulhas 
current. To the Muslims, both currents “would obstruct their way to return to the north.”131 
The Portuguese Jesuit Jerónimo Lobo (1595-1678) also believed that “if one ignored the 
impact of water current, things could go badly astray.” When his ship had trouble getting 
around the Cape, he regretted if it had kept closer to land in southeast Africa he could have 
made good progress because “the water current between Madagascar and the East African 
coast was so strong that it could carry a ship to the south even when the winds were 
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164.  
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contrary.”132 
 
Wave was another climatic element which affected sea voyages. Maritime writers of 
Fujian had described some huge waves and the impact in the South China Sea,133 though 
some of these may be exaggerated by excited narrators. But it should not be hard to 
understand that a serious wave could make sea travels difficult and even caused traumatic 
shipwrecks. Not only did the pattern of waves obstruct a passage, waves beating on lee 
shores damaged poor harbors and littorals. As recorded in the DaQing Shichao shengxun 
(The sacred instructions of the ten reigns﹝1616–1874﹞) and the Qing shilu (The veritable 
records of Qing dynasty), hydrological disasters generated by strong waves occurred 
regularly in the reign of Kangxi (1662-1723).134 Local gazetteers of coastal provinces 
recorded that some lee shores in Jiangsu, Fujian, Zhejiang, and Shandong, when hit by 
serious sea-waves, were almost unapproachable in a fishing boat.135 Tides - the rise and fall 
of sea level - are also perilous for sailors in “narrower” seaways like the Taiwan Strait.136 
The effect of a strong tide can be felt hundred miles up the Fujian coast and into the 
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estuaries and deltas in South China. These incalculable factors had always presented 
daunting challenges to Chinese mariners sailing across the East Asian Sea.  
 
To recapitulate, this chapter touches upon the “deep structures” of the East Asian 
Sea, from climate and topography to current and winds. Almost all seafaring activities, from 
the ancient era to around the 1800s, were greatly affected by the foregoing “deep 
structures.” It was until the very late nineteenth century that the direct influences of these 
climatic factors became less predominant – as monsoons, currents, and waves were all 
overcome by combustion engines and coal steamers. By the Age of Steamship, marine 
navigations had evolved into a fully systematic technique;137 while the history of the East 
Asian Sea, similar to the South Atlantic, the Indian Ocean, and the Caribbean, entered into a 
new chapter, in which, for the first time, its economical and sociological dimensions were 
dramatically altered by the “industrialization of ocean passage.”138 
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Chapter Two 
Modelling the Sea Space 
 
Abstract 
 
The standardized naming of oceans, namely the Pacific, Atlantic, Indian, Southern, and 
Arctic, was only introduced by Euro-American hydrologists in the late nineteenth century. 
Arguably however, these oceans were conceptualized in various ways in the centuries 
before the 1800s. The Chinese in the Ming and Qing, for instance, applied a specific 
nomenclature to indicate the Indian Ocean which was different from the way in which the 
Ottomans referred to the same piece of seawater. The Manchu monarchs and the Japanese 
daimyo also conceptualized the East Asian Sea as a constituent part of their maritime 
territories in different ways. Therefore, by analyzing the novel schemes of oceanic division 
of a particular region, one can see the maritime world afresh and even discover the 
historical, political, and cultural constructions of the maritime spaces that are obscured by 
conventionally accepted English-language terms for bodies of water. In this chapter, I will 
examine how the central authority of the Qing named and modeled maritime spaces from 
the early seventeenth to the second quarter of the nineteenth centuries. I argue that the Qing 
court named the maritime world in their own way and tended to conceptualize the ocean as 
an asymmetrical relationship between inner and outer space from a state-centered 
perspective. Unlike the European seaborne powers, which successfully established trans-
maritime empires, the Qing government showed little interest in mapping a capitalist 
geography across the globe where the access to goods and resources mattered most; it 
instead directed its attention to its inner ocean, where the empire could claim ownership of 
the marine resources within the oceanic realm that was readily accessible. The outer ocean, 
or the outer sea space, was regarded as a capricious domain increasingly beyond 
administrative governance and economic extraction. Even though the inner-outer 
correlation in some cases might not be hierarchical in a straightforward fashion, such spatial 
construction is worth analyzing because, on the one hand, it was a continuation of an 
existing Han-Chinese spatial conceptualization, while on the other hand, it signified the 
political ideology of the Qing ruling authorities in frontier management. By studying the 
ways in which the Qing conceptualized the maritime space over the course of the long 
eighteenth century, we can better understand its maritime policies within a broader picture 
of its frontier governing strategies.  
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Introduction 
 
We are all familiar with the five great oceans in the world, namely the Pacific, 
Atlantic, Indian, Southern, and Arctic. These oceans that constitute the division of our globe 
seem natural and normal. They are generally regarded as geographic features that have been 
discovered through objective analysis rather than defined by convention. If we take a quick 
glance at the watery portions of the globe, however, the division between the Indian and the 
Pacific oceans is not discernable by physical criteria. Similar to the separation of Asia and 
North America, as argued by Kären Wigen and Martin W. Lewis, the Indian and the Pacific 
Oceans are as much intellectual constructs as they are given features of the natural world.139  
 
It is hard to divide the body of world’s oceans into different specific oceans simply 
because the waters themselves is boundless. Although a series of geographical materials 
have presented an “exact” depiction of each ocean’s areal extent, these figures are not 
standardized at all. For example, we are informed by the World Almanac and Book of Facts 
that the Pacific Ocean covers 64,186,300 square miles,140 whereas Goode’s World Atlas 
records that the Pacific is 63,800,000 square miles.141 Even if the discrepancy regarding the 
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size of the Pacific for a few million square miles might be of little account and hardly a 
pressing matter, most maritime geographers have contended that these numbers are merely 
approximations, thereby reflecting the arbitrary division of the boundless sea. Despite the 
matter of size, what is more problematic is that the same piece of ocean might be on many 
occasions named differently. The Chinese in the Ming and Qing, for instance, applied a 
specific nomenclature to indicate the Indian Ocean that was different from the way in which 
the Ottomans named the same piece of seawater. Even today, the South Koreans would 
insist that the body of water embracing their country is the “Eastern Sea” but not the Sea of 
Japan due to political considerations. Similarly, some Vietnamese and the Western Africans 
occasionally refer to their immediate body of seawater as the Indonesian Ocean or the 
African Ocean rather than the Indian Ocean. These differences of nomenclature indicate the 
fact that the way we used to divide oceans into “relatively internationally recognized units” 
is not flawless to the extent that it disguises the historical, political, and cultural 
construction of the sea space. It is, in this regard, noticeable that the maritime world, as 
suggested by Martin Lewis, can be named and conceptualized beyond the so-called 
“modern standard.”142 Arguably, these alternative views or conceptualizations of the ocean 
allow us to see the maritime world afresh and to discover the patterns and connections that 
have been obscured by our standard worldview. In fact, the standardization of maritime 
spatial classification (the five great oceans) only emerged in the nineteenth century, while 
such schema of maritime geography was rooted in a specifically European colonial 
model.143 Before the age of colonialism, the boundless sea space was conceptualized 
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distinctively in the non-Western world. Compared to the Dutch and the British authorities, 
for example, the Qing monarchs and the Japanese daimyo conceptualized the East Asian 
Sea as a constituent part of their maritime territories differently. By studying the oceanic 
conceptualizations in the pre-1800 era, I am interested in showing not only these oceanic 
conceptualizations are possible but that these alternative visions can shed light on certain 
political usage of geographical ideas as well as the historical patterns and processes beyond 
our constricted assumptions about the maritime world in East Asia.  
 
Taking the above research questions into consideration, I attempt to examine in this 
chapter how the Qing Dynasty named and modeled maritime spaces in the long eighteenth 
century. I argue that the Qing court named the maritime world in their own way and tended 
to conceptualize the ocean as an asymmetrical relationship between inner and outer space 
from a state-centered perspective. Unlike the European seaborne powers, which 
successfully established trans-maritime empires, the Qing court showed little interest in 
mapping a capitalist geography across the globe where the access to goods and resources 
mattered most; it instead directed its attention to their inner ocean, where the empire could 
claim ownership of the marine resources within the oceanic realm that was readily 
accessible.144 The outer ocean, or the outer sea space, was regarded as a capricious domain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and oceanic constructs alike, were forced on many other societies, thereby largely extinguishing competing 
geographies. 
 
144 Recent scholars, such as Yangwen Zheng, Gang Zhao, and Wensheng Wang, have argued that the Qing did 
not ignore its maritime frontier in the long eighteenth century by reexamining the relationship between the 
Great Qing and the maritime world from various perspective. Yangwen Zheng’s China on the Sea: How the 
Maritime World Shaped Modern China (Leiden: Brill, 2012) argues that Qing China was a strongly 
consumerist society, and that much of what it consumed arrived by sea, often on foreign ships. The author is 
interested in examining what the seas brought and shaped to the sociological landscape of late imperial China. 
Gang Zhao’s The Qing Opening to the Ocean: Chinese Maritime Policies, 1684-1757 (Honolulu: University 
of Hawai’i Press, 2013) offers a convincing reinterpretation of Chinese attitudes toward maritime trade. This 
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increasingly beyond administrative governance and economic extraction. Even though the 
inner-outer correlation in some cases might not have been hierarchical in a straightforward 
fashion, such spatial construction is worth analyzing because, on the one hand, it was a 
continuation of an existing Han-Chinese spatial conceptualization, while on the other hand, 
it signified the political ideology of the Qing ruling authorities in frontier management. By 
studying the way in which the Qing conceptualized the sea space over the course of the long 
eighteenth century, we can better understand its maritime policies within a broader picture 
of its frontier governing strategies.   
 
The inner-outer model underwent a transformation when the Qing Empire was 
threatened both internally and externally during the transition from the Qianlong (1735-
1796) to the Jiaqing-Daoguang era (1797-1850). During this period of significant turmoil 
and disorder, the Manchu court in the early nineteenth century was no longer as eager to 
maintain its domination or to be as proactive in controlling the inner sea space as it had 
been during the previous century. Eventually, the inner-outer model that had been 
maintained for decades was sternly challenged by Western intruders, who sought to realize 
their aggressive policies in East Asia during the age of high imperialism. In addition to 
introducing the inner-outer spatial construction of the Chinese maritime world and how it 
underwent a transformation from the eighteenth to the early nineteenth century, I will also 
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examine in this chapter whether the Qing court had divided the oceans into parts of sections 
and whether they shared similar views with the Portuguese, the Dutch, the French, or later 
the British with respect to conceptualizing the sea space as being a free sea (mare liberum).  
 
The Classical Tradition 
 
 To examine the way the Qing authorizes named and modeled the ocean, one must 
begin with the ancient Chinese cartographic tradition. The ancient Chinese view of 
maritime geography was focused, not surprisingly, on the immediate sea space embracing 
Northern China. One of the earliest recorded representations, the Shanhai Jing (Classics of 
Mountains and Seas), pictured the maritime world as an unknown and eerie region full of 
strange animals and gods.145 Similar to the ancient Greeks who saw the sea as a boundless 
space (aperion) which represented everything they feared,146 the sea off the China coast was 
also conceptualized in myths and fantasies in the ancient period. Perhaps the legend of the 
Isles of Penglai might serve as a good example. Situating somewhere thought to be in the 
furthest reaches of the Bohai Bay or beyond, Penglai was one of the many mythical and 
mystical islands inhabited by celestial beings in the sea. For several times the First Emperor 
of China Qin Shi Huang (259BC-210BC; r. 220BC-210BC) decided to send missions in 
search of the islands, but his envoys never returned to Qin.147 According to other Daoist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 Guo Pu, Shanhai jing 山海經 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985): see also Richard E. Strassberg, A Chinese 
Bestiary Strange Creatures from the Guideways through Mountains and Seas (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 2002) p. 41. 
 
146 James Hamilton-Paterson, The Great Deep: The Sea and Its Thresholds (New York: Random House, 1992), 
p. 67.  
 
147 Robert Ford Campany, Making Transcendent: Ascetics and Social Memory in Early Medieval China 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2009), p. 122.  
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records, the ocean, mythologically, was ruled by four dragon kings, who respectively 
governed the four cardinal sections of the sea space.148 The dragon kings had their own 
royal courts and commanded armies comprising various marine creatures. In this view, the 
sea space was literally and figuratively a hierarchical kingdom that existed under the sea 
surface.  
 
 The mythological vision of a primordial ocean gradually yielded to a more mundane 
conceptualization. Although some of the underlying Daoist perceptions of the maritime 
world, such as the existence of dragon kings, remained unchanged, the sea space was 
considered part of the territory ruled by the Son of Heaven (the Chinese monarch) within 
the framework of the sihai worldview (the four seas). Literarily meaning the seas of the four 
directions (north, east, south, and west), the term sihai refereed to the vast domain, covering 
both land and sea, under imperial control. When the Chinese statement of the Han Dynasty, 
Jia Yi (201BC-169BC), commented upon the aggressive expansion of the Qin empire 
(221BC-206BC), he described the Qin as a power that “swept across the four seas and 
invaded the eight borderlands (nangkuo sihai, bingtun bahuang).” 149  Jia’s comment 
indicates that the maritime territory, at least in the Han era, was no longer an unknown 
region but a known space that was considered part of the empire.  
 
 As the Qin and the Han dynasties expanded, the southern coast of China became 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
148 See Yang Erzeng, The Story of Han Xiangzi: The Alchemical Adventures of a Daoist Immortal (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2007), pp. 171-172. 
 
149 Jia Yi, “Guo Qin lun 過秦論,” in Jia Yi zhuan zhu (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chuban she, 1975), p. 43.  
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part of these empires. Even before the arrival of the Qin and the Han armies, however, the 
Nanyue peoples of the far south already interacted with coastal seawaters as well as the 
littoral regions of Southeast Asia. As recorded in the Shanhai jing, “Panyu (nowadays 
Guangzhou) is the first place where ships were built.”150 A Han text only survives in 
fragments, the Nanyue zhi, also noted that “the king of Yue constructed a great boat, and 
three thousand people drowned.”151 More importantly, archeologists have excavated clay, 
wooden models of a dozen boat designs, and a boatyard in an ancient tomb in 
Guangzhou.152 If these figures are reliable enough, the Nanyue civilization would be among 
the first group of peoples who started developing maritime technology in the world.  
 
 In the centuries that followed, the south was more and more integrated into the 
empire. The southeastern coast, of China thus became a key platform that linked Southeast 
Asia to the Chinese empires. Identified in the Han and Tang official documents, “there were 
over a hundred tribute missions to the Chinese courts from fourteen different kingdoms 
throughout Southeast Asia via the sea.”153 From this perspective, the sea space that connects 
China and Southeast Asia (the nanyang) was where the tributary system took place. Even 
though the Chinese empires might not view that body of seawater as their territory, the 
nanyang was considered one of the gateways to consolidate the tributary system. Arguably, 
in the increasingly China-centered worldview, the maritime world was held to have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 Guo Pu, Shanhai jing, p. 67.  
 
151 Huang Qichen, Guangdong haishang sichou zhi lu shi  廣東海上絲綢之路史 (Guangzhou: Xinhua shuju, 
2003), pp. 21-25. 
 
152 Joseph Needham, Science and Civilisation in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), vol. 
4, see figs. 961-965. 
 
153 Huang Qichen, Guangdong haishang sichou zhi lu shi, p. 25. 
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profound politico-cultural significance, whereas the Daoist and the mythical perception of 
the ocean at that time were of relatively little account.  
 
During the centuries between the Han and Tang, specific segments of the ocean 
received locational referents within the tributary framework, such as the Eastern Ocean 
(donghai) and the Southeastern Ocean (dongnan yang). The aforementioned term nanyang 
(Southern Ocean) was employed to refer to the body of water near the Malay-Indonesian 
archipelagoes, whereas the Indian Ocean was commonly called the xiaoxiyang (the little 
Western ocean), covering the seawater off the coast of India and Sri Lanka (the Lion 
Kingdom). In addition to the locational terms, Chinese thinkers had long been appending 
the terms	   hai and yang to the ocean. By the tenth century BCE an inscription of the 
character hai was recorded in a bronze inscription and was understood to represent the sea. 
Around the same period, the term yang began to stand for the idea of a “border region,” a 
“mythical area,” or an “extensive space;”154 gradually, yang also became a synonym of hai, 
meaning the sea. 155 
 
From the Song period onward, there were maritime diagrams (haitu), which 
depicted spatial patterns of land and sea, produced officially and non-officially. The Yu di tu 
(Map of the world) produced by the imperial court in the 1260s, for example, depicted the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 The concept of extensive space was expressed early on in the Shijing (Book of Odes) and the Daoist classic 
Liezi in early imperial China. For instance, the term donghai (Eastern Sea) was considered a mythical place in 
Liezi. 
 
155 Angela Schottenhammer, “The Sea as Barrier and Contact Zone: Maritime Space and Sea Routes in 
Traditional Chinese Books and Maps,” in Angela Schottenhammer and Roderich Ptak, The Perception of 
Maritime Space in Traditional Chinese Sources, p. 1. 
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Southern Song Empire surrounded by the East Asian Sea as well as a cluster of islands in 
Southeast Asia.156 In the	  Nantai an zhi sansheng shidao tu and the Guangyu jiangli tu, two 
official maps produced by Han-Chinese cartographers in the Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368), 
the southern part of the empire was encircled by the ocean (the maritime frontier). What 
might strike the modern viewers on one of these maps is that the maritime frontier at the 
periphery of the terrestrial region, whatever its width might be, was not conceived as the 
edge of the known world. As indicated in the southwestern reach of the Guangyu jiangli tu, 
it stated that “this way connects to India and the Indian Ocean.” From this evidence, the 
ocean was not only perceived as part of the empire but as a potential conduit for 
interregional communication. Unlike the Daoist ecumene, the surrounding sea was no 
longer represented as the huge realm of non-humanity.  
 
The seven voyages led by Zheng He (1371-1433) in the Ming necessitated a 
radically new vision of the Sino-centric world and its oceanic reaches. The east coast of 
Africa and part of the Atlantic region was introduced to the Chinese maritime worldview. 
The vast maritime expanse was discovered and the maritime world was not simply divided 
according to the cardinal system but also represented in an inner-outer model. One example 
would be the naming of the Indian Ocean. The body of water that we now call the Indian 
Ocean was usually named in Chinese records as the siyang (the Western ocean), a term first 
recorded in an anecdote entitled Sishan zaji published in the Five Dynasties era (897-
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979).157 Chinese geographers in the following decades continued to depict the Indian Ocean 
as the Western Ocean. In his Daoyi jilüe (Records of island barbarians) published in the 
Yuan period, for example, Wang Dayuan considered Calicut as the strategic front gate of 
the siyang region covered the Indonesian seawaters and the northern portion of the Indian 
Ocean.158 In Zhou Zhizhong’s Yiyu zhi (Gazetteer of strange regions), most of the countries 
located in the Indian Ocean were listed under the chapter entitled “siyang guo (countries in 
the Western Ocean).”159 Later in the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries, the term siyang 
appeared with increasing frequency, but the term did not only refer to the Indian Ocean 
region since the maritime landscape was significantly broadened after the Zheng He 
voyages. The term siyang, at that time, encompassed broader expanses of the Indian Ocean 
and the Atlantic region, while the latter was labeled as the wai dasiyang (the Outer Great 
Western ocean) and the former was renamed as the xiao siyang (the Little Western Ocean) 
in a series of geographical writings.160 Yet how much this reflected popular usage is 
difficult to determine, but in any case, what is notable is that the term outer (wai) used in 
some Ming records implies that the Atlantic Ocean was regarded as a discrete sea space far 
from China. Viewing this expanse of ocean as a distinct area, the Atlantic sphere was 
categorized as an outer sea space that was beyond the influence of the tributary system. 
 
The Maritime Frontier in the Eighteenth Century 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 Zhou Zhizhong, Yiyu zhi 異域志 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985), p. 373.  
 
158 Wang Dayuan, Daoyi zhilüe 島夷志略 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1987), p. 44. 
 
159 See Tang Wenji, Fujian gudai jingji shi 福建古代經濟史 (Fujian: Fujian jiaoyu chubanshe, 1995), p. 190.  
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The inner-outer construction gradually became one of the dominant geographical 
and political means of conceptualizing the maritime frontier in the Qing period, especially 
after Emperor Kangxi conquered Taiwan in 1684. Officials tended to perceive the inner sea 
(neihai) as the farthest extent of their maritime authority, a region legitimately subject to 
sustainable governance and state possession, whereas the outer sea space (waihai) was 
considered a capricious blue-water domain increasingly beyond administrative governance 
and economic extraction.  
 
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, however, it should be noted that it 
is hard to draw a dividing line in the ocean because of its boundlessness. There is no clear 
physiographical boundary such as mountain ranges or dense forests that could help 
demarcate the two imagined zones of inner and outer ocean. The division of a natural and 
cohesive realm into two discrete parts was a matter of sociopolitical construction rather than 
unchanging topography and ecology. While making little sense to the seafaring people who 
regarded the sea as a vital resource for their survival, the separation of inner and outer ocean 
functioned primarily to set limits on the reach and responsibilities of the state to regulate 
government operations across the sea space. The Qianlong Emperor and his son the Jiaqing 
Emperor (1760-1820; r. 1796-1820) mentioned that the officials in coastal provinces did not 
dare to venture into the outer sea space. They often wrote off incidents in these waters as 
beyond their jurisdiction and thus of little concern. Some of the officials even ordered that 
official salt junks avoid passing over the outer ocean, suggesting the government gave up 
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policing this unfamiliar sea space altogether.161 While the outer sea represented the place 
where maritime governance ceased, as argued by Wang Wensheng, it was also the space 
where pirates sought to maximize their autonomy and power.162  
 
Considering the demarcation between the inner and outer sea space, one might 
notice that the inner sea space was literally identified as waihai or waiyang (which literally 
means the outer ocean) in some Qing official documents. In such case, it should be 
emphasized that the word wai (outer) did not essentially connote a sense of externality or 
exteriority. Given that the boundary between nei and wai is always shifting, did such 
mutability undercut the very notions of these binary pairs as meaningful categories for 
differentiation? I argue that this question cannot be approached from a ratiocinative 
perspective but from the idea of perspectivism and the very logic of the political ideology of 
the Qing court. By perspectivism I refer here to the spatialization that was contingent on the 
land-sea relation. When both the sea and the river were juxtaposed, the Qing government, as 
well as many other ruling elites, considered the sea to be a space relatively external to the 
river. Thus, on such occasions, even the inner sea belonged to its sovereignty and the Qing 
government used waihai to indicate this, whereas the rivers were termed as neihe (inner 
rivers). For instance, in DaQing Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu (Completed records of the 
Qianlong Emperor), it was recorded that some areas in the waiyang off the Dongguang 
coast were labeled as the locations where pirates and gangsters hid, while the “neihei (inner-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161  Imperial edicts of January 10 and November 10, 1796, in Jiaqing daoguang liangchao shangyudang 嘉慶
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river) region” was comparatively less troublesome (di bijin waiyang, yicang jianfei……dizai 
neihe, shiwu jianshao).163 When specifying the difference between waihai and neihe, the 
scholar-official Wu Shijun (1800-1883) also juxtaposed the two terms in his analyses of the 
maritime militarization along the coast. He wrote, “[until now], some obstinate officials still 
uphold an idea that it is much more practical to guard against invaders along the inner river 
[neihe] rather than across the ocean [waiyang] (yu zhu waiyang, buru yu zhu neihe).”164 
Clearly, the sea was often conceptualized as an external space when mentioned in 
comparison with the river-region, although this does not necessarily mean that the former 
was less important than the latter.  
 
In the use of the term perspectivism I am also referring to the elastic classification of 
sea space, which was contingent on the position of the person in relation to the sea. For 
example, if one looked at the ocean from the coast of Fuzhou, s/he might regard the 
shallower, easily accessible seawaters facing her/him as the inner sea space. Looking at the 
question from the other way around, one might regard the seawater beyond sight and reach 
as the outer sea space.165 In this case, the deep seawater around the islands that were located 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 DaQing Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu (Taipei: Xin wenfeng chuban gongsi, 1978), juan 155, “Zuo dou 
yushi guan Guangdong xunfu Wang Anguo yifu, anchashi Pan Siqu zouqing Dongguang xian quekou zhensi 
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164 Wu Shijun, Zhurong zuoshi zhenquan, collected in Guojia tushuguan fenguan (ed.), Qingdai junzheng 
ziliao xuancui 清代軍政資料選粹  [Collection of military documents in the Qing] (Beijing: Quanguo 
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165 See Fang Junshi, Jiaoxuan suilu 蕉軒隨錄 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1995), juan 8, “haiyang jilüe 海洋記
略 [Records on the ocean],”juan 8, 35b–36a; Chen Changyuan, Guangdong tongzhi 廣東通志 [Gazetteer of 
Guangdong] (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1995), juan 123, “haifang lüe”1,  1093; Jiang Chenying, 
Haifang zonglun 海防總論 [A Comprehensive study on naval defense] in Congshu jicheng chubian 叢書集成
初編 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1991), vol. 3229, 8a–8b. In addition, from time to time the Chinese regarded 
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a hundred miles away from Fujian could be regarded as the outer sea space. Dian Murray 
also touched upon the idea of perspecitvism when she discussed the dividing line between 
the inner and outer ocean,  
 
offshore, as the open expanse of the South China Sea 
stretched from the border of Guangdong and Fujian 
provinces, around Hainan island and the Leizhou peninsula 
to the Gulf of Tonkin, the saltwater realm of shallow seas 
and inshore islands were referred to in Chinese sources as 
the inner sea (neihai) or inner ocean (neiyang). Once the 
shallows deepened, the inshore islands gave way to 
offshore islands farther from the land, and the South China 
Sea became the southern ocean (nanyang). This region of 
deep seas, offshore islands and coral reefs constituted the 
outer sea (waihai) or outer ocean (waiyang).166 
 
By political ideology, I refer specifically to how the Qing court defined the sea 
space from a state-centered perspective. For instance, in most cases high Qing monarchs 
regarded the seawater that was instrumental to their maritime and economic policies as the 
inner sea, whereas the one that fell outside of their plans was seen as the outer one.167 When 
the Qianlong Emperor prescribed the patrolling limit (xunshao jiangji) of the Fujian navy, 
he declared that the navy was responsible for policing all of the assigned area across the 
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166 Dian Murray, “Piracy and China's Maritime Transition, 1750-1850,” in Wang Gangwu and Ng Chin-keong 
(ed.). Maritime China in Transition 1750–1850 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2004), p. 55.  
 
167 See, for example, DaQing Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu 大清聖祖仁皇帝實錄 [Complete records of Emperor 
Kangxi] (Taipei: Xin wenfeng chuban gongsi, 1978), juan 232, gengwu, “Duo chayuan qiandou yushi Lo 
Zhibian shuyan;” juan 243, runqi yue, “Yu bingbu: Ju Shandong xunfu Jiang Chenxi zoubao;” juan 251, 
bingwu, “bingbuyifu: Zhenhai jiangjun Ma Sanqi shuyan;” See also DaQing Shizong Xianhuangdi shilu 大清
世宗憲皇帝實錄 [Complete records of Emperor Yongzheng] (Taipei: Xin wenfeng chuban gongsi, 1978), 
juan 72, dingwei, “Yizheng wang dachen deng yifu;” DaQing Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu, juan 105, jiwei, 
“Jiangsu xunfu Zhangqu zou;” juan 167, dinghai,“Yuju Zhejiang tidu Peishi zou;” juan 176, gengyin, “Zai ju 
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“neiyang sector (liuzi neiyang xunqi).”168 On another occasion, he declared that neiyang 
was subject to imperial prerogative since it was more “manageable and accessible (neiyang 
yiyu kanding)” than the waiyang surface.169 In Guozhao xianzheng shilüe, Li Yuandu 
(1821-1887) also recalled the directive promulgated by Yongzheng to expel unregistered 
foreign battleships that anchored and sailed across the inner sea space (waiyi bingchuan 
huoji neiyang, ju diaobing jishi quzhu).170 In Li’s record, the inner sea space was in this 
regard not conceptualized as a contact zone where international trade and cultural 
interactions could be forged freely. Instead, all maritime activities across the neiyang region 
were under strict state supervision. From the 1720s onward, all maritime activities operated 
by Western merchants were obliged to their Chinese counterparts in the form of an 
authorized monopolistic guild known as the cohong. Partly as a measure of cultural 
protection, direct contacts between Chinese and “barbaric merchants (yishang)” were 
strictly forbidden, except for the government-designated agents, the cohong, who served as 
the only middlemen between them.  
 
The existence of the inner sea from a state-centered perspective is also evident in 
imperial maps officially produced in the eighteenth century. By 1760, the Qing had 
achieved the incredible feat of doubling the size of the empire’s territory, both at sea and 
inland. In order to promote this new conception of the empire, the Qing court commissioned 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 DaQing Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu, juan 156, “bingbu deng bu yizhun yuanshu LiangJiang zongdu 
Yangchaoceng huiyi” (Qianlong 156 nian, xinyou, shieryue, renchen shuo, jihai). 
 
169 DaQing Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu, juan 750, “Xingbu deng bu yifu: LiangJiang zongdu Gaojin dengzou, 
xunfang haiyang ge shiyi” (Qianlong 30 nian, yiyou, shier yue, renyin shuo, bingchen). 
 
170 Li Yuandu, Guozhao xianzheng shilüe [collected in Sibu beiyao 四部備要] (Taipei: Taiwan Zhonghua 
shuju, 1989), vol. 46 ] juan 21, “Mingchen Wu Huaijiang gongbao shilüe,” 275. 
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a number of geo-political projects to depict the expanded imperial domain such as the 
Kangxi Atlas compiled by the Jesuits in 1717, the Comprehensive Gazetteer of the Great 
Qing Realm (Da Qing yitong zhi) in 1746, and the Qing Imperial Tribute Illustrations 
(Huang Qing zhigong tu) in 1769.171 Among these imperial projects the importance of the 
inner sea space was precisely articulated in a maritime diagram (haitu) entitled the Maritime 
Diagram of the Seven Coastal Provinces (Qishan yuanhai quantu) produced in 1798. This 
haitu was one of the very few topographical maritime diagrams showcasing information 
that was crucial for strategic management across the maritime frontier in the eighteenth 
century. This is also one of the very few imperial maps printed in the Qing featuring the 
inner sea that is preserved in good condition. Yet this haitu is worth noticing not only 
because of its rarity, but also because of its salient features. By salient features I refer to the 
detailed paratextual information printed on the map, which touch upon a variety of issues 
such as the importance of coastal defense, the significance of the Bohai Bay, as well as the 
dividing lines between certain sea spaces. Unlike other maritime diagrams produced in the 
Ming-Qing period such as the Topographic Diagram of Maritime Defense (Wanli haifang 
tu) [1561] and the	   Complete topographic Diagram of Maritime Defense of the United 
Empire (Qiankun yitong haifang quantu) [1605], the Qishan yuanhai quantu showed the 
maritime frontier horizontally, placing the land mass of coastal China in the upper part of 
the map, while the vast body of water was depicted in the lower part. In this regard, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 As argued by Mark Elliott, cartographic projects in the Qing were important because they enabled the 
representation of a space that the Manchus could claim as their own, thereby sustaining the idea of the 
superior Manchu power. See Elliott, Mark C. “The Limits of Tartary: Manchuria in Imperial and National 
Geographies,” The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 59, no. 9 (2000), pp. 603-646. Peter Perdue also suggested 
that imperial map making in the Qing served to legitimate territorial claims. See Peter Perdue, “Boundaries, 
Maps and Movements: Chinese, Russian, and Mongol Empires in Early Central Eurasia,” The International 
History Review, vol. 20, no. 2 (1998), pp. 263-286. 
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diagram showed the eastern side of China and the western part of the East Asian Sea in a 
landscape orientation. In most of the coastal diagrams or atlases produced under official 
supervision in the Qing Dynasty, one significant feature is that if the area was beyond 
governmental control, it would not be described in detail and was even left blank because, 
as examined by Emma J. Teng, the extension of Qing mapping was directly related to 
imperial expansionism.172 In the Qishan yuanhai quan tu, a large portion of sea space was 
filled with detailed information. Some particular sea space, such as Dinghai (seawater off 
the Jiangsu coast), was even indicated as the “foremost region guarding the inner sea (you 
Dinghai wei zhi hanwei, shi neihai zhi tang ao ye).” Moreover, the haitu marked the 
boundary between the Guangdong and Vietnam seawaters with the phrase “the limit and the 
edge (yuan jin zhi chu),” signifying the sea space beyond that boundary was utterly outside 
imperial control.173 This cartographic evidence thus supports the notion that some further 
sea space had “not yet entered the map” (weiru bantu) and served visually as an outer sea 
space from the state-centered perspective.  
 
According to the paratextual information on the Qishan yuanhai quan tu, the inner-
outer framework could also be conceptualized as a double-layered framework. Within the 
inner sea, the water space was deliberately divided into another layer of wai and nei. As 
written by the cartographer of the Qishan yuanhai quant tu, “the outer sea was strategically 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Emma Jinhua Teng, Taiwan’s Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures, 1683-
1895 (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2004). p. 143. 
 
173 This piece of information might also help substantiate Charles Wheeler’s argument that it was difficult to 
ascertain where the Gulf of Tonkin started and ended. See Charles Wheeler, “Rethinking the Sea in 
Vietnamese History: Littoral Society in the Integration of Thuan-Quang, Seventeenth-Eighteenth Centuries,” 
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 37 (2006), pp. 123-153. 
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important, while the inner sea was full of scattered islands and tiny isles.” Such 
differentiation mentioned in this haitu primarily based on the depth of seawater and the 
geographical distances off the coast. On one hand, because large-sized war junks often 
found it difficult to come close to shore in a low tide situation which only enabled smaller 
warships to do the policing, they were thus responsible to patrol the deeper “outer coastal 
water [it has to be noted that this part of “outer water” was still included in the inner sea 
region]” so as to “defend the frontier (han bianzu).” On the other hand, small patrol 
warships were given the duty to police the shallower “inner coastal water” so as to 
“strengthen the foundation (cun genben).” To give another illustrative example, we can 
make use of the account recorded in the Guangdong haifang huilan published in the 1760s. 
Across the Guangdong sea space, the strength of the water forces consisted of 167 war 
junks of various sizes in the 1700s. In order to interdict smuggling activities happening in 
shallower seawaters, it was decided in 1730 that the inner sea space should be divided into 
two sectors according to the aforementioned logic. Therefore, the 167 vessels (and perhaps 
even more) were divided into 38 separate units under the command of the admiral (shuishi 
tidu) along the Guangdong coast, covering some 3,000 li of the seawater from Chaoyang on 
the eastern flank to Hainan on the western flank. Islets, harbor-areas, shoals, and half-tide 
rocks were meticulously patrolled by the “inner-water fleet,” while the “outer-water fleet” 
was responsible for policing the region at a greater distance. Yet unfortunately, it was not 
recorded either in official gazetteers or in memorials what the exact limit of the area (in 
terms of kilometers) the “outer-water fleet” was given the authority to undertake its patrol 
duties. But it was mentioned in the account that other land-based military units across 
Guangdong, which were close to seaports, carried the dual responsibility of cooperating 
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with the “inner- and outer-water fleets” to help defend the maritime frontier.174 
 
The above attempts to demarcate inner and outer space in the sea were also 
practiced in the diplomatic strategies used for the inner Asian tributaries that lay beyond the 
western boundaries. Under the tributary system, the Manchu court deliberately divided their 
tributaries into inner polities (dependencies) and outer polities. Only the inner polities (such 
as Nepal and Kanjut) would be granted military protection;175 whereas the outer polities 
(such as Tashkent, Bukhara, Badakhshan, and Kazakas) were client states that were not 
directly linked to the Qing Empire.176 In 1751, for instance, the Qianlong emperor issued an 
imperial decree stating that,  
Our dynasty has unified the vast terrain that lies within the 
frontiers. The various barbarians, inner and outer, have 
submitted and turned toward civilization. Each of them has 
a different costume and appearance. We order the 
governor-general and provincial governors along the 
frontiers to have illustrations made copying the likeness of 
the clothing and ornaments of the Miao, Yao, Li, Zhuang, 
under their jurisdiction, as well as of the outer barbarians, 
and to submit these illustrations to the Grand Council, that 
they may be compiled and arranged for imperial survey.177  
 
The above imperial edict reflected not only the Qianlong emperor’s desire to order his 
officials to compile the Imperial Tribute Illustrations of the Great Qing (Huang Qing 
zhigong tu), but also his interest in using the inner-outer correlation as a language or a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 Guangdong haifang huilan 廣東海防彙覽, chapter 12, pp. 25a-27b. 
 
175 See Nicola Di Cosmo, “Qing Colonial Administration in Inner Asia,” The International History Review, 
vol. 20, no. 2 (1998), pp. 287-309.  
 
176 See Joseph Fletcher, “Ch’ing Inner Asia c. 1800,” in The Cambridge History of China (Cambridge, MA.: 
Cambridge University Press, 1978), vol. 10, part 1, 35-38.  
 
177 See Taiwan yinhang jingji yanjiushi, Qing zhigong tu xuan (Taipei: Taiwan yinhang, 1963), p.3. This 
imperial edict is translated by Emma Teng.  
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rhetoric of governance and control that explicated, if not justified, the Qing exertion of 
power over certain selected or desired peoples and regions –– whether on land or sea.178 
Moreover, in dealing with the question of civilization and “barbarity,” the Qing tended to 
follow the inner-outer model in the seventeenth century. Unlike the Ming Dynasty that 
worked with the basic dichotomy between civilization and “barbarity,” the Qing tended to 
eschew this binarism and considered “civilized” and “barbaric” relative and nested with 
each other by applying the inner-outer conception. By the eighteenth century, as argued by 
Pamela Crossley, “these degrees of inner and outer were distinctly narrative, that is, they 
might be contrasted to moral, ethical, or cultural criteria.”179 Most of the inner groups were 
those associated with the early conquest such as the Banner Manchus, the Mongols, and the 
Hanjun, while most of the outer group were those who remained unincorporated objects of 
the conquest. The inner-outer model here is demonstrably hierarchical, with the innermost 
enjoying the greatest intimacy with the ruling lineage and the outermost having the least.  
 
A Traditional Pair: Inner - Outer 
 
The inner-outer correlation was not only applicable when modeling and demarcating 
the sea space, it had long been viewed as a traditional spatial binary in Chinese philosophy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 Some scholars such as Pitman B. Potter also apply the inner-outer model to analyze the PRC’s frontier 
management. According to Potter, “conditions in China’s inner and outer peripheries serve as an essential 
context for understanding China’s policies of governance and control.” By inner periphery the author referred 
to Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang where constitutional arrangements of local governance were applied. The 
outer periphery covers Hong Kong and Taiwan, where the Beijing authorities established the “special 
administrative region” or applied another constitutional model of governance. See Pitman B. Potter, 
“Theoretical and Conceptual Perspectives on the Periphery,” in Diana Lary ed., The Chinese State at the 
Borders (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), p. 249. 
  
179 Pamela Kyle Crossley, Helen F. Siu and Donald S. Sutton, eds., Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, 
and Frontier in Early Modern China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), p. 15.  
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and philology. Throughout the history of imperial China, ideas about the configuration of 
space and mankind’s position within such a configuration were of significant importance to 
officials, thinkers, writers, and other intellectuals of all sorts. Exploring China through the 
lens of spatial configuration, as argued by Robin McNeal, is analytically productive, 
because “it opens up a mode of inquiry that was itself enormously productive in Chinese 
history.” In his masterpiece The Construction of Space in Early China, Mark Edward Lewis 
has shown how spatial configuration was applied at every level of Chinese thinking, from 
the skin as the boundary of the human body to visions of the cosmos:  
 
Chinese thinkers insisted on the importance of boundaries 
and at the same time of proper relations across them, so 
that order within and openness to the outside remained 
compatible.180 
 
Mark Lewis unequivocally demonstrates that the importance of boundaries, consisting the 
inner sphere and the outer sphere, was deeply rooted in the Chinese conception of space 
from a philosophical perspective. Similar to Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), Lewis believed 
that space, like time, is relational. As it evolved in imperial China over the span of about a 
thousand years, space came to be ordered and conceived primarily in terms of basic 
juxtapositions such as inner and outer, central and peripheral, superior and inferior. The 
inner and the outer space, in this regard, came to be constructed or represented, through 
actual and conceptual means, to produce or reproduce social and political hierarchies, to 
reveal relationships among micro- and macro- levels of society. For example, in the 
symbolic language of sacred writing, the outer and the inner are referring to images and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 Mark Edward Lewis, The Construction of Space in Early China (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 2006), pp. 1-12. 
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formulations that embrace the law of one’s own inner world and the greater world 
simultaneously;181 in the I-Ching there are the inner spirit and the outer presence;182 the 
civil court contained an inner administrative office (neiting) and an outer political office 
(waiting);183 in the Chinese houses there are inner chambers and outer courtyards; and 
inside those inner chambers there are further divisions between exteriority and interiority.184 
In this regard, it is essential in Chinese culture to be able to understand one’s position in 
space, time and society, and the establishment of a structure of tangible spatial reference 
greatly facilitated this process of orientation. In other words, spatial division such as the 
inner-outer juxtaposition is ubiquitous and omnipresent in Chinese settings and in their 
spaces.  
 
Ruling the Inner Sea Space 
 
Unlike the Portuguese in the seventeenth century who claimed sovereignty over a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 Laozi, translated by Gia-fu Geng, Jane English and Toinette Lippe, Tao Te Ching (New York: Vintage 
Book, 2011), p. xl 
 
182 See Alfred Huang, The Numerology of the I Ching: A Sourcebook of Symbols, Structures, and Traditional 
Wisdom (Rochester: Inner Tradition International, 2000).  
 
183 These two offices were crucial distinctions made between two main spheres of government power. To 
reinforce absolute monarchical control over the unwieldy meritocratic officialdom, dynastic rulers often 
established the neiting as their personal staff in order to keep the growing waiting in careful check. See 
Beatrice S. Bartlett, Monarchs and Ministers: The Grand Council in Mid-Ch'ing China, 1723-1820 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1991), pp. 4-7.  
 
184 In imperial China, men and women were encouraged to keep a strict separation between their respective 
spheres of influence within the household, which is architecturally divided into an inner space, reserved to 
women, and an outer space, reserved to men. Indeed, as argued by Giovanni Vitiello, “inner and outer were 
associated with women and men, and by extension with hetero- and homosexuality, respectively.” See 
Giovanni Vitiello, The Libertine’s Friend: Homosexuality and Masculinity in Late Imperial China (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2011), p. 40.  See also Francesca Bray, Technology and Society in Ming China 
(1368-1644) (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997).  
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sea space not through its proximity but by economic and martial forces, it never occurred to 
the Qing court that the control of a monarch could transcend physical and geographical 
boundaries across thousands of miles of ocean. Instead, the Manchu monarchs insisted on 
the importance of continued action in order to properly govern their inner sea space. They 
saw the inner ocean as a legitimate arena that was critical to the building of the empire as 
well as to national security.185 The Qing court in the eighteenth century thus expended 
energy in ruling and supervising their inner sea space through the establishment of the 
imperial navy. The imperial navy was responsible for guarding and policing five different 
yet interconnected sea zones off the China coast from north to south, namely the Bohai Bay, 
the Jiangsu sea space, the Zhejiang sea space, the Taiwan Strait, and the Guangdong sea 
space. The division of the maritime frontier into five sea zones is evident, once again, in the 
cartographic depictions of the Qishan yuanhai tu. In the Qishan yuanhai tu, the 
cartographer introduced to viewers the conception of dividing line (fenjia) across the 
maritime frontier. For instance, the Jiangsu sea space and the Zhejiang sea space was 
divided by the Jiang-Zhe fenjia (the Jiang-Zhe dividing line), while the Taiwan Strait and 
the Guangdong sea space by the Fujian-Guangdong fenjia (Fujian-Guangdong dividing 
line). Usually, a particular island or a chain of isles was regarded as the indicating 
geographical feature to represent the boundary between the two sea zones on the map.    
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 See, for instance, DaQing Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu 大清聖祖仁皇帝實錄 [Complete records of Emperor 
Kangxi] (Taipei: Xin wenfeng chuban gongsi, 1978), dated to “Kangxi liunian (1667) dingwei jiuyue, renyin 
shuo,” “bingbu yifu [message directed to the Ministry of War];” Zhao Erxun, et al. (eds.), Qing shi gao 清史
稿 [The draft of Qing history], juan 135, “bingzhi,” no. 6, 4015–4018; Qing Gaozong (the Qianlong Emperor), 
Qingchao wenxian tongkao 清朝文獻通考 [Overview of literary studies in the Qing dynasty], juan 185, 
“bingkao,” no. 8, 6463–6470; Zhongguo diyi lishi dang’anguan (ed.), Yongzhengchao Hanwen zhupi zouzhe 
huibian 雍正朝漢文朱批奏折 [Imperial documents approved by the Kangxi Emperor in Chinese] (Nanjing: 
Jiangsu guji chubanshe, 1989–1991), juan 8, “Memorial submitted by Gao Qizhuo,” p. 279. 
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Apart from guarding and policing the five sea zones, the imperial navy bore the 
responsibility of suppressing piratical violence. In fact, the Qing court was eager to 
actualize its sovereignty over its inner sea space by strictly fighting piracy in the eighteenth 
century. In the words of Anne Perotin-Dumon,  
 
confrontations at sea were both an important instrument of 
state power and of a measure of the degree to which state 
authority was actually established......the state was 
responsible for quashing piracy within its own territorial 
waters, that is, where it claimed sovereignty. 186  
 
Therefore, the piracy crises in China, especially in South China, created a challenge for the 
Qing court as to what sort of power and order could be enforced in the sea space, and how 
best to ensure security across the infested waters as well as the maritime littoral. The 
management of piratical violence, in short, was closely related to a consideration of real 
problems associated with maritime sovereignty. The Qing emperors in the eighteenth 
century were keenly aware of these waves of maritime violence. The Yongzheng Emperor, 
for example, instructed his officials many times to crack down on sea raiders. His son, 
Qianlong, ordered the Guangdong and the Zhejiang naval fleets to patrol frequently so as to 
leave no room for illegal trade and other unlawful activities. However, given the 
unpredictable environment and the pirates’ high mobility, the sea bandits could easily 
escape government suppression by retreating to areas where the Qing naval force could 
hardly patrol. Some pirates even used resources in a supranational way so as to survive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 Anne Perotin-Dumon, “The Pirate and the Emperor: Power and Law on the Sea, 1450-1850,” in James D. 
Tracy ed., The Political Economy of Merchant Empires (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 
202.  
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Qing suppression and expand their power and autonomy.187 Consequently, the management 
of piratical disturbances long been remained a problem at the heart of Qing maritime 
spatiality. 
 
In addition to the establishment of a strong navy, the Qing court also gave 
substantial administrative consideration to its inner sea space by setting up the customs 
system. After Taiwan was annexed in 1683, the maritime trade ban was also relaxed. To 
manage sea trade following the end of the embargo policy, Sun Hui, a supervising secretary 
in the revenue office, suggested to the Kangxi Emperor that the government establish a 
customs system to regulate the issuance of licenses and collection of duties. In 1683, 
Kangxi approved Sun’s suggestion and decided to institute the customs system. He 
mentioned to his officials that, 
 
without a regular way of collection, levying duties would 
trouble maritime traders [who would be subject to extortion 
from customs officials]. Therefore, it is necessary to 
establish the same system as the inland one in the coastal 
regions and appoint special officials to deal with the related 
affairs.188 
 
One year after the emperor issued the above edict, Kangxi appointed two Manchu officials, 
Igeertu and Wushiba, as the first heads of the Guangdong (Guangzhou, Xiangshan, and 
Macau) and Fujian (Fuzhou, Nantai, and Xiamen) commissions. Over the next three years, 
two more customs offices were established in Zhejiang (Ningbo and Dinghai) and Jiangsu 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 See Wensheng Wang, White Lotus Rebels and South China Pirates: Crisis and Reform in the Qing Empire, 
pp. 209-229.  
 
188 Gang Zhao, The Qing Opening to the Ocean, p. 118. 
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(Huating, Chongque, and Shanghai). Once the four customs offices were established and 
institutionalized, the maritime activities across the inner sea were being controlled and 
governed. And the establishment of the new customs structure also suggests that the Qing 
court was aware of the fact that the inner sea was different from other land-frontiers in its 
rhythms and dynamics.  
  
By policing and regulating maritime activities across the inner sea space, the Qing 
court was able to assert forcefully its sovereignty over its immediate coastal waters against 
(potential) foreign penetration and invasion. The Qing Empire, however, was not the only 
power in Asia who was proactive in guarding against foreign aggression on domestic 
seawaters. Other Asian rulers also expanded their naval powers to limit foreign influence 
within their maritime region. The Ottomans, for example, had long been in conflict with the 
Portuguese. During the sixteenth century, in order to protect their maritime interests, the 
Ottomans built up a considerable navy that they hoped would reopen the Red Sea route to 
the Persian Gulf despite the Portuguese blockade.189 These Ottoman actions managed to 
hold off the Portuguese invasion for a certain period of time. In the early 1500s Gujarat also 
allied itself with Egypt to regain its trade networks from the Portuguese (they were defeated 
by Portugal in the battle of Diu in 1509).190 There were also a number of small states in 
Asia that mounted an effective response to check the expansion of European sea powers. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 S. Ozbaran, “The Ottoman Turks and the Portuguese in the Persian Gulf, 1534–1581,” Journal of Asian 
History, vol. 6 (1972): 45–87; see also Giancarlo Casale, “The Ottoman Discovery of the Indian Ocean in the 
Sixteenth Century: The Age of Exploration from an Islamic Perspective,” in Jerry H. Bentley, Renate 
Bridenthal, and Kären Wigen eds., Seascape: Maritime Histories, Littoral Cultures, and Transoceanic 
Exchanges (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2007), pp. 87-104.  
 
190 See Edward A. Alpers, “Gujarat and the Trade of East Africa, c. 1500–1800,” The International Journal of 
African Historical Studies, vol. 9 no. 1 (1976), pp. 22-44. 
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For instance, the Kingdom of Oman, located along the southeast coast of the Arabian 
Peninsula, managed to oust the Portuguese from Muscat and a few other coastal enclaves in 
the seventeenth century.191 Although Asian powers did not capitalize on the ocean in the 
same way that the Europeans did (for example, by using the sea as a means to colonize the 
globe), most of them regarded their domestic sea space as a significant sector of their 
activity. And as previously mentioned, they responded effectively to foreign incursions into 
their domestic sea zones with naval militarization or trading restrictions that protected their 
maritime interests. 
 
Before the Manchus came to power, a telling example showing how China projected 
its power beyond the inner sea space was the seven great odysseys led by Zheng He as 
briefly mentioned above. In 1405, the Yongle Emperor (1360-1424; r. 1402-1424) sent 
sixty-three warships carrying 27,000 men across the equatorial and subtropical waters of the 
South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. Over the next twenty-five years, six more 
expeditions were launched and some even reached the east coast of Africa and the Arabian 
peninsula. As Geoffrey Wade has concluded,  
 
[in] the renowned voyages led by Admiral Zheng. He 
revealed that the Ming court exerted considerable power 
from the southern coastal region of China to the coast of 
India.192  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 Abdul Ali, “Struggle between the Portuguese and the Arabs of Oman for Supremacy in the Persian Gulf 
and the Indian Ocean,” Hamdard Islamicus, vol. 9 no. 4 (1986), pp. 75-80. 
 
192 Geoffrey Wade, “The Zheng He Voyages: A Reassessment,” Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal 
Asiatic Society, vol. 78 no. 1 (2005), pp. 37–58; Edward L. Dreyer, Zheng He: China and the Oceans in the 
Early Ming Dynasty, 1405–1433 (New York : Pearson Longman, 2007). 
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The projection of power across the sea space in the early Ming was primarily based on the 
sea-power paradigm theorized by the American admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) 
in the 1890s. Mahan established an extremely influential doctrine that related sea power to 
national strength and prosperity.193 Western European states such as Spain, Portugal, the 
Netherlands, France, and Britain had fought their way to power via the ocean, while 
Germany, Japan, and the United States were following the same path in the late nineteenth 
century. Within the paradigm set up by Mahan, modern historians tended to agree that 
Zheng He’s voyages, representing the Ming court, indicated that China also had the 
capability to pursue a program of imperial and colonial expansion based on sea power. 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that the Chinese projection of power to the outer sea space 
differs from the trans-oceanic projection of power by the Portuguese, the Dutch, the French, 
and the British. The Chinese imperial court did not seek to claim sovereignty across other 
sea spaces in order to generate economic wealth. Even though Zheng He reached the coast 
of the Arabian world and eastern Africa, his large fleet did not attempt to conquer territories 
or set up colonies. His purpose was merely to establish and consolidate diplomatic relations 
with foreign countries, and to strengthen commercial contacts between the Ming and other 
Asian states across the Indian Ocean. According to Satish Chandra, the policy of combining 
trade with establishing monopolies by dominating the ocean “was uniquely European.”194 In 
contrast to those European seaborne powers that were interested in sponsoring overseas 
colonialism,195 both the Ming and Qing Empires did not recognize the need to capitalize 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 (New York: Sagamore Press, 
1957).  
 
194 Satish Chandra, The Indian Ocean: Explorations in History, Commerce and Politics, p. 26. 
 
195 European traders could rely on their states to provide military, financial, and legal support for overseas 
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upon their naval supremacy beyond their inner sea. In other words, they did not seek to 
transcend the division segregating domestic and foreign sea space.196 It is probable that they 
viewed the domestic sea space as a part of their territorial realm and sought merely to keep 
the inner ocean under tight imperial control and supervision. In this regard, the inner-outer 
model could partly explain China’s general disinclination, unlike that of Western Europe, 
toward conceptualizing the ocean as a power base and a battleground for international 
conflicts and competition.  
 
When we talk about Qing ruling activities across its inner sea space, one might think 
of the sea blockade policy (haijin) issued by the high Qing emperors. In the late seventeenth 
century the Kangxi Emperor issued an imperial decree to “block the sea (jinhai)” by 
imposing a strict ban on navigation, which aimed at cutting off ties between the insurrection 
in Taiwan led by Zheng Chenggong (or Koxinga; 1624-1662) and the coastal population in 
Fujian.197 In view of the sea blockade policy, some historians concluded that the Qing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
expansion. For example, the Dutch East India Company in the early seventeenth century benefited from 
exceptional government support. Although it was in name a private trading company, it was in actuality an 
official arm of the Dutch state, which intended to establish a trading empire all over the world. The Dutch East 
India Company had the right to sign treaties, subjugate people, and establish colonies, all in the name of the 
Estates General of the United Provinces. For more details, see John E. Wills Jr., “Maritime Asia, 1500–1800: 
The Interactive Emergence of European Domination,” American Historical Review, vol. 98 (February 1993), 
pp. 83-105. In addition, I would argue that the Japanese daimyo during the Warring States period also 
supported maritime expansion, although they did not always combine trade with establishing monopolies to 
set up overseas colonies. Similar to the situation in sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe, Japan was 
divided into independent and fiercely competitive states, each of which sought revenues to fund wars against 
its rivals. Like the European seaborne power, the Japanese daimyo encouraged piracy and armed expansion 
overseas. But whereas the situation in Europe lasted until 1945, Japan’s Warring States period only lasted a 
century. 
 
196 But it has to be noted that some scholars, such as Nicola Di Cosmo and Dorothea Heuschert, argue that the 
Qing should be considered a colonial empire. See for instance Nicola Di Cosmo, “Qing Colonial 
Administration in Inner Asia,” pp. 287-309; Dorothea Heuschert, “Legal Pluralism in the Qing Empire: 
Manchu Legislation for the Mongols,” International  History Review vol. 20, no. 2 (1998), pp. 310-24. 
 
197 Jonathan D. Spence, “The K’ang-hsi Reign,” in The Cambridge history of China. Vol. 9. Part 1, Ch'ing 
Empire to 1800, ed. Willard J. Peterson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 150-160. 
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Empire “was an isolated land-power which ignored the ocean,” and ended up leaving the 
seas open to Western Europeans.198 However, there is a problem to that conclusion because 
it has overlooked the actual reason for activating the sea ban. In fact, the coastal evacuation 
meant only that the specific concern about security had trumped all other concerns, it did 
not mean that the Qing court began to keep a distance from the sea. Even during the period 
of the sea blockade policy, Kangxi began extensive shipbuilding, the fortification of coastal 
cities, the training of marine forces,199 as well as establishing an alliance with the Dutch in 
order to utilize and learn from their advanced naval technology.200 As soon as the region 
was pacified and economic growth once again became politically feasible in the early 
eighteenth century, the emperor and the banner elites immediately questioned the blockade 
restrictions. In this regard, the Qing court was arguably far from ignoring the inner sea even 
during the so-called age of blockade as the haijin policy could be read as a strategy of sea 
denial,201 which aimed to prevent opponents from achieving sea control. By rendering the 
sea secure for its own military and commercial purposes, the Qing still viewed every part of 
its inner ocean as a special strategic area that was of vital importance. 
 
Beyond mare liberum and mare clausum 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
198 For instance, Barry Cunliffe, Europe between the Oceans: 9000BC-AD1000 (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2008, second edition 2011), vii.  
 
199 See Du Zhen, Yue Min xun shi ji lüe (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2008), juan 1, p. 10a.  
 
200 See John E, Wills, Jr., Pepper, Guns, and Parleys: The Dutch East India Company and China 1622–1681 
(Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 98-99; pp. 125-132.  
 
201 For details about the strategy of sea denial, see Ministry of Defence, British Maritime Doctrine (Norwich, 
U.K.: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2004), pp. 41–43. 
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In his The International Law of the Sea, D.P.O. Connell examines the history of 
ocean governance as a fluctuation between the concept of free seas (Grotius’s mare 
liberum) and enclosed seas (Selden’s mare clausum):  
 
The history of the law of the sea has been dominated by a 
central and persistent theme: the competition between the 
exercise of governmental authority over the sea and the 
idea of the freedom of the seas…When one or two great 
commercial powers have been dominant or have achieved 
parity of power, the emphasis in practice has lain upon the 
liberty of navigation and the immunity of shipping from 
local control. When, on the one hand, great powers have 
been in decline or have been unable to impose their wills 
upon smaller states, or when an equilibrium of power has 
been attained between a multiplicity of states, the emphasis 
has lain upon the protection and reservation of maritime 
resources, and consequently upon the assertion of local 
authority over the sea.202 
 
O’Connell’s observation is somewhat accurate, but his binary characterization depends 
upon a conventional staticization of legal principles, and on ocean management strategies 
that overshadow what actually has been a dynamic and fluid history in East Asian 
seawaters. Indeed, the Qing government in the long eighteenth century exercised its 
maritime hegemony in a manner that was very different from that exercised by the 
Portuguese, the French, and the British in the eighteenth century. As a corollary, Connell’s 
example suggests that the binary classifications of “freedom” and “enclosure” in maritime 
governance might not be as absolute as they first appear. It also suggests that the 
construction of a “freedom versus enclosure” dichotomy can lie only within a specifically 
European organization of space and society, but is obviously not a global, symmetrical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202  O’Connell, The International Law of the Sea (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 1.  
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pattern. 
 
One of the important systems mentioned by Connell is the mare liberum. In 
response to Iberian complaints about French encroachments on their littoral, Francis I 
(1494-1547; r. 1515-1547), the French monarch, proclaimed that navigation of the seas was 
open to all nations. In 1608 Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) theorized Francis I’s actions as the 
notion of mare liberum. By mare liberum, Grotius declared that the sea was an international 
territory and that all countries were free to use it for seafaring activities. He further 
indicated that freedom to navigate the oceans was an essential condition for the 
development of international sea trade.203 Unlike Francis I and Grotius, the Qing court did 
not mention anything about the freedom of navigation. Nor did it ever claim that all 
countries had a “basic right” to the open waters beyond their inner sea space.204 In other 
words, High Qing emperors did not formulate any concepts similar to those of James I of 
England (1566-1625; r. 1567–1625), Elizabeth I, or Francis I –– namely, that both “royal 
jurisdiction” and “free trade property right” could be exerted on any watery surface of the 
globe.205 Rather, in the eighteenth century the Qing Empire continued to model the sea 
space after their inner-outer conception. To the Manchu government the inner sea was akin 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 Grotius was even praised as the “father of the law of nations.” For instance, John C. Colombos suggested 
that “Grotius’s treatise achieved such an international reputation that before the end of the seventeenth century 
it was generally considered embodying the rules of international law and he, therefore, deserves the title 
‘Father of the Law of Nations,’ by which he is usually styled.” See John C. Colombos, The International Law 
of the Sea [the sixth edition] (New York: David McKay, 1967), p. 8. 
 
204 For instance, Emperor Qianlong had once stated that the seawater near the Ryūkyū Kingdom only belonged 
to the Ryūkyū monarch, even though at that time Ryūkyū was one of the Qing’s tributaries. See DaQing 
Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu, juan 167, dinghai, “Ju Zhejiang tidu Pei Shi zou.” 
 
205 Anthony Pagden, Lords of all the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France, c. 1500–c. 
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to the land-space and thus was subject to a high degree of social incorporation and territorial 
control. In contrast to Western European powers, the Manchu Empire viewed the inner sea 
as part of its territory; what lay beyond this space was simply beyond their interest to 
control. By understanding this inner-outer conception, we can also revise some of the 
conventional notions about the Qing Empire, including the idea that, unlike other seaborne 
powers, it viewed the ocean as an insignificant space outside or beyond the empire and 
therefore immune to societal, land-like territorial control. In fact, as this chapter seeks to 
illustrate, for the Manchu government the inner sea was spatially important to their 
territorial control and empire-building program. The Manchu court governed the sea as 
much as they governed the land: as a political space to be demarcated and controlled 
according to their spatial principles that were based on the conception of an inner-outer 
realm. 
 
The Challenges 
 
From 1683 (the year of Taiwan’s annexation) to 1795 (when the Qianlong Emperor 
abdicated the throne), the Qing Empire was at the zenith of its control and power; its 
resources were utilized in expansion, occupation, and stabilization. Throughout this golden 
epoch, the Manchu court had successfully maintained its dominance, which allowed it to 
claim sovereignty and jurisdiction over the inner sea space without fierce resistance. 
However, during the first two decades of the nineteenth century the Qing was in decline 
and, owing to a series of internal and external crises, the Manchu rulers were forced to 
revise their inner-outer model.
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During this period of turmoil and disorder, it took some time for the Qing state to 
modify its ruling mechanism from one marked by “an extraordinary combination of 
expansion and stability”206 to one that aimed at resolving the problems of overpopulation, 
economic downturn, and two destructive rebellions –– the Miao Rebellion of 1795 and the 
White Lotus Rebellion a year later. Unfortunately, most of the new policies attempted by 
the Jiaqing government were futile. The costs of putting down the two rebellions in 1804 
had almost depleted the state treasury,207 and by the end of the 1810s the remaining 60 
million silver taels in the reserve were drained away by other domestic crises.208 The veneer 
of glorious stability created by Qianlong could no longer be maintained in his declining 
years. 
  
With the death of the Emperor Qianlong in 1799, the Qing navy descended into a 
state of passivity and incompetence. The Qing court was no longer as proactive in 
safeguarding the inner sea space as it had been during the golden age. In the case of 
Guangdong, for example, the military presence along the coast was hopelessly 
overstretched: only 137 fortresses dotted the 2,500 kilometer coast in 1806. These 
fortresses, more importantly, were insufficiently manned, poorly equipped, and loosely 
coordinated. Patrolling fleets were also spread hopelessly thin, given the size of the area 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 Pamela Kyle Crossley, The Manchus (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1997), p. 108. 
 
207 William T. Rowe, China’s Last Empire: The Great Qing (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 
2009), 149–175; Wang Yeh-chien, Land Taxation in Imperial China, 1750–1911 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1973), 131; John Robert Shepherd, Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 
1600–1800 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 398. 
 
208 See Helen Dunstan, State or Merchant: The Political Economy and Political Process in 1740s China 
(Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press), p. 446. 
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they had to patrol and protect. According to Nayancheng, the governor-general of 
Liangguang, there were over 1,000 pirate vessels in Guangdong waters, but the provincial 
navy had merely 87 battleships at that time.209 Furthermore, the Qing court was strained by 
its prolonged and expensive battles against domestic rebellions; further militarization along 
the maritime frontier would have seemed an exorbitant and unnecessary cost. Due to the 
shortage of funding the navy was incapable of enhancing their combat powers, and the 
government had to rely on customs revenues and borrowed money from merchants and 
religious groups to support the military operations against the Miao and the White Lotus.210 
Without state support and plentiful sponsorship, substantiation and aggrandizement of naval 
militarization were impossible. Over the course of the nineteenth century the Qing navy had 
deteriorated to an extent that they even lacked the ability to check illegal sea crimes along 
the littoral. For example, the period between 1802 and 1810 saw the rise of large-scale 
pirate leagues that pillaged and terrorized the south China coast. Pirate chiefs such as Zhu 
Fen and Cai Qian even formed an alliance, trying to set up a maritime regime in Taiwan. 
More importantly, these piratical predations in Guangdong and Fujian was directly 
supported by the newly unified Vietnamese state that emerged from the Tay Son rebellion 
of the 1770s. Secret sponsorship by foreign powers not only integrated different bands of 
Chinese pirates into several well-equipped fleets operating in the Guangdong sea zone, it 
also showcased the structural limits of the Qing state to properly govern its maritime 
frontier, thereby suggesting that the Manchu’s suzerainty over the inner sea space became 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209 Imperial edict of May 30, 1804, collected in Jiaqing Daoguang liangchao shangyudang (Imperial edicts of 
the Jiaqing-Daoguang reigns) (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2000).  
 
210 DaQing lichao shilu 大清歷朝實錄 (Renzongchao) [Veritable records of successive reigns of the Qing 
dynasty, the Jiaqing reign] (Taipei: Huawen shuju, 1964), juan 91, 6b–7b. 
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increasingly nominal. 
 
Apart from this series of domestic crises, the Qing Empire in the nineteenth century 
was also challenged by the encroachment of Western imperialists. After the dissolution of 
the Napoleonic Empire at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the newly enshrined 
international order provided Western European powers with greater impetus for overseas 
expansion, asserted and materialized by the advancements in steel-making and other steam-
powered industrial technologies that had ensured the modernization of the military. The 
seaborne powers of the West, as William T. Rowe has pointed out, “now found 
[themselves] suddenly in possession of the motives (a need for foreign markets), the 
ideological justification (the comity of nations and free-trade liberalism), and the means 
(new military technologies)” to force the “opening” of the Qing Empire, as well as other 
East Asian countries.211 
 
Among various European powers, Britain – which had created a vast naval 
enterprise sustained by industrial might and unparalleled financial resources – was the first 
to declare war on China. Exploiting the chaotic situation in Chinese seawaters, Britain 
launched two naval expeditions to occupy the longtime Portuguese settlement of Macau in 
1802 and 1808. Situated between the West River and Pearl River estuary, Macao consists of 
a small peninsula and two islands near Canton. Starting from the sixteenth century, the 
Portuguese gradually turned Macau from a desolate region into a flourishing trading 
seaport. In the words of Robert Montgomery Martin, Macao became “the best and most 
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important pillar the Portuguese had in all the East.”212 Unlike the British, the Portuguese 
approach to China rested on a sense of economic pragmatism. Their assistance to the 
suppression of late Ming piracy helped them gain settlement rights in Macao in 1557. 
During the Ming and Qing, the Portuguese even paid a symbolic annual tribute and 
practiced obligatory rituals like the kowtow in order to show their submission. The Qing 
court therefore decided to bestow on the Portuguese the right to set up their own municipal 
government elected by local Portuguese inhabitants in Macao, enabling them to have a 
considerable amount of self-governing power in the settlement. However, none of this 
meant that the Qing had given up control over Macao and the seawaters surrounding the 
city. The Qing court instead gradually intensified their bureaucratic oversight over this 
region in the eighteenth century. In 1763, for instance, a Chinese official was posted in 
Macao, followed by a district magistrate at mid-century and a vice magistrate in 1800.213 
That said, the Qing was the real master of Macao before the outbreak of the First Opium 
War. Therefore, the British attempt to occupy Macao as their trading foothold in China was 
concretely violating the Qing’s rule over its inner sea space of Guangdong. Harney William 
Parish of the Royal Artillery at that time even calculated that a British occupation of Macao 
would lead to either the rise of contraband trade or the independence of south China from 
the Qing Empire.214 Later in the 1802, the British decided to send warships to Chinese 
seawaters, even though they hoped to achieve their mission without waging a war with 
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Portugal or with the Qing. True or not, such military action undertaken by the British was 
sufficient enough to alarm the Jiaqing emperor. Yet unlike in previous decades, the Qing at 
that time was unable to suppress the British militarily in order to restore order in Macao. 
Alternatively, the Qing court turned to collaborate with the Portuguese so as to protect its 
sovereignty across the inner sea space by signing a convention with the Portuguese in 
response to British movements.  
 
In order to avoid military conflict with both the Qing and the Portuguese, the British 
sought to find a new way to achieve their ambitions. In 1805, the British noticed that the 
seawaters off the Macao coast were disturbed by swarming Chinese pirate fleets, they thus 
volunteered to provide naval assistance to fight against the pirates between Macao and 
Canton. In return, the British presented a request to expand their interest and power in 
Macao and the Pearl River region. As the piracy crises intensified dramatically, the Qing 
court became more receptive toward offers of British help since the Portuguese had been 
found using their routine patrol off the Canton coast to facilitate opium trafficking. In order 
to suppress the sea bandits without further delay, the Jiaqing emperor accepted the British 
proposal to dispatch warships to escort the EIC’s cargoes to and from the mouth of the Pearl 
River.215  
  
The British, however, were not entirely satisfied with the arrangement. They became 
more aggressive in 1807 and 1808, when the army of Napoleonic France invaded Portugal 
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and forced the Lisbon government to flee to Brazil. On July 21, 1808, William O’Brien 
Drury, the British Admiral who was based in Bengal, arrived in Macao waters with a 
detachment of three hundred marines. His squadron of nine warships anchored off the place 
called Chicken Neck (Jijing), the sea space off Xiangshan county.216 With only two hundred 
soldiers in the Portuguese garrison, the Portuguese governor of Macao, Bernardo Aleixo de 
Lemos Faria, believed that the only way to fight the British was to follow British orders 
while sending for Qing help.217 As the British moved into the city of Macao on August 2, 
Miguel de Arriaga, the chief justice of Faria, worked diplomatically with the Qing 
authorities in Canton. He emphasized that if the Chinese were serious about the sovereignty 
over their inner sea off Macao, the Qing court should send troops to drive the British 
away.218 Even though the Qing realized that Britain might menace and rock the empire, 
Jiaqing heavily criticized the British that their unauthorized intrusion was an outright 
assault on Qing sovereignty of their inner sea space,  
 
If you say you (the British) come because the pirates have 
not yet been suppressed and you are eager to serve the 
Celestial Empire, this is utter nonsense! The pirates on the 
seas have been repeatedly suppressed, and now they are 
powerless, driven to escape now to the east, now to the 
west……Within the near future, the remaining pirates will 
be annihilated. We do not need to borrow military aid from 
your country. We can well imagine that the barbarian 
merchants of your country, jealous of Portuguese privileges 
at Macao, wished to take advantage of the critical moment 
when the Portuguese were weak, and attempt to occupy 
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Macao and live there. If this is the case, you have 
drastically violated the laws of the Celestial Empire.219 
 
This is an important edict because it shows that the Jiaqing Emperor, representing the Qing, 
was eager to protect its sovereignty over its inner sea space, even though the empire was 
suffering from a series of domestic crises and financial problems. Moreover, as carefully 
analyzed by Wensheng Wang, the emperor toned down in this edict the much “celebrated 
rhetoric of tributary superiority……He instead took the moral high ground through another 
route: by emphasizing the relatively new norms of formal equality, territorial rights, 
reciprocity, and nonintervention.”220 Since the British were not entirely ready to fight the 
Qing at that time and, more importantly, they were worried about destroying the trade for 
the season, Jiaqing’s warning achieved its desired effect. On October 25, British warships 
cruising near the Bogue and Whampoa were ordered to withdraw from the Pearl River 
within forty-eight hours, while all other ships of war anchoring at Macao had to leave the 
peninsula on November 12.221  
  
Britain’s relationship with the Qing, however, seemed to take an uneasy turn for the 
worse. In the early 1840s, it is well known that the British were ready to wage a war by 
sending their fleets up the Pearl River and Canton, occupied Dinghai in July, and the next 
month threatened to move directly to Beijing. After the decisive blow to Qing defenses in 
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the Yangtze Valley,222 the Qing court was sent into a tailspin. Unlike his father, the 
Daoguang Emperor (1782-1850; r. 1821-1850) decided to conclude a treaty of peace in 
August 1842. The British Navy was then authorized to patrol the Yangtze region regularly 
and to set up a colony as well as a naval base in Hong Kong. But the Treaty of Nanjing did 
not contain any specific stipulations about extra-territoriality (zhiwai faquan), the 
jurisdiction that penetrated both water layers of protection and profoundly defaced the 
inner-outer model. Such provision was only formally granted to the British after the 
“General Regulations of Trade” were signed between England and the Qing in July 1843. 
 
Following the British example, in subsequent years the French and Americans also 
concluded treaties with the Qing government that contained extra-territorial clauses. 
Against the backdrop of the humiliating treaty port system, the extra-territoriality practiced 
in China was likewise inequitable. While the foreigners settling and sailing along the coast 
would be exempted from the law of the Great Qing, Chinese sojourners in Europe and 
North America had to submit to foreign laws.223 Clearly, extra-territoriality not only meant 
that foreigners in China could be tried under their own consular jurisdiction, but also forced 
the Qing Empire to give up its sovereignty over some part of its inner sea space. In stark 
contrast to the maritime policies in the High Qing, when all vessels sailing across the inner 
sea were strictly monitored by imperial supervision, the implementation of extra-
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territoriality in China challenged the inner-outer framework substantially for the first time 
in Chinese history.  
 
The Qing government was far from ignorant of the potential hazards and problems 
brought about by an unequal extra-territorial treaty. After signing the “General Regulations 
of Trade” with Britain, the Manchu government emphasized that the legal concessions 
made to the British should never be taken as precedents for other countries.224 There was an 
incident in December 1842 (after the First Opium War) when Lawrence Kearny (1789-
1868), an American commodore, went to Guangzhou and asked for similar privileges. He 
was directly rebuffed and commanded by the Daoguang Emperor to stick to the “old rules” 
that had been established during the High Qing. Yet things took a sharp turn under the 
advice of two Manchu statesmen, Yilibu (1772-1843) and Qi Ying (1787-1858), who 
suggested that Daoguang extend the same privileges granted to Britain to other foreign 
powers across the inner sea space. Their rationale was that this would avoid any appearance 
that the British Empire was a pre-eminent power along China’s maritime frontier.225 By 
granting the same privileges to other foreign powers (yiti junzhan), the Qing government 
could limit the influence of the British to the extent that no other countries would rely on 
her agency to seek further interests in China. The Qing government called this diplomatic 
tactic “controlling one barbarian [with] the other barbarian.” This strategic turn also implied 
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an adjustment to the inner-outer model. By “decentralizing” some level of its sovereign 
power across the inner sea space to several foreign nations, the Qing government believed 
that it would be able to protect its imperial autonomy because foreign powers would have to 
compete with each other for commercial interests. To the Manchu monarchs these 
adjustments were, in a sense, tantamount to an overhaul of the strategy required to 
safeguard the maritime frontier and entailed a new type of sea-modeling. 
  
Conclusion 
  
In his The Social Construction of the Ocean, Philip E. Steinberg explained that the 
history of ocean space is “explicitly constructivist,” and one in which institutional 
arrangements, social structures, individual behaviors, and natural features all intersect to 
create special territorial space either on land or at sea.226 By positioning the history of the 
ocean within the spatiality of territoriality, the inner-outer framework detailed in this 
chapter may reflect how particular seawaters were criss-crossed by natural features and 
institutional practice of actual regimes in special historical eras. My argument here 
resonates somewhat with Henri Lefebvre’s (1901–1991) “admonition” that the production 
of space is not only social and dialectical but also political. 227  In examining the 
epistemological perspective of the inner-outer model, I have also demonstrated that such 
spatial-pairs were very much the outcome of territorial politics. As Peter J. Talyor suggested 
in 1991, territoriality is  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 Philip E. Steinberg, The Social Construction of the Ocean (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
pp. 1-7. 
 
227 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991).  
 
   
 
	  
106	  
 
[a] form of behavior that uses [the] bounding of space 
for political advantage. Territoriality is about 
attempting to control both people and their activities 
within a delimited area and flows of people and their 
products in and out of an area.228  
 
Patently, the inner-outer model was used to define possession and differential rights of 
access in the oceanic territory. It was also a conceptualization used by the Manchu 
government to define which peoples and resources were under their control, and to define 
exactly what that relationship of control should be. In fact, the inner-outer model adopted 
by the Qing Empire was similar to the territorial conception embraced by European 
seaborne powers in the eighteenth century, in which territoriality was constructed in a way 
that supported empire-building and the concept of a political space. In exploring the 
European history of territoriality in the eighteenth century, Edward W. Soja defined the 
concept of territoriality as  
 
…a behavioral phenomenon associated with the 
organization of space into spheres of influence or 
clearly demarcated territories which are made 
distinctive and considered at least partially exclusive 
by their occupants or definers.229 
 
Edward Soja pays little attention to the Qing Empire, but one sees in his statement that the 
Manchu government also conceptualized and constructed the inner sea space in a way that 
was similar to Western Europe. The inner-outer model presents one of the clearest pieces of 
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evidence for such similarities, since the model itself consolidated the political system of a 
sovereign, territorially defined sea space. Like the European oceanic powers, the High Qing 
also utilized various territorial mechanisms at sea to manufacture specific social 
constructions, while these social constructions created certain spatial patterns that were 
closely linked with the idea of sovereignty (the inner sea space) and otherness (the outer sea 
space). As a corollary, the inner-outer framework had played a key role in constructing 
“other” foreign sea space and in facilitating the conceptualization of the inner sea as a 
relative space (in distinction to the outer sea space) where power was to be applied and 
projected. 
 
Over a century this “inner-outer framework” had been trusted as a viable principle 
upon which the Manchu monarchs could base their maritime affairs. But in the late 
eighteenth century, when the Qing Empire no longer had the resources to maintain a 
substantial naval power across her neihai region, it faced a cluster of crises. The passing 
away of the Qianlong Emperor marked a turning point in the political strength of the Great 
Qing, which had been tossed into a road of irretrievable decline. By the early nineteenth 
century the navy was plagued by inertia, backwardness, and indecision. Had the succeeding 
emperors been equal to their predecessors in terms of vision and ability, they would have 
mobilized a comprehensive naval reform to save their empire from the encroachments of 
the European seaborne powers. However, military revolution remained a pipe dream and 
the naval structure bequeathed by the high Qing continued until the First Opium War. As a 
result, by the 1840s most warships, naval bases, and armed forts were too outmoded to meet 
any challenges, and the navy was undermanned and badly trained. Although there was an 
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appeal for naval reforms during the Daoguang era, most attempts to facilitate change 
dribbled away into an ocean of inertia. As Mao Haijian has succinctly pointed out, “China 
at that time was in no position to challenge the British Empire.”230 Compared to the 
European armadas, which were formed by armed and better-equipped warships, which were 
indispensable for the realization of their aggressive policies in East Asia,231 the Manchu 
navy was pathetically inferior. Only after the two Opium Wars when the Qing Empire 
suffered crushing defeats did the Manchu monarchs begin to restore their sovereign power 
across the inner sea space. 
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Chapter Three 
The Dragon Navy 
 
Abstract 
After examining how maritime space was conceptually modeled on an “inner-outer” 
conception in the high Qing, we will see how this model was put into practice as policy 
during the long eighteenth century. This chapter will thus uncover the historical background 
and overall structure of maritime militarization in the high Qing, including the 
establishment and construction of naval bases, warships, and coastal fortresses. By detailing 
the development of high Qing naval forces, I argue that maritime militarization under that 
regime aimed at securing major seaways and port cities within its inner sea perimeter. To 
better illustrate the goals and duties of Qing naval forces, I have divided the inner sea space 
into four different, yet interconnected, strategic sea zones, showing how specific naval 
tactics were applied to those respective zones. Although this chapter only provides an 
overview of the high Qing maritime militarization project from 1683 to 1798 (115 years), I 
believe, it amply demonstrates that the efforts of the Qing court were not simply a 
contingent reaction to unexpected circumstances, but a deliberate, precautionary strategy 
that offered an effective response that aimed at thorough, formal coastal rule. 
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Introduction 
 
In 1990, the naval commander of the Peoples’ Liberation Army, Zhang Lianzhong, 
bemoaned the defeats of China’s nineteenth-century sea battles:  
We will never forget that China was invaded seven times 
by imperialist troops from the sea. The nation’s suffering 
for lack of sea defense still remains fresh in our minds, and 
history must not repeat itself.232  
 
In reminiscing these nineteenth-century maritime defeats, Zhang was calling for a strong 
PRC navy in the late twentieth century. He portrays the Qing as a passive victim on the sea 
and anything but a naval power. Zhang is not alone in refusing to grant the Qing Empire a 
place in world history as a sea power. Conventional historiography has cast the Qing as 
indifferent to the maritime world and portrayed naval development as a marginal and 
subordinate realm for the Qing court. In other words, the sea and the navy simply did not 
appeal to the Qing leadership or the Chinese literati. It has long been said that the Qing only 
began to realize the importance of establishing a powerful and sustainable naval force after 
the First Opium War. From this vantage point, eighteenth century Qing history seems to 
have nothing to do with maritime militarization or naval development. As Benjamin A. 
Elman once put it, “the Qing court in the 1860s and we today might have heralded the 
revival of the Qing navy after the Opium wars as a return to the brighter days of the early 
fifteenth, mid-sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries.”233 Thus, coverage of the eighteenth 
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century is always left out of the naval history of late imperial China. This chapter aims to 
challenge this convention, showing that the high Qing can—and should—be studied from 
the perspective of naval-power. The Qing Empire was not merely driven by the 
imperialistic impulse to conquer territory in Inner Asia. Instead, the empire cared about 
security across East Asian seas, and its naval project was sufficiently deliberate and 
precautionary to offer an effective response that aimed at thorough, formal coastal rule. 
Furthermore, I would argue that the navy’s ability to consolidate and maintain peace along 
the maritime frontier made it possible for Qing troops to carry out its conquests in Inner 
Asia in the eighteenth century. During most of the Kang-Yong-Qian period (1661-1796), 
the Qing navy was effective in suppressing piracy, protecting commodity shipping, and 
intimidating real and potential enemies. Its supremacy in East Asian seas also fostered 
domestic and Sino-nanyang trade before the Age of Imperialism, when the pattern of trade 
among Western European nations in East and Southeast Asia changed considerably. In the 
broader context of Asian power relations, the Qing navy was thus one of the vehicles the 
empire used to showcase the empire’s sea power in the eighteenth century, developing its 
trading interests, securing the China coast, and supporting the transport and provisioning of 
activities required for the empire’s littoral governance.  
 
Establishing the Navy 
 
The history of the Manchu navy began in 1615, almost thirty years before the 
Manchus entered the Sea Mountain Pass (Shanhai guan) and swept across northeast China. 
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According to the Collected Archival Materials written in Manchu (Menwen laodang), the 
founder of the Qing dynasty, Nurhaci (r. 1616-1626), was the first Qing monarch to 
organize and create a “navy”:  
 
 
The Manchus were not familiar with warship construction 
before entering China. On July 9, 1615, Nurhaci sent out 600 
followers to the River Ulgiyan in order to harvest timbers for 
navy construction. But at that time, the Manchus were only 
able to build 200 lightweight canoes.234 
 
 
The text indicates that Nurhaci sent his troops to harvest timber for warship construction in 
what is now Huanren County. Although this navy was poorly structured, the Manchu did 
manage to establish a naval presence in Manchuria, mainly to facilitate logistical support 
for banner cavalries before invading the Ming Empire. At that time, the navy was not well 
trained as the Manchu administration did not give priority to naval development.  
 
It was at the turn of the seventeenth century that the Qing firmly and decisively set 
out to develop and expand its navy, beginning earnestly under the Kangxi emperor. Under 
Kangxi’s reign, military and naval capabilities built up in earlier decades were utilized and 
expanded. At that time, the Zheng family attempted to overthrow the Manchu leadership 
and restore the Ming dynasty by establishing a remarkable navy based in Taiwan.235 In 
response, the Qing emperor imposed an embargo to isolate Taiwan and began expanding its 
navy. Following this grand strategy, the Qing Empire worked toward building a most 
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  Menwen laodang, p. 78.  
	  
235 In 1654, Zheng even renamed Xiamen “the Ming Memorial Prefecture” (Siming zhou). Clearly, the Zheng 
party chose the side of the old regime, declaring themselves loyal to the Ming dynasty and recognizing the 
price of Tang (Zhu Yujian, a Ming descendant known as the Longwu emperor) as rightful heir to the empire.  
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formidable navy and planned ever greater naval conquests. The only obstacle was the lack 
of skilled sailors and an outstanding naval commander. To meet this need, the emperor 
skillfully recruited Shi Lang (1621-1696), who defected from Zheng’s side to join the Qing 
force. As “one of the very few maritime experts in the very continental early Qing,”236 Shi 
was given the authority to lead and direct the navy in Fujian. Over the course of two 
decades (1662 -1683), he launched a major naval reorganization aimed at increasing the 
number of skilled sailors, repairing the existing fleet, constructing more powerful new 
battleships, and adopting Dutch military technology on navy vessels.237  Under Shi’s 
leadership, Qing soldiers became effective fighting at sea and vessels became more 
formidable. After over twenty years of preparation, the emperor ordered Shi Lang, 
commanding 300 warships and a force of 20,000 sailors, to attack the Zheng naval base in 
the Pescadores in the summer of 1683. Shi’s navy succeeded and moved on to attack Zheng 
Keshuang (1670-1707), the leader of the Tungning Kingdom and the grandson of Zheng 
Chenggong (Koxinga), and other surviving leaders in southern Taiwan. In August of that 
year, Zheng Keshuang was unable to repulse the Qing attack and surrendered to the Kangxi 
Emperor, instead of committing suicide. The fifty-plus year rivalry between Qing and 
Zheng forces ultimately came to an end. This long campaign against the Zheng was 
arguably one of the most successful examples of maritime warfare planned and fought by 
the Qing court, making the 1680s one of the most successful historical watersheds of Qing 
governance. This was embodied in the initiation of maritime militarization in the North and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236 John E. Wills, Jr. The Seventeenth-Century Transformation: Taiwan Under the Dutch and the Cheng 
Regime, in Murray A. Rubinstein, Taiwan: A New History (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2007), p. 96.  
 
237	  Christine	  Verente et al., The Authentic Story of Taiwan: An Illustrated History Based on Ancient Maps, 
Manuscripts and Prints (Taipei: Mappamundi Books, 1991), pp. 127-130. 
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South, as well as the extension of power across territory (both continental and maritime) 
previously controlled by the Ming Dynasty. 
 
Other historians have called the 1680s a turning point in the development of the 
Qing Empire, but mostly based on the Qing defeat of the Revolt of the Three Feudatories, 
the Inner-Asia frontier, and the Zunghar question in the North.238 However, the place of 
maritime development on this epochal change to Qing state development has not received 
the attention it deserves. I think this neglect of maritime concerns stems largely from the 
logic that once Taiwan was conquered and under Qing control; that is, as long as all of the 
known threats to the empire were eliminated, the Beijing court could ignore the ocean and 
devote all its energy to “marching West [to Inner Asia].”239 However, I believe that elite 
Qing authorities did not dichotomize the land-sea relationship, in the sense that the 
expansion of land was not necessarily predicated on the neglect of the sea, and vice versa. I 
maintain that the Qing tended to control both naval management and Westward expansion 
so as to maintain the empire in a balanced manner. The logic of mutual exclusivity seems to 
stem from Emperor Kangxi’s statement that “Taiwan is a barbaric, distant island (waidao) 
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  Before 1800 the focus of Qing history was on Inner Asia – its conquest, and its politics. See Lawrence D. 
Kessler, K’ang-his and the Consolidation of Ch’ing Rule (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), pp. 
97-103; Mark Mancall, Russia and China; Their Diplomatic Relations Until 1728 (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1971), chapter 2-5; Joseph Fletcher, “Ch’ing Inner Asia c. 1800,” in The Cambridge 
History of China, Vol. 10, Part 1, pp. 35-39; Jonathan D. Spence, “The K’ang-His Reign,” in The Cambridge 
History of China, p. 150; Yuan Sengpo, Kang Yong Qian jingying yu kaifa beijiang [The Qing governance and 
explorations of the northern frontiers during the Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong periods] (Beijing: 
Zhongguo shehuikexue chubanshe, 1991), pp. 36-58.  
	  
239 See Peter Perdue, China Marches West. Pamela Kyle Crossley also pointed out that the Great Qing was by 
an significant empire, one of the largest, most powerful and influential of the early modern period. Along with 
the Romanov Empire based in Russia, the Ottoman Empire based in Turkey, and the Mogul Empire of India, 
“the Qing was one of the land-based empires which ruled Eurasia when Western Europe was a small and not 
obviously important outcropping of the greater continent.” See Pamela K. Crossley, The Manchus, p. 8.  
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unworthy of obedience”240 before the island was conquered and annexed. Yet, if we take 
into consideration Kangxi’s capriciousness later in contradicting this above statement with 
various deliberations to impose control over sea trade with Taiwan, 241 the notion that 
Kangxi simply ignored this waidao should be taken with a grain of salt. After all, even if the 
emperor once decided to abandon the distant island, this does not necessarily mean that he 
ignored the Taiwan Strait that connected Fujian and the east coast of Taiwan. 
 
After Taiwan was annexed, the succeeding decades were long considered a time of 
peace without large-scale rebellion or dissent. As a consequence, most Qing historians tend 
to focus more on the rapid development of short and long distance sea trade across the East 
Asian Sea. Much has been written on how Chinese sea merchants contributed to the 
promising growth of the coastal economy. Among other things there is consensus that sea 
trade played a key role in maintaining the stability of the Qing Empire during the long 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240 When news of victory in Taiwan reached Beijing, courtiers suggested to Kangxi that the empire should 
incorporate a reference to the conquest of the island among his many titles. However, Kangxi dismissed the 
idea by replying that “Taiwan is outside the empire and of no great consequence.” See Hung Chein-chao, A 
History of Taiwan (Rimini, Italy: Cerchio Iniziative Editoriali, 2000), p. 128; Jonathan Manthorpe, Forbidden 
Nation: A History of Taiwan (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), pp. 111-124. In fact, some documents 
even show that Kangxi once tried to persuade the Dutch to buy back Taiwan, but the Dutch finally declined 
the offer. See John E. Wills Jr., Embassies and Illusions: Dutch and Portuguese Envoys to K’ang-hsi, 1666-
1687 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), pp. 148, 151. The act to “sell” the Taiwan Island 
happened again in 1895, when the Qing court realized that she was about to be defeated by the Meiji 
government in 1895. This time, the Qing governemnt offered to sell Taiwan to the British. However, British 
Prime Minister the Earl of Rosebery and Foreign Secretary Lord Kimberley declined the Chinese offer. See 
James W. Davidson, The Island of Formosa: Past and Present, pp. 265-266. 
 
241 Although Kangxi once mentioned “Taiwan was outside the empire,” he took a series of measures to resume 
the mainland’s maritime trade with the island. And he soon made Taiwan a prefecture (fu) of Fukien Province 
on May 27, 1684. Therefore, hundreds of Chinese junks annually carried raw materials such as rice, sugar, 
peanut oil, deerskins, indigo, and hemp from Taiwan to Amoy, Foochow, Ch’uan-chou, Ningpo, Shanghai, 
and Tianjin. During the eighteenth century, three merchant guilds, supported by the central government, were 
established in Taiwan to facilitate commodity trading and other business transactions. See Chou Hsien-wen, 
Chingji Taiwan jingjishi [Economic history of Taiwan since the Qing rule] (Taipei: Bank of Taiwan Economic 
Research Room, 1957), p. 80; Chang Ben-cheng, Qing Shilu Taiwan shi tsailiao quanqi [Special edition on 
Taiwan’s historical documents contained in the Qing Veritable Records] (Foochow: Fukien People’s 
Publishing, 1993), pp. 59, 82-83; Ts’ao Yung-ho, “Taiwan as an Entrepot in East Asia in the Seventeenth 
Century,” Itinerario, vol. xxi no. 3 (1997), p. 105. 
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eighteenth century. However, few historians have touched upon how the Qing navy 
protected and policed sea space in order to establish relatively “risk-free” conditions for 
numerous maritime activities. This role of the Qing navy has been overlooked in most 
discussions. The navy should be given more consideration because, once the Taiwan Strait, 
the inner sea (from the Bohai Bay to the Guangdong coast) were assimilated into Qing 
political space, one of the aims of the high Qing maritime militarization project was to work 
in collaboration with the inland armed-force for policing of coastal areas and maritime 
business. Maritime militarization was, in fact, always tied to sea trade in the high Qing, as 
Kangxi noted in his 1686 imperial edict: 
 
The development of maritime trade is regulated by the 
governor-general, the governor, and the military 
commanders. If they handle maritime affairs righteously, 
avoid groundless disputes, and work together, private 
traders will benefit from the peaceful situation. By contrast, 
if the provincial administration and the navy selfishly 
compete with the common people, this is bound to make 
things difficult for the regular traders. .242 
 
  
From this, we should appreciate that the significance of the navy could not be denied or 
overlooked in the socio-economic context of the high Qing. Even in peacetime, the navy 
had a significant role in monitoring, regulating, and overseeing the entire maritime frontier. 
Its role must be considered in line with the development of domestic and foreign sea trade 
beginning in the late seventeenth century.  
 
Maritime militarization in the high Qing was best embodied in the establishment of 
a strong navy to garrison four sea zones, namely (1) the Bohai Gulf, (2) the Jiangsu-
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  Kangxi qijuzhu (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984), p. 1454.	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Zhejiang region, (3) the Fujian coast (or the Taiwan Strait), and (4) the Guangdong coast. 
Although the Qing court did not explicitly spell out these zones across its maritime frontier, 
I use this “four-zone model,” on the one hand, because high Qing officials often mentioned 
these specific zones in their memoirs. On the other, the seven large fleets – which we will 
consider in upcoming sections – were literally assigned to police and guard these four zones. 
As a result, although the four-zone structure was not a deliberate design of the Qing court, it 
is a model that helps us conceptualize the significance of the high Qing navy as well as the 
inter-relations between zones. Yet we must keep in mind that vast geographical differences 
in the four sea zones imply differences in wind patterns, direction of currents, sea depths, 
and wave levels, as well as other environmental conditions. In addition to ecological 
differences from one sea zone to another, each had specific problems requiring particular 
solutions, to which I will return in due course. 
 
The Bohai Gulf 
 
Of all the sea zones bordering China, the Bohai Gulf was the closest to the Qing 
capital and the Manchu homeland (Manchuria). Therefore, in the eyes of many Qing 
intellectuals and officials, the Bohai region was one of the most important sections of the 
empire’s maritime frontier, due to its strategic location and plentiful resources. As the 
senior officer Du  Zhen wrote in his Haifang shulüe (A concise study on maritime defense), 
“this lake-like sea space (Bohai) and its surrounding geography was a strategic maritime 
frontier guarding three prominent provinces, namely Xhandong, Liaodong, and Fengtian, 
   
 
	  
118	  
for the Qing empire.”243  According to Du Zhen, this piece of maritime territory was “born 
to be a strategic sector (tianzao dishe zhi xian) to defend the Qing against invaders.” 244 The 
renowned Qing geo-historian Gu Zuyu also observed that the Bohai area was a “main gate 
as well as a protector” of the Qilu region, encompassing the three aforementioned provinces. 
Gu went on to describe the strategic importance of Bohai Bay to the mainland, “once Bohai 
is under strict control, the country would greatly benefit from this natural buffer.” 245 Like 
Du and Gu, the author of an undated, anonymous, presumably mid-1720s slim publication 
entitled Qingchu haijiang tushuo (maps and commentaries of the maritime frontier areas 
from the early Qing—hereafter QCHJTS), was equally aware of the strategic importance of 
the Bohai area to shelter the capital region from potential dangers. He emphasized, “[the 
Bohai region] is the front door of our capital [Beijing] that must be safely guarded by 
faithful sailors and a strong navy.” 246  In the high Qing at least, the Bohai Gulf—
surrounded as it was by Manchuria, Zhili, and the Shandong peninsula—was considered to 
be both a strategic corridor to the open sea and a natural buffer for the region surrounding 
the Qing capital. 
 
Another notable feature of the Bohai Gulf was its extensive maritime resources. 
From the early Ming, Zhou Hongzu had mentioned the Bohai’s fame for sea-salt and the 
variety of fish in Haifang zonglun (A comprehensive study on maritime defense). 247  In his 
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  Du Zhen, Haifang shulüe, p. 3a.  
	  
244  Ibid.  
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  Gu Zuyu, Dushi fangyu jiyao, juan 24, p. 7a. 	  
246	  Qingchu haijiang tushuo, p. 5.  
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  Zhou Hongzu, Haifang zonglun, p. 5b. 	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Dushi fangyu jiyao (Essence of historical geography), Gu Zuyu also noted the bountiful sea-
salt and seafood production across the Bohai, explaining how it contributed significantly to 
the prosperous coastal economy along northeastern China. 248 As many scholars have 
pointed out, beginning in the eighteenth century, significant maritime resources (e.g. sea 
salt) as well as some trading goods produced in northeastern China (e.g. soybean paste) 
were shipped to South China from the Bohai Gulf. 249 It was, therefore, not only a gate or 
natural buffer but a critical channel that facilitated the traffic and sea trade between the 
north and the south.  
 
In order to protect this strategic and economically important sea zone, three major 
navies were gradually set up along the Bohai Gulf between the late seventeenth and the late 
eighteenth centuries. Based in Shandong, Fengtian, and Zhili, most of these navies were 
gradually expanded throughout the high Qing period. This growth in the scale of naval 
forces was marked by an increase in the number of sailors and warships stationed at the 
naval bases, which allowed more frequent maritime policing.  
 
The Shandong Navy 
 
In another anonymous account titled Shandong haijiang tuji (Illustrated study on the 
maritime frontier of Shandong) published in the late Kangxi period, Shandong was 
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  Robert J. Antony, Jane Kate Leonard, “Introduction,” in Robert J. Antony, Jane Kate Leonard (eds.), 
Dragons, Tigers and Dogs: Qing Crisis Management and the Boundaries of State Power in Late Imperial 
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described as the front door of coastal defense. It was also the province where the Manchu, 
after entering China Proper, carefully set up their first naval base. 250 Early in 1644, 
Emperor Shunzhi established a naval base in Dengzhou in order to attack the Ming loyalists 
stationed in Pidao (Pi Island).  At first, there were 386 sailors and 13 battleships (or 30 
sailors per ship) stationed in the water castle (shuicheng). 251 Their primary duty was to 
police the assigned region in order to guard the merchant ships commuting to Tianjin from 
the South (mainly from Suzhou and Fujian) via Shandong Province. 252 In 1661, the Shunzhi 
Emperor, following Zhou Nan`s suggestion, decided to consolidate the maritime frontier in 
order to make sure that the Ming loyalists had no way to attack the Qing from the sea. 253 
As a result, 1200 sailors and 7 new battleships (around 180 sailors per ship) were added to 
the Dengzhou naval base by 1704. 254 The Dengzhou navy was further developed into a 
double-layered system (qianhou lianyin), which enhanced the mobility, flexibility, 
efficiency, and combat power of the navy. Two years later, in 1706, a portion of the 
battleships was moved from Dengzhou to Jiaozhou, catalyzing a new naval base. At that 
time, Jiaozhou navy patrolled the body of seawater in the southern part of Shandong, while 
the Dengzhou navy (Dengzhou shuishi) controlled the seawater surrounding northern 
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  Shandong haijiang tuji, p. 1. 
 	  
251 DaQing Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu 大清聖祖仁皇帝實錄 [Completed records of Emperor Kangxi] (Taipei: 
Xin wenfeng chuban gongsi, 1978), dated on “Kangxi liunian (1667) dingwei jiuyue, renyin shuo,” “bingbu 
yifu [message directed to the Ministry of War].” 
 
252 DaQing Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu, “Kangxi wushisan nian (1714) jiawu shiyi yue, renyin,” “bingbu 
yifu:Shandong Dengzhou zongbingguan Li Xiong shu [message directed to Li Xiong, the general commander 
of the Dengzhou Navy].” 
 
253	  DaQing Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu, juan 2, pp. 54. 	  
 
254 DaQing Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu, dated on “Kangxi liu nian (1667) dingwei jiuyue, renyin shuo,” 
“bingbu yifu [message directed to the Ministry of War].” 
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Shandong extending across a significant part of the Bohai Gulf.255 From 1706 to 1734, there 
was further augmentation of naval size within the Shandong naval bases, namely in 
Dengzhou, Jiaozhou, and Chengshan Mountain. 256 Altogether 550 sailors and 27 battleships 
were introduced into the armed forces. 257  As sea trade surrounding coastal regions 
continued to boom, clamping down on pirates as well as contraband activity assumed more 
importance among their various duties. As a result, patrol lanes were officially standardized, 
extending to the Yingyoushan Mountain in the south, Matouzui in the east, and 
Chengshantou in the north. 258  
The Fengtian navy 
 
The Qing government considered Lüshun (Port Arthur) as one of the most important 
seaports in Fengtian Province because it was located at the tip of the Liaodong Peninsula, 
forming an integral part of the natural barrier (with Dengzhou and Jiaozhou) that shielded 
the highway to and from the capital area. 259 It was also the closest port city guarding 
Manchuria – the homeland of the Manchu. The nature of its harbor further elevated its 
importance because its depth and breadth made it ideal for large numbers of warships to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
255 DaQing Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu, dated on “Kangxi ershiyi nian (1682) renxu shiyiyue xinyou,” “Cai 
Shandong Yizhou zhen zongbing guanque [Replacement of the general commander of Yizhou in Shandong ].”  
 
256 DaQing Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu, dated on “Kangxi sishijiu nian (1710) gengyin run qiyue bingwu,” 
juan 243, “yu bingbu: ju Shandong xunfu Jiangchenxi zoubao [memorial submitted by Governor of Shandong, 
Jiang Chenxi].” 
 
257 Yue Jun, Shandong tongzhi 山東通志 [Gazetteer of Shangdong] (Hong Kong: Dizhi wenhua chuban 
youxian gongsi, 2002), juan 16, “bingfang,” p. 9. 
 
258 Ibid. 
 
259 Bi Zisu, Liaodong shu gao 遼東疏稿 [Writings on Liaodong] (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, reprint in 2000), 
juan 1. 
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anchor. 260  Early in the Shunzhi period, a “water castle,” harboring 10 battleships, was 
constructed in Lüshun. This castle overlooked almost all major seaways passing through the 
Bohai Gulf near the Liaodong Peninsula. Later in 1676, Kangxi conscripted 16 naval 
generals and 500 troops to serve in the Lüshun water castle, because he likened Lüshun to 
an arrow strategically pointing out at the sea. 261  In 1714, the emperor took steps to further 
enhance the naval strength of the Lüshun naval base, ordering artisans in Fujian to build six 
more battleships for the Lüshun navy. This was the first time a Manchu ruler had used 
warships constructed in the shipyards in the south to carry out military operations in the 
north. 262 Fifteen years later, Kangxi continued to develop the Lüshun naval base. He added 
ten sailors to every battleship, increasing the entire navy by 160 men.263 At that time, Qing 
warships were capable of accommodating nearly 40 people armed with melee weapons (i.e. 
bows and arrows), as well as a small number of Dutch-style cannons and firing guns. 264 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
260 Guo Songyi, “Qing qianqi Tianjin de haishang jiaotong” [Maritime traffic near Tianjin in the early Qing 
period], in Tianjin shizhi [History of Tianjin] (1985), pp. 24-25; see also G.R.C. Worcester, Sail and Sweep in 
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Although the combat power of individual warships was enhanced, the Qing navy remained 
technically and qualitatively way behind Spanish and English fleets, whose battleships had 
gun ports installed in their hulls beginning as early as 1501, providing much more 
destructive power. 265  
 
 Compared with other Bohai naval bases in Jinzhou, Moergen, and Qiqihaer, where 
only about 100 sailors were stationed throughout the long eighteenth century,266 Lüshun 
clearly had the strongest naval force, which was located in Fengtian to protect the Bohai 
Gulf. The naval base in Fengtian near Heilongjiang began in 1684, forty years after the 
Manchu army seized Beijing. Initially, it was manned with nine generals, thirty warships, 
and 419 troops. In 1701, forty warships were added and more towers for fortification were 
built near the water castle. 267 But unfortunately, records of and references to naval 
development in Heilongjiang are rather scarce, and these are the only materials I have been 
able to access so far. Regardless, to the Manchus, the Fengtian naval context was essential 
to their naval tactics and political agenda. Compelled by cultural and ethnic ties to 
Manchuria (Fengtian being its natural barrier), Qing governors understandably strived to 
ensure the stability of Fengtian, despite the onerous burden. Its prominence was reflected in 
the ethnic backgrounds of its sailors. The Lüshun navy was one of the only naval forces 
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made up solely of bannermen – the most privileged soldier clan in the Qing, whose 
members had to declare their national identity to be Manchu, regardless of their original 
ethnicity. This changed only after the Yongzheng Emperor came to power in 1722, when he 
noticed that bannermen were weaker in sea battles than Han-Chinese in the Green Standard 
Army, as the emperor stated, “our Manchu warriors were capable of mastering several kinds 
of martial arts, but they were unfortunately not well trained in sea battles.”268 In fact, 
bannermen at the naval detachments across the four sea zones had to master sailing skills, 
which are entirely different from hunting and equestrianism. For Chinese bannermen, 
perhaps this was not so traumatic, but for Manchu and Mongol troops, who often suffered 
from seasickness, operating on the sea was quite a challenge. Apart from basic techniques 
of sailing and navigation (taught by Chinese sailors from the Green Standard), bannermen 
had to learn how to effectively adapt muskets and cannon to maritime use. They also had to 
perfect other seafaring skills, such as boarding and disembarking, casting anchor, hoisting 
sails, scaling masts, and so on.269   
  
Zhili 
 
Compared to bases in Shandong and Fengtian Provinces, the one and only large 
Zhili naval base was established in Tianjin in 1726 (during the Yongzheng period). One old 
saying sums up the strategic importance of Tianjin: “If you want to conquer the Qing, you 
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must conquer Beijing; and to take Beijing by sea, you must first seize Tianjin.” 270  Indeed, 
once the united force of Western imperial powers trashed the navy station outside of Tianjin 
during the Anglo-French Expedition to China (1856-1860), the Beijing authority went into a 
tailspin. 271 It goes without saying that the Zhili navy was one of the firewalls shielding the 
imperial capital. The first navy stationed in Tianjin was established in 1726. It was led by 
the Manchu commander Jiaoluo Bayande. Like the Lüshun navy, the Tianjin navy in North 
China consisted solely of Manchu and Mongolian bannermen. It was responsible for 
policing the coast off of Zhili Province. A large-scale patrol was deployed for six months a 
year from April to September. Most of the warships in the Tianjin navy were constructed in 
Jiangnan, Zhejiang, and Fujian. By the late Yongzheng era, roughly 30-35 vessels were 
based in Tianjin.272 Another significant feature of the Tianjin navy is that sailors were 
required to attend lectures about maritime affairs and sea battles (shuiwu). This is perhaps 
the first example of naval education provided to bannermen by the Qing court. Prince 
Yinxiang, the 13th brother of Yongzheng, was the key figure who promoted this training. 
He once wrote:  
 
Looking at the sea space of Tianjin, it is strategic because it 
connects Chengde and Korea in the east, Fujian and 
Zhejiang in the south, and Beijing the capital in the west. 
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Even though we have land forces guarding the coast, 
maritime defense is much more important. Our Manchu 
warriors are well trained on land, but not at sea. It is 
therefore essential to send them to Tianjin to study how to 
fight sea battles. After training our soldiers to become the 
best warriors on the sea, they will be able to help 
consolidate the defense system of our maritime frontier, on 
the one hand, and their battle capabilities will be very much 
enhanced, on the other.273 
 
Tianjin became the only naval base where bannermen could receive naval education in the 
high Qing. Even though the program was not conducted like the admiral academy in Great 
Britain and the naval school in Tsar Russia, the move toward naval education was a 
significant step for the Manchu. It also shows that, at least during the Yongzheng period, 
Manchu ruling officials were not relying exclusively on land forces and a land-based 
defensive strategy to police the maritime frontier.  
 
Although Tianjin weighed heavy as a strategic naval base, the Tianjin navy lost its 
capability as a reliable, united force. One of the significant problems was corruption. 
According to Qing archives, Tianjin was the most corrupt navy, even though corruption was 
well recognized as a nation-wide, rather than regional or local, problem. Only three years 
after the establishment of the naval forces, Tianjin navy commander Gong E Qi was 
demoted three levels for corruption. In 1732, four years later, it was reported that almost the 
entire navy was corrupt. Gong E Qi, the demoted commander, was sent to jail because he 
was involved in another large scale case of corruption that was discovered by Emperor 
Yongzheng. The problem with corruption in the navy led to a decline in navy discipline.  As 
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in the case of Chang Jiu and Fu Qing, the commander generals of the Tianjin navy in the 
early Qianlong period, reported: 
 
Even though the navy in Tianjin received training both on 
land and at sea on a regular basis, the bannermen lack 
discipline and have poor morale. Their ability to fight our 
enemies is thus significantly weakened. If we want to 
maintain the navy, sailors have to be better officered and 
their bad habits prohibited.274 
 
To reform the navy, Emperor Qianlong granted Chang Jiu the authority to resolve the 
legacy of corruption in the Tianjin navy. The emperor even decided to add 32 war junks to 
the navy, showing that he was willing to make efforts to consolidate Manchu bannermen in 
the Zhili naval structure. However, Chang Jiu failed to engage in any serious reform with 
the other Manchu naval commanders and officers in Tianjin, and the navy failed to respond 
to or even constructively acknowledge the emperor’s efforts. In 1767, Qianlong decided to 
dissolve the entire navy after visiting the Tianjin naval base. Zhao Lian recorded the precise 
details of this visit in Xiaoting Zalu, 
In the year of Dinghai (1767), Emperor Qianlong visited the 
coast of Tianjin. It was a windy day, but the direction of the 
wind was inappropriate for the navy to leave the coast. Hou 
Yingjun was the commander in charge of the navy. He was old 
and ill. He was even too weak to carry the heavy armor and 
too inexperienced to command the navy. He gave out the 
wrong commands several times in front of the emperor. The 
sailors were not well trained either. They were noisy and 
unprofessional. The emperor was furious at what he had seen. 
He then decided to dissolve the entire navy.275 
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When the Tianjin navy was dissolved in 1767, the bannermen were relocated to Guangzhou, 
Fuzhou, Liangzhou, and Shanhai guan. Among them, 692 were removed from the banner 
system. Yet, with the disbandment of the Tianjin navy, the Qing court had not given up on 
the maritime militarization project in Zhili. Indeed, the governor-general of Zhili county, 
Fang Guancheng (1698-1768), had proposed in the same year that the navy stationed in 
Daigu should replace the Tianjin navy, otherwise the maritime frontier of Zhili would be 
endangered. The emperor agreed with Fang’s proposal and moved the Daigu navy to New 
City (Xincheng), where the Tianjin navy was originally based. The Daigu navy, which 
consisted mainly of Han-Chinese, thus became the major force to police the western side of 
the Bohai Gulf. Yet, it was far smaller than the Shandong or Fengtian navies.276  
 
The Jiangs-Zhejiang Zone 
 
The Jiangsu-Zhejiang zone had long been considered the “fishing (and rice) basket 
of China.” 277 There were numerous fishing areas in the seawater off Jiangsu and Zhejiang, 
which was inhabited by thousands of species of fish and other marine life. In the 1830s, Liu 
Menglan vividly captured the evocative picture of the scene in the Zhuoshan Archipelago, 
the chain of islands off the coast of Zhejiang and Jiangsu Provinces that makes up China’s 
most important maritime fishing ground:  
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Countless fishing boats, gathered in a harbor. The flickers 
of fishing lanterns flow in the rippling waves. Highest 
heaven’s stars have fallen in the dead of night. Shining 
everywhere, like a coral islet in the sea. 278  
 
 
Indeed, ever since the period of disunity, or the so-called “Six States Period” (220-589), the 
Jiangnan area had functioned as the key economic zone for successive empires because of 
its significant sea trade, agricultural productivity, and commercialization.279 During the 
Qing, Jiangsu and Zhejiang retained their economic vibrancy. As Kangxi once noted, “the 
southeast (Jiangnan) is the key economic area, I often give my thoughts to it.” 280 Moreover, 
the importation of copper from Japan (Nagasaki) to China (Jiangsu) rose dramatically in the 
eighteenth century until copper mines were discovered in Yuannan in the 1780s. 281 By the 
middle of the Qianlong reign, Jiangsu was one of the busiest coastal provinces in China, 
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connecting with other East Asian polities, and the headquarters of the country’s greatest 
traders of goods shipped from Northern China and the very strong economic neighbor Japan. 
282 Indeed, compared to Ming rulers, the high Qing monarchs had a more open attitude 
towards sea trade with the Japanese. For instance, this is clearly reflected in Kangxi’s 
reaction to the governor-general Wang Lian’s proposal to impose more limits on Japanese 
traders. Kangxi noted:  
 
During my tours to Southern China, I noticed the presence 
of forts and asked locals what they were for. I was told that 
in the late Ming, some from Japan had come to Huizhou to 
trade, but they were arrested and then killed by the Ming 
army. None of them survived. Since then, the conflict has 
never ceased….But time has changed, our court is now 
diligent and capable of dealing with these affairs. 283   
 
Apart from this, Kangxi also promoted private trade with the Japanese by sending two 
provincial officials to Japan in order to explore other trading opportunities between the two 
countries. 284 Kangxi’s work proved successful. According to the Ka’i hentai—a collection 
of Sino-Japanese sea trade reports between 1684 and 1722 edited by the Japanese scholars 
Hayashi Harunobu and Hayashi Nobuatsu in 1730 285 —by the middle of the 1730s, nearly 
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seventy Chinese ships departing from China sailed to Japan every year. 286 The Japanese 
were also interested in opening the Chinese market in the eighteenth century. For example, 
one of the biggest cities in the Jiangsu region, Suzhou, attracted a sizable number of 
Japanese traders importing raw materials for manufacturing ceramic goods and porcelain.287    
 
The warships operating in the Jiangsu–Zhejiang region had to be designed to 
navigate numerous clusters of small islands scattered off the coast. 288  Because of this 
geography, naval policy had to be island oriented to accommodate the complex, 
crisscrossing, interlocking, and rugged terrain. Compared to naval defenses under previous 
dynasties (particularly the Ming) the Qing was a more meticulous, primarily because the 
Ming government had no contingency plans to take care of the minor, small islands along 
the sea coast. In other words, the Qing advanced their line of defense, which signified their 
will to incrementally expand their inner sea space. 289  
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286 See also Iwao Sei’ichi, “Kinsei Nisshi boeki ni kansuru suryoteki kosatsu,” Shigaku zasshi, vol. 62, no. 11 
(1953), p. 1015.  
 
287 On the Japanese admiration for Chinese products made in Suzhou, see Wang Zhenhong, “Tangtu mengbo 
yu haiyang laiwang huotao: Yicun Riben de Suzhou huishang ziliao ji xinangguang wenti yanjiu,” Jianghui 
luntan, no. 2, pp. 18-29. While importing a lot of Chinese ceramic products and porcelain from the Jiangsu 
region, the Japanese exported a lot of silver and copper to China. Some Japanese educated elites became 
increasingly worried about the problem of trade imbalance pertaining to the outflow of silver. For instance, 
Arai Hakuseki, a leading government officials once warned in 1716, “Over the past one hundred years, one-
quarter of the gold coins and three quarters of the silver currency made by our government has flowed abroad. 
If no limits are imposed, in less than one hundred years our country will have no silver at all. Our production 
of copper has not yet met the demand of foreign trade, let alone domestic needs. It is inappropriate to export 
our gold, silver, and copper, which should be preserved for future generations, when all we get in exchange is 
useless foreign products.” See Arai Hakuseki, Zhou Yiliang (trans.), Zhenfen chaiji [折りたく柴の記 Oritaku 
Shiba no ki] (Beijing: Beijing daxue chbanshe, 1998), p. 134.  
 
288 高晉 Gao Jin ([Viceroy of Liangkiang] 兩江總督), “Waiyang ge shandao qingxing 外洋各山島情
形,“ Junjichu dangan (Qianlong 36 nian, June 18; no. 014274). 
 
289 Ibid.  
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There were two substantial naval forces in the Jiangsu-Zhejiang region, namely the 
Jiangnan navy (Jiangnan shuishi) and the Zhejiang navy (Zhejiang shuishi). The two navies 
were responsible for managing a total of 83 naval bases scattered along the sea front 
stretching across a 4,623 mile coastline. 290 Despite the vastness of the sea zone, what 
characteristically tied together the naval bases was their locations: all of them were at or 
near the intersection of the Yangtze River and the sea. Therefore, the responsibilities of 
these naval bases were bifurcated into river defense and sea defense. 
 
The Jiangnan Naval Force 
 
The Jiangnan navy was once the largest naval force of the Great Qing, comprising 
365 battleships that were assigned to 73 naval bases. 291 They were specially administered 
by high ranking officials, such as the Governor of Jiangsu and Jiangxi (Liangjiang 
zongdu),292 the General of Jiangnan (Jiangnan tidu),293 and the Chief Commander of Susong 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
290 Zhu Zhengyuan, Zhejiang yanhai tushuo 浙江沿海圖說 [The seafront of Zhejiang] (Beijing: Zhishi 
chanquan chubanshe, 2011), p. 1. 
 
291 See Zhao Erxun, et al. (eds.), Qing shi gao 清史稿 [The draft history of Qing], juan 135, “bingzhi,” no. 6, 
pp. 4003-4010; Qing Gaozong (Emperor Qianlong), Qingchao wenxian tongkao 清朝文獻通考 [Overview of 
literary studies in the Qing dynasty], juan 185, “bingkao,” no. 8, pp. 6463-6470. More information of naval 
drill across the Jiangnan seawater, see Li Fengyao 李奉堯 (Jiangnan tidu 江南提督 [general of Fujian and 
Zhejiang]), Junjichu dangan (Qianlong 44 nian, May 24; no. 023942).  
 
292 Ranking higher and with more power than a governor, who was by default a civil official, a governor-
general was the highest civil and military overseer in a given region that often consisted of two provinces. For 
a detailed discussion on the distinction between a governor and a governor-general in rank, duties, functions, 
and scope of power, see Kent. R. Guy, Inspiring Tinkering: The Qing Creation of the Province (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2002), chapter 3. 
 
293 Chen Kui and Chen Jie are two of the Jiangnan tidu who reported to the emperor periodically about the 
naval drill of the Jiangnan sea force. See for instance, Chen Kui 陳奎, “Chayue waiyang shuizhen qingxing 查
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(Suzhang zhongbin). Ever since 1675, this powerful naval force had been responsible for 
defending the Jiangsu coastline, spanning 593 miles. 294 
 
The Jiangnan Navy was indispensable to the boom in North-South sea trade, as well 
as Sino-Japanese trade. The first reason lies in the fact that most shipping lanes were 
established to connect Zhili (Tianjin), Shandong (Dengzhou), and Jiangsu (Suzhou) – the 
three highly developed provinces economically. Due to its relative closeness to the North, 
Jiangsu was the cradle of goods and fresh resources, and merchant ships that departed from 
it (mainly from Suzhou and Jingkou) out-competed their counterparts from Fuzhou and, 
hence, dominated the sea trade with the North. 295 As merchant ships traveling between 
Tianjin and Suzhou gradually became one of the financial pillars of the Qing government, 
their safety on the sea also became an imperative concern for the Qing court.296 One major 
policy was for officially appointed battleships to escort specific Jiangnan merchant ships to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
閱外洋水陣情形” Junjichu dangan (Qianlong 43 nian, October 14; no. 021191); Chen Jie, “Waiyang shuicao 
qingxing 外洋水操情形,” Junjichu dangan (Qianlong 53 nian, October 1; no. 037748). 
 
294 Shan Shumo, Wang Weiping, Wang Tinghuai (eds.), Jiangsu dili 江蘇地理 [Geography of Jiangsu] 
(Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 1980), pp. 7; Yuan Cheng, Zhongguo haian he daoyu 中國海岸和島嶼 
[Coast and islands in China] (Taipei: Haiwai wenku chubanshe, 1957), they entry of “Jiangsu.” 
 
295 Duan Guangqing, Jinghu zizhuan nianpu 鏡湖自撰年譜 [Chronology of Duan Guanqing] (Beijing : 
Zhonghua shu ju, 1960), p. 66; Tōa Dōbunkai, Shina shōbetsu zenshi 支那省別全誌 (Tōkyō: Tōa Dōbunkai, 
Shōwa, 1917-1920), dai 8-kan, “Kanan-shō”; see also Yoshinobu Shiba, “Ningpo and its Hinterland,” in G. C. 
William Skinner (ed.), The City in Late Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977). 
 
296 See Guoli gugong bowuyuan (ed.), Gongzhongdang Yongzheng chao zouzhe 宮中檔雍正朝奏摺 [Imperial 
documents in the Yongzheng era] (Taipei: Guoli gugong bowuguan, 1977), “memorial submitted by Liu 
Yuyi,” p. 265; “memorial submitted by Li Wei,” p. 761; see also Liu Hui (ed.), Wushinian gebu haiguan 
baogao, 1882-1931 五十年各埠海關報告 1882-1931 [China Imperial Maritime Customs: Decennial Reports, 
1882-1931] (Beijing: Zhongguo haiguan chubanshe, 2009), vol. 3, pp. 377-378; Matsura Akira 松浦章, 
“Shindai kounan senshou to enkai kouun 清代江南船商と沿海航运 [Jiangnan merchants and commercial 
trades in the Qing period],” in his Shindai uchikawa suiun shi no kenkyuu 清代内河水運史の研究 
[Examination on canals and rivers of the Qing dynasty] (Kansai: Kansaidaigaku shuppan bu, 2009). 
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and from the Tianjin-Jiangsu sea lanes. 297  Merchant ships that were not being escorted had 
the following legal rights. If a merchant ship got wrecked, the navy was not permitted any 
delay in rescuing and dredging for victims. If a merchant ship was attacked by pirates, the 
Qing navy was required to begin investigating the crime no less than a day after the initial 
report. If these rules were not followed, the naval officer in charge would risk demotion to a 
lower badge rank. Records were kept on naval officers who were found to have abused or 
shirked their duties. For threatening victims not to report crimes, an officer would be 
demoted by three badges or sacked immediately. If the officer was found to have taken part 
in pirate activity, he would be sentenced to prison. 298  
 
The system of patrols and tactics used for protection by the Jiangnan navy were 
notable for their “demonstrative” nature (jianghai huixiao) throughout river and sea spaces. 
As mentioned earlier, most naval bases in Jiangnan were located where the Yangtze River 
intersected the ocean. The navy had a responsibility to the river as well as the sea. Its 
mandate was to weave a sprawling dragnet that could efficiently detect and eliminate pirates. 
299  To give a brief, figurative picture: When a pirate ship was detected in the inner sea, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
297 Shengzu renhuangdi shilu 聖祖仁皇帝實錄, Kangxi wushiqi nian, February, jiashen, “Fujian Zhejiang 
zongdu Jueluomanbao shuyan 福建浙江總督覺羅滿保疏言.” See also Lin Xiu 林秀 (Congming shuishi 
zongbing 祟明水師總兵 [Chief commander of Chongming]), “Zoubao waiyang xunshao zhe 奏報外洋巡哨
摺,” Junjichu dangan (Yongzheng 6 nian, June 3; no. 402021493). Yan Ruyu (1759-1826), Yangfang jiyao 洋
防輯要 [On naval defense], juan 2, “yangfang jingzhi 洋防經制,” pp. 91-96. 
 
298 Jiaoluo Langxu 覺羅琅玝 (Zhejiang xunfu [General of Fujian and Zhejiang] 浙江巡撫), Junjichu dangan 
(Qianlong 54 nian, May 25; no. 403057218). See also Yan Ruyu, Yangfang jiyao 洋防輯要 [On naval 
defense], juan 2, “yangfang jingzhi 洋防經制,” pp. 91-96. 
 
299 Regarding the issue of pirates, Japan had provided a safe haven to pirate bands harassing the China coast 
since the sixteenth century. For further details, see the classic discussion on Tokugawa Japan written by 
Ronald Toby in his State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan: Asia in the Development of Tokogawa 
Bakufu (Princeton: Priceton University Press, 1984), pp. 110-167. For more recent research, see Mizuno 
Norihito, “China in Tokugawa Foreign Relations: The Tokugawa Bakufu’s Perception of and Attitudes toward 
   
 
	  
135	  
responsible battleship would immediately sail to the reported area and deal with the crime. 
Yet, in most cases, the pirates would escape through the closest connecting river and 
battleships would have to pursue them. Due to the ineffectiveness of such pursuits, the Qing 
government divided the navy into two groups: one specialized in the sea (i.e. sea-navy) and 
the other in the river (i.e. river-navy). The sea-navy would pursue fleeing pirates until it 
reached the mouth of the winding river and would leave the pursuit to the river-navy. 
Meanwhile, the sea-navy had to be stationed at this confluence to block the pirates from 
escaping.300 Moreover, the Jiangnan navy calculated climatological conditions and seasonal 
wind directions to assist them in projecting where to find targeted pirates. 301 Although there 
was no guarantee that pirates would not slip away using creeks or hidden inlets, the system 
was comprehensive in that they could be arrested “in any waters.” 
 
The Zhejiang Navy 
 
Compared to Jiangsu, Zhejiang has a much longer coastline, spanning almost 1400 
miles. This extensive length, of course, required a more complex and rigorous naval 
organization. There were eight key naval bases located along the Zhejiang coast in Zhapu, 
Jiaxing, Shaoxing, Dinghai, Huangyan, Wenzhou, Ruian, and Yuhuan.302 By the early 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Ming-Qing China,” Sino-Japanese Studies, vol. 15, p. 244-269.  
 
300 Ibid. 
 
301 Ibid. 
 
302 Zhao Erxun, et al. (eds.), Qing shi gao, juan 135, “bingzhi,” no. 6, pp. 4010-4013; Qing Gaozong (Emperor 
Qianlong), Qingchao wenxian tongkao, juan 185, “bingkao,” no. 8, pp. 6479-6484; Ji Zengyun, Li Wei, 
Zhejiang tongzhi 浙江通志 [Gazetteer of Zhejiang] (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1991), juan 97 and 
98. 
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nineteenth century, ten naval bases were garrisoned with a total of 9400 sailors and 302 
battleships.303    
 
Among the ten “water castles,” Jiaxing, Shaoxing, Dinghai, and Huangyan were 
more heavily armed than the others. The four naval bases complemented one another to 
form a comprehensive protection net. With more than 7000 sailors, navies stationed there 
were the principal entity patroling the inner sea surrounding Zhejiang as well as protecting 
major ship lanes throughout Zhejiang waters. 304 Over the eighteenth century, the Zhejiang 
navy never ceased to train and patrol on the sea. From February to September, the prime 
time of commercial and fishing activities, the navy would run a large scale sea-patrol 
(haiyang huaixiao) conducted by the chief commander.305  In every large scale sea-patrol, 
battleships from two or three naval bases would join together to augment defensive forces 
as well as to provide a sense of military deterrence. 306 For example, an imperial edict 
promulgated by Emperor Qianlong stated that: 
 
The Dinghai navy and the Huangyan navy must patrol the 
Bay of Kowloon on March 15 and September 15. On May 
15, the Dinghai navy must join the navy in Congming to 
patrol the waters off Mountain Goat Island; the Huangyan 
navy must join the Wenzhou navy on September 1. These 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303 Ibid. 
 
304 Yin Jishan 尹繼善 (Liangjiang zongdu [Viceroy of Liangjiang] 兩江總督), Junjichu dangan (Qianlong 4 
nian , April 9; no.00464). 
 
305 Zhongguo diyi lishi danganguan (ed.), Yongzheng chao Hanwen zhupi zouzhe huibian 雍正朝漢文朱批奏
折 [Imperial documents approved by Emperor Kangxi in Chinese] (Nanjing: Jiangsu guji chubanshe, 1989-
1991), juan 8, “memorial submitted by Gao Qizhuo,” p. 279; Zhao Erxun, et al. (eds.), Qing shi gao, juan 135, 
“bingzhi,” no. 6, pp. 4015-4018. 
 
306 Kaer Jishan 喀爾吉善 (Minzhe zongdu 閩浙總督 [Viceroy of Fujian and Zhejiang]), Junjichu dangan 
(Qianlong 14 nian, July 6; no. 004530). 
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dates are unchangeable. The naval generals must send their 
officers to the destinations in order to report to and 
exchange information with each other regarding their patrol 
areas for further actions of combined effort. 307 
 
Strict policies regulated large-scale sea patrols. If any battleships arrived at a particular 
meeting point more than one (or sometimes two) day(s) late without having a proper reason, 
the chief commander would be demoted or even sentenced to prison. But the Qing court 
also realized that, in some cases, initiating a large scale sea patrol might not be possible due 
to weather conditions. For instance, the Qianlong Emperor made this announcement:  
 
Large-scale sea patrols were conducted under a set of strict 
regulations. Generals and naval commanders cannot refuse 
to fulfill their duties simply because of strong wind or bad 
weather. But I understand that weather conditions could 
sometime be worse than expected. In such case, it is 
possible for generals and naval commanders to delay their 
operations. Yet they have to report to other naval bases and 
reschedule sea patrols as soon as possible. The governor-
generals should also check with the naval commanders to 
see if weather conditions are tolerable or not. If it is found 
that a naval commander is not reporting actual weather 
conditions, he and his team must be severely punished.308  
 
The Zhejiang navy served as a pivotal lever in the commercial hub connecting 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Fujian. It was the merchants from Jiangsu, Fujian, and Guangdong 
who became the most dominant in domestic sea trade, although merchants from many 
different provinces had businesses across the seacoast. 309  Before 1850, seventy percent of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
307 Yan Ruyu, Yangfang jiyao, juan 2, “yangfang jingzhi,” pp. 91-96. 
 
308 Kungang, et al., Qinding daQing huidian shili, Guangxu chao (Shanghai : Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2002), 
juan 632, “waihai xunfang in Qianlong 17 nian,” p. 1187. 
 
309 Fu Yiling 傅衣凌, “Qingdai qianqi Xiamen yanghang 清代前期厦門洋行 [Xiamen’s business in the early 
Qing],” in his Ming Qing shidai shangren ji shangye ziben 明清時代商人及商業資本 [Merchants and 
capitals in the Ming-Qing era] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1956), pp. 203-204; Zhou Kai, Xiamen zhi 厦門
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the “sea-trading enterprises” on China’s coast were based in Fujian, Jiangsu, and 
Guangdong. And at major sea ports, such as Tianjin, Shanghai, and Canton, eight out of ten 
companies were affiliated with businessmen who came from one of these three provinces. 
310  Because Zhejiang was geographically proximate to Jiangsu and Fujian, a large number 
of sloops, barges, and coasters in full sail passed to or from Zhejiang every year. 311  
Therefore, Zhejiang’s navy was not only responsible for handling local affairs, but for 
protecting those merchant vessels departing from Jiangsu and Fujian.  Apart from offering 
protection, the Zhejiang Navy was also required to police some areas near the two 
neighboring provinces. According to an edict pronounced by the Qianlong Emperor in 
1750:  
 
As the Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Fujian coastlines are 
interconnected for a thousand li, the Zhejiang navy has had 
to assist both the Jiangsu and the Fujian navies by sending 
warships to stretches of islands off the Jiangsu and Fujian 
littorals. The Zhejiang navy should patrol the sea zones of 
Fujian and Jiangsu every two months in order to protect the 
merchants and eliminate the pirates (baosheng chengdu). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
志 [History of Xiamen] (Taipei: Taiwan yinhang jingji yanjiushi, 1999), p. 193. 
 
310 For details, see John Chaffee, “At the Intersection of Empire and World Trade: The Chinese Port City of 
Quanzhou (Zaitun), Eleventh to Fifteenth Centuries,” in Kenneth R. Hall (ed.), Secondary Cities and Urban 
Networking in the Indian Ocean Realm, c. 1400-1800 (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2008), pp. 99-121; 
John E. Wills, Jr., “Contingent Connections: Fujian, the Empire, and the Early Modern World,” in Lynn A. 
Struve (ed.), Qing Formations in World Historical Time (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2004), 
pp. 167-203; Philip A. Khun, Chinese among Others: Emigration in Modern Times (Lanham, Mtd.: Rowman 
and Littlefield, 2008), pp. 33-36; Wang Gangwu, “Merchants without Empire: The Hokkien Sojourning 
Communities,” in James D. Tracy (ed.), The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long-Distance Trade in the Early 
Modern World, 1350-1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 400-421; Ng Chin-keong, 
Trade and Society: The Amoy Network on the China Coast; Kenneth Pomeranz and Steven Topik, The World 
that Trade Created: Society, Culture, and the World Economy, 1400 to the Present (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1999), pp. 9-11; Chang Pin-tsun, “The Formation of a Maritime Convention in Minnan (Southern 
Fujian), c. 900-1200,” in Claude Guillot, et al (eds.), From the Mediterranean to the China Sea: 
Miscellaneous Notes (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 1998), pp. 143-155; and Timothy Brook, The 
Confusions of Pleasure: Commerce and Culture in Ming China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1998), pp. 119-124. 
 
311 Zhao Erxun, et al. (eds.), Qing shi gao, juan 135, “bingzhi,” no. 6, pp. 4015-4018. 
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312   
 
As an armed force regimented by large numbers of battleships and sailors, the Zhejiang 
Navy was instrumental in placating sea crimes and helping thwart pirates in these areas. The 
extent of responsibilities of the Zhejiang Navy demonstrates that the Qing state endeavored 
to strengthen Zhejiang’s capability as a launching pad for its military operations in sea 
waters stretching from Jiangsu to Fujian, extending across at least sixty percent of the 
Southeastern coastline. 
 
The Fujian Coast/Taiwan Strait 
 
Covered with a series of undulating mountain chains, Fujian Province has a very 
twisted and convoluted coastline, second only to Guangdong in length. The largest 
waterway in the province, the Min River and its tributaries traverse the northern half of 
Fujian before winding eastward into the sea, creating narrow drainage basins facing out to 
the Taiwan Strait. In Song-Yuan times, Fujian was a key economic area due to its vibrant 
sea trade with Southeast Asia, India, the Muslim heartland, and indirectly with Western 
Europe. 313 Quanzhou harbor was once considered the biggest center of trans-national trade 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
312 Ji Zengyun, Li Wei, Zhejiang tongzhi 浙江通志 [Gazetteer of Zhejiang] (Shanghai: Shanghai guji 
chubanshe, 1991), juan 98. 
 
313 Fujian qualifies as a maritime province, with only a small hinterland suitable for farming, and a long 
history of Fujianese moving and migrating along the coast. As Lan Dingyuan once mentioned, “Fujian never 
had much farmland, yet the population growth, and more than half the population turned to maritime trade. 
Chinese products worth nothing at all appeared like gold and jades when they were shippd to the southeast. 
The prosperous trade with Southeast Asia yielded annual revenues of nearly one million taels. Those who 
lacked other employment rarely joined the bandits. Instead sailing to make their fortunes.” See Lan Dingyuan, 
Luzhou quanji, juan 3, 3a. For details discussions on the integration between overseas trade and the Fujian’s 
local economy in imperial China, see Y.M. Yeung and David K.F. Chu, Fujian: A Coastal Province in 
Transition and Transformation (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2000); Billy K.L. So, Prosperity, 
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in world history.314  At the end of the thirteenth century, Marco Polo spared few words in 
describing the wealth of trade passing through Quanzhou. He wrote Quanzhou was the port 
“to which all the ships from India come with many goods dear,” carrying to and from the 
city “so great abundance of goods and of stones and of pearls that it is a wonderful thing to 
see.” “You may know,” he concluded, “that this is one of the two ports in the world where 
most merchandise comes, for its greatness and convenience.”315Unfortunately, Quanzhou 
lost this status following the destructive Ispah Rebellion (1357-1366). After that, Fujian did 
not merit the status of a key economic area until the Ming-Qing transition, or as Anthony 
Reid puts it, “the Age of Commerce.” 316  Fujian’s rebirth as a key economic area in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries served as a critical event in the naval management of 
the Ming and Qing governments as well as the socioeconomic development of maritime 
China. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Region, and Institutions in Maritime China: The South Fukien Pattern, 946-1368 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2000); Hugh R. Clark, Community, Trade, and Networks: Southern Fujian Province from 
the Third to the Thirteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Ng Chin-keong, Trade 
and Society: The Amoy Network on the China Coast, 1683-1735; and Chen Dasheng and Denys Lombard, 
“Foreign Merchants in Maritime Trade in Quanzhou (Zaitun): Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries,” in Denys 
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Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 19-23. 
 
314 See Angela Schottenhammer (ed.), The Emporium of the World: Maritime Quanzhou, 1000-1400 (Leiden, 
Boston and Köln: E.J. Brill, 2001).  
 
315 Marco Polo, A.C. Moule and Paul Pelliot (trans.), Marco Polo: The Discription of the World (London : 
Routledge, 1938), p. 351. 
 
316 On “the Age of commerce” thesis, see Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988-1993); Anthony Reid, “An ‘Age of Commerce in Southeast Asian 
History,’” Modern Asian Studies, vol. 24 no. 1 (1990), pp. 1-30; and Anthony Reid, “Economic and Social 
Change, c. 1400-1800,” in Nicholas Tarling (ed.), The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), vol. 1, pp. 460-504. See also Yokkaichi Yasuhiro, “Chinese and Muslim 
Diasporas and the Indian Ocean Trade Network under Mongol Hegemony,” in Angela Schottenhammer (ed.), 
The East Asian Mediterranean: Maritime Crossroads of Culture, Commerce, and Human Migration 
(Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz Verlag, 2008), pp. 91-93. 
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Fujian experienced another economic downturn in the late seventeenth century when 
a “sea blockade” policy was decreed. The state’s strategic focus changed and many trading 
connections between Fujian and Southeast Asia were destroyed. Although most maritime 
businesses linking Fujian and other countries were wiped out, the number and capacity of 
the naval settlements along the Fujian coast did not decrease. Emperor Kangxi decided to 
strengthen Fujian’s naval forces for its military operations toward Taiwan, which was then 
occupied by Zheng Chenggong as his base of operations in his bid to become emperor. 317 
After the suppression of the Three Feudatories, Kangxi sought someone to lead an 
amphibious operation against Zheng’s regime; and, following the advice of Li Juangti, 
chose Shi Lang. Under the expansive strategy attempted by Kangxi, the Fujian Navy had to 
shoulder the exclusive and critical task of supporting Qing engagement in Taiwan. By that 
time, it was well officered and well captained, with relatively well-trained crews. 
Nonetheless, the frequent mobilization and reinforcement of naval strength did not 
necessarily increase Qing control over coastal Fujian Province. Rather, the littoral control 
and the sea-policing system were weakened by war mobilization. The civil bureaucracy 
became so preoccupied with the task of supporting the military campaign that it did not 
have the capacity to police the sea zone. 
 
As mentioned previously, in September 1683, Shi Lang assembled a fleet of three 
hundred vessels, mostly from the Fujian Navy, and swiftly defeated the leading naval 
commander of the Zheng forces, Liu Kuohsuan, in a major engagement near the Pescadores. 
A few weeks later, the last member of the Zheng family in Taiwan surrendered. Capturing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
317 Jonathan D. Spence, “The K’ang-hsi Reign,” in Willard J. Peterson, The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 
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put Kangxi at ease, as he expressed in a poem: “I am always concerned with the hardships 
faced by the coastal people; now all the people in the empire will be able to live in peace 
and prosperity.” 318 
  
Following the campaign, Taiwan was divided into three counties (xian) and 
established as a prefecture of Fujian Province. The establishment of central control over 
Taiwan was remarkable, as John Robert Shepherd has explained in his monumental 
research on the Taiwan frontier during the first half of the Qing dynasty. “Taiwan’s location 
was strategically critical as the Qing holding of Taiwan would prevent pirates and foreign 
powers from using the island for activities that might be harmful to the Qing Empire.” 319  
Even so, Taiwan’s militarization over the eighteenth century was not as intensive as other 
peripheral territory (such as Sichuan Province). The Fujian provincial office and its navy 
took care of Taiwan’s administrative and military affairs, respectively. 320  The naval 
organization along the Fujian coast demonstrates rather conclusively that the Manchu 
monarchs were attentive to maintaining control over the Taiwan Strait, rather than over the 
Island of Taiwan itself, until the Mudan Incident in 1874. 
 
The capture of Taiwan fostered changes in Qing naval tactics in Fujian. The Manchu 
rulers, on the one hand, had skillfully made use of the Fujian navy to sustain and shelter sea 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
318 Kangxi yuzhi wenji 康熙御製文集 [Imperial poems written by emperor Kangxi] (Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 
1966), juan 38, p. 86. 
 
319 John Robert Shepherd, Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600-1800 (Stanford, 
Cali.: Stanford University Press, 1993) p. 182 
 
320 In fact, the Qing official record states, “Among the Taiwanese, there was an outbreak every three years, 
and every five year a rebellion.” See Philip A. Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: 
Militarization and Social Structure, 1796-1864 (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 24-27. 
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trade across the region. 321  On the other, they began to adopt a more interventionist 
approach to the Taiwan Strait, in an attempt to ensure that no anti-Qing forces could alter 
the stability of this piece of sea, which had just been assimilated into the jurisdiction of the 
Manchu Empire. Because of this strategic turn, the Fujian Navy underwent another 
transformation. As reflected in the Fujian tongzhi and the Qing shigao, the Fujian navy was 
made up of 237 warships (comprising ten different types, each with specific military 
functions) by 1722 (the year of the Kangxi Emperor’s death). 322 No doubt, this was an 
impressive array of warships at their disposal. Each warship was able to carry 30 to 40 
mostly well-trained sailors. 323  The size of the naval force in Fujian after the 1730s was 
nearly frozen because Emperor Yongzheng found further expansion too expensive, while 
his son Qianlong was confident that the Fujian Navy was already sufficient. 324  Another 
reason for limiting expansion was because the early eighteenth century was a low point in 
Fujian’s regional fortune following on the sea blockade. Although the end of this embargo 
brought Fujian some fifty years of gradual resuscitation, Guangdong’s maritime economy 
ultimately overshadowed it through the establishment of the Canton system in 1757. 
Guangdong thereafter monopolized most of the sea trade connecting China with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
321 See Zhong Yin 鍾音 ([Governor-general of Fujian and Zhejiang] 閩浙總督), Junjichu dangan (Qianlong 
42 nian, November 12; no. 403033212). 
 
322 Zhao Erxun, et al. (eds.), Qing shi gao, juan 135, “bingzhi,” no. 6, pp. 4014-4015; Chen Shouqi, et al., 
Fujian tongzhi 福建通志 [Gazetteer of Fujian] (Taipei: Huawen shuju, 1968), juan 86 and 87. 
 
323 Du Zhen 杜臻, Yue Min xunshi jilüe 粵閩巡視紀略 [Inspection of Guangdong and Fujian] [compiled in 
Jingyin wenyuange siku quanshu (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1987), “shibu”7, “chuanji lei”4], juan 5, 
pp. 67-75. 
 
324 The only increment of the Fujian navy was a direct response to a rebellion occurred in Taiwan led by Liu 
Shuangwen in 1787. For more information about the Fujian navy in the early Qianlong period, see 新柱 Xin 
Zhu (Fuzhou jiangjun [General of Fujian and Zhejiang] 福州將軍), Junjichu dangan (Qianlong 16 nian, 
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nanyang region (Southeast Asia) and Western Europe. Competition from the neighboring 
province resulted in a gradual decline of Fujian’s maritime shipping from the 1780s onward. 
More and more junks moved their base of trade from Fujian to Guangzhou, the Leizhou 
peninsula, and the Hainan island. This southward shift from Fujian to Guangzhou in turn 
contributed to a dramatic upsurge in predation by Fujianese pirates along the coasts of 
Fujian and Guangdong.  
 
 Labelled a “heaven for pirates” by some Qing officials, Fujian Province furnished a 
large part of the coastal population with illicit jobs that enabled them to make a living. 
According to Robert Antony’s research, the people who struggled on the edge of survival 
accounted for 73.8 percent of the pirate population. By another estimate, fishermen alone 
made up 80.7% of all sea robbers. These pirates pillaged up and down the coast of 
Guangdong, Fujian, and Zhejiang. The Fujian navy thus faced a thorny problem in its battle 
against this pirate activity. The Fujian navy was thought to have conducted the highest 
number of sea patrols throughout the year. For example, according to the records of the 
Gazetteer of Jinmen, one of the navies in Fujian, the Jinmin navy:  
Every year on February 1, the naval commander of Jinmen 
was ordered to lead six warships to operate a large scale sea 
patrol. The navy had to first reach Xianjiang on April 1, 
meet with the Haitan navy, and police that maritime 
territory. On 15 June, the navy had to reach the southern 
part of the Fujian seawater and police that region; on 
August 1, it needed to sail north and oversee the northern 
seawater. According to the schedule, the navy had to return 
to Jinmen on September 30 on time. From October to 
January, the navy had to initiate two other large scale sea 
patrols. During the patrol, the navy had to collaborate with 
the land forces in order to spot pirates and eliminate 
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them.325  
 
 
Even though the Fujian navy was busy combatting plunder by pirates, many local 
officials and scholar-officials believed that the ultimate solution to piracy was to expand the 
maritime economy by encouraging coastal trade. They realized that downtrodden people 
were not born pirates and that poverty had pushed them into this illegal activity. In his 
Yangfang jiyao, for example, Yan Ruyi explained the persistence of piracy in the South 
China Sea, noting that the pirates in Fujian were not like the Miao rebels who attempted to 
reclaim the lands occupied by the Manchu, nor were they like the White Lotus sectarians 
who strove to overthrow the Qing regime. The pirates’ primary motivation was profit, and 
they attained this through theft, extortion, kidnapping, looting villages, attacking ships, and 
collecting protection money. When they were offered better opportunities by surrendering, 
many did so. In responding to the piracy crisis, Qing policies were therefore both offensive 
and caring. The government believed that the ultimate solution was to expand the maritime 
economy by encouraging coastal trade in Fujian territory instead of prohibiting it. By the 
late Qianlong era, the combination of aggressive and appeasement policies mitigated the 
problem of piracy along the Fujian coast considerably. By that time, only small scale petty 
piracy, a form of sporadic raiding led by disorganized bands of impoverished seafarers or 
marauders, was found in Fujian waters.   
 
The Guangdong Coast 
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As the Liangguang governor-general Lu Kun once commented, Guangdong consists 
“of hills and rivers blended together, and borders on foreign countries.”326 Of all the 
Chinese provinces, Guangdong enjoys the most extensive trade links with other parts of 
Asia due to its many well-endowed seaports connecting the open seaboard with the 
landlocked interior. These powerful trade links could not even be severed by two sea 
blockades (first imposed by the Ming government on maritime emigration and on private 
sea trade between the 1470s and 1567, then by the Qing government between the 1660s and 
the 1680s [which I will discuss in detail in the next chapter]). 327 The Guangzhou traders 
(mostly Hokkien sea-traders)	  were tenacious in circumventing these enforced embargoes. 
They willed to exploit the sea, or “land the sea,” which hints at their tendency to conceive 
the sea as walk-on land. 328 As a Guangdong official noted in the Qianlong era, “whereas 
Guangzhou has a huge population, its land is very limited. Most of the coastal residents 
make their living by relying on seagoing ships.” 329 Therefore, it is not hard to understand 
the vivid and immediate resurgence in sea trade around the Guangdong area once the 
embargo was lifted. This compelled the establishment of a stronger naval force working 
exclusively for the Guangdong region. 
 
The Guangdong Navy was directed and administrated by the Governor General of 
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327 Ye Xian’en, Guangdong hangyun shi: Gudai bufen 廣東航運史 : 古代部分  [Maritime history of 
Guangdong: Ancient and imperial eras] (Beijing: Renmin jiaotong chubanshe, 1989), pp. 212-213. 
 
328 In his New Discourses on Guangdong, first published in 1700, the Qing scholar Qu Dajun captured the 
quintessence of the most southerly of China’s maritime province with two simple sentences, “Guangdong is a 
kingdom of water; many people need boats to make a living.” See Qu Dajun, Guangdong xinyu 廣東新語 
(Bejing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985), p. 395.  
 
329 DaQing gaozong chun huangdi shilu (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985), juan 15, pp. 1023-1025. 
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Guangdong and Guangxi (LiangGuang zongdu). 330 In practice, the navy was divided into 
two categories: a “governor’s fleet (dubiao shuishi)” and a “regular fleet (chengshe 
shuishi).” The former was commanded directly by the Governor General and the later by 
the Military Commissioner of the Navy (shuishi tidu). By 1745, the “governor’s fleet,” 
consisting of 56 warships and approximately 1700 sailors, was responsible to garrison eight 
key spots along the Guangdong coast; 331 whereas the “regular fleet” was much larger in 
terms of the number of its sailors and warships. According to the Qingchao wenxian 
tongkao, there were around 400 battleships under the “regular fleet,” stationed in Nanaou, 
Chaozhou, Gaolian, and Luqin. By the 1850s, each battleship could carry 20 to 30 sailors. 
332 Moreover, a new, special “fleet” manned exclusively by bannermen was added to the 
Guangdong Navy in 1745. But the force itself was relatively smaller in size and consisted of 
merely 500 sailors. Like the Fujian Navy, the “regular fleet” of the Guangdong Navy had a 
wide variety of warships. Among them, the armed “rice boat” (mitian) was considered the 
largest and fastest. 333 Weighing 2500 shi, the mitian was 31.7 meters long and 6.8 meters 
wide. It was first used in commercial trade and later remodeled as a battleship in the early 
1720s. 
 
When the Qianlong Emperor was petitioned in the 1750s regarding the large number 
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331 Zhao Erxun, et al. (eds.), Qing shi gao, juan 135, “bingzhi,” no. 6, pp. 4015-4018. 
 
332 Ibid. See also Mao Keming 毛克明 (Left-wing commander of Guangzhou [Guangzhou zuoyi dutong]), 
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of Western merchant ships, mostly armed with weapons, harboring in the customs’ ports 
(i.e. Zhejiang, Fuzhou, and Canton), he was keenly aware of their strength along the 
empire’s sea front. 334 Therefore, he soon ordered the closure of all customs offices, except 
the one in Canton, for overseas businesses in 1757, and explicitly declared all armed foreign 
merchant ships harbored along China’s coast to be illegal. 335 Curbing the trading rights of 
all European merchants in 1750, he promulgated a policy requiring European merchants to 
trade with a Chinese trader association known as a cohong. 336  In addition to this constraint, 
all Europeans without official permits were restricted to settlements in the so–called 
“thirteen factories (shisan hang)” next to the Canton harbor during the trading season. 337 
The (in)famous “Canton System” was thus inaugurated, swiftly transforming Canton from a 
“median point” to a core city in the Eurasian trade network, and China’s only sea port 
where European traders could congregate. 338  The Canton System provided the Qing court 
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335 In fact, in 1745, the imperial court had already started the discussion about how to respond to the Dutch 
massacre of Chinese in Batavia. It was the Guangdong officials who convinced the emperor that trades with 
Southeast Asia had to be continued and Canton could not be blocked for overseas business. As recorded in the 
imperial documents, the Guangdong officials argued that “whereas Guangzhou has a huge population, its land 
is very limited. Most of the coastal residents make their living by relying on seagoing ships and the twenty-six 
hong merchants. Thus it is right to channel Western merchants to Guangdong. This is beneficial to the 
livelihood of the people of Guangdong and contributes to tax revenues in Jiangxi and Shaoguan. It also 
eliminates the potential threat to maritime defense in Zhejiang.” See DaQing gaozong chun huangdi shilu, 
juan 15, pp. 1023-1025. 
 
336 Yet, not all European could trade in Canton. For instance, the Russians were forbidden to have direct 
contact by sea with Canton. 
 
337 Liang Jiabin, Guangdong shisanhang kao 廣東十三行考 [Research on the Canton thirteen merchants] 
(Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1999), pp. 2-7; Paul Arthur van Dyke, “Port Canton and the 
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338 Since the inauguration of the Canton System, Canton became a key port in the cohesive maritime network 
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Unlike Tianjin, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu where domestic sea trade dominated the trading network, Guangdong 
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with a plausible justification for giving extra attention and military support to Guangdong. 
As a result, a cadre of warships (around 10) and sailors (around 1,000) led by veteran 
generals were added to the Guangdong forces during the last quarter of the eighteenth 
century. 339  From then on, the Guangdong Navy had to keep constant and utmost 
surveillance over Western merchant ships sailing along the Guangdong coast. Apart from 
checking pirates and domestic sea crimes, it was responsible for warding off even the 
slightest danger that foreign seafarers might pose.340  
 
Apparently, the inauguration of the Canton system, together with the 
aggrandizement of the Guangdong Navy, was a political move limiting Western access to 
operate in the inner sea space (i.e. along the coast). Yet we should keep in mind that the 
Canton system, in itself, does not provide a complete picture of the dynamic sea trade 
between China and the rest of the world. Most scholarship before the 1970s reinforced the 
perception that virtually all of China’s foreign trade in Canton after 1757 was conducted by 
the cohong and that the Guangdong Navy was the only military force governing foreign 
maritime trade. As early as the 1990s, Jennifer Cushman’s classic work convincingly 
refuted this perception, however. Cushman pointed out that throughout the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries Chinese sea traders were active and major economic actors in 
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global trade. 341 Sailing in large and versatile junks, many with three masts, Chinese 
merchants from Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong traveled regularly between China, Java, 
Indonesia, Siam, and the Philippines.342 Some of them even settled down permanently in 
Southeast Asian seaports to solidify and expand trade connections.343 If we accept Timothy 
Brook’s view that China’s superiority in the manufacturing and transport sectors drew 
China, Europe, Southeast Asia, and the Americas into an extensive trading network that laid 
the foundation for the modern global economy early in the sixteenth century, 344 it is fair to 
say that Canton and Fujian traders had effectively linked the Qing Empire to “the 
hemispheric trade nexus.” 345 Increasing numbers of Chinese sea traders ushered in what 
Carl Trocki has called a “Chinese century” in the global economy from around 1750 to the 
mid–1800s.346 By that time, as many as one million Cantonese seafarers were plying Asian 
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Chinese Maritime Networks to Southern Asia,” Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient, vol. 49, 
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343 Chinese merchants even motivated a “trade diaspora,” which is “an interrelated net of commercial 
communities from the same ethnic group that formed a trade network.” Because of this “trade diaspora,” 
entrepots such as Melaka, Malina, Hoi An, and Ayutthaya had developed a strong commercial ties to the 
Chinese markets. 
 
344 Timothy Brook, Vermeer’s Hat: The Seventeenth Century and the Dawn of the Global World, pp. 22-25. 
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waters, facilitating sea trade across the globe. 347 
 
Fortress Protection 
 
The dragon navy stationed in the four sea zones were supported and protected by a 
chain of forts (paotai) with artillery batteries arrayed along the maritime frontier from north 
to south. In contrast to the navies of other dynastic states in greater Asia, such as those of 
the Ottoman Empire, the Arabic Empire, and the Russian Empire, 348 the Qing Seven Navies 
were well fortified by an assemblage of protective cannons onshore. Owing to the fact that 
the Qing created structured fortifications, historians generally speculate that the Manchu 
relied exclusively on “passive defense,” which simply consisted of fortifying the shoreline. 
349 However, I would argue that the Qing court often found maintaining a “passive defense” 
strategy inadequate. It held that integrated naval management required comprehensive sea 
patrol, as well as substantial coastal and estuarine management. To this end, they made use 
of co-operative measures—combining a standing navy with a powerful fortress structure—
to consolidate existing hegemony over their inner sea space. This “land-sea protection 
scheme (hailu lüanfang),” to some extent echoes what I argued earlier: Manchu emperors of 
the eighteenth century were inclined to integrate inner sea space into their terrestrial 
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domains. 
 
A coastal paotai was a fixed, fortified military installation equipped with cannons, 
magazines, and cisterns. It functioned as a launch pad for attack, a storehouse for provisions, 
a tower for signaling, and sometimes a warning station when enemy and pirate vessels were 
sighted along the coast. Qu Dajun, a native of Guangdong, described how a paotai acted as 
a warning station:  
along the seacoast of Guangdong are ‘fortresses 
(baocheng),’ from which the summons to arms is 
given …… Whenever an enemy appears, the fortress gives 
an alarm by lighting up a bush at night, while generating 
much smoke during daytime, so as to alert the nearby 
troops. 350    
 
Under this chain of protection, the navy as well as merchant ships could seek shelter from 
potential dangers at coastal fortifications. And sometimes, battleships could stop at some 
large paotai for minor repairs and replenishment. Located near the mouth of navigable 
waterways, coastal paotai did not arise from the need to protect the interior, but to facilitate 
access for military and commercial shipping. 
 
Most of the paotai of the Qing Empire were constructed in two separate periods, 
first in the first decades of the Qing dynasty, with a later period of expansion coming at the 
middle of the Kangxi reign and extending through the early Daoguang era (1821–1850). As 
the installation of armed fortifications may have spanned nearly two centuries, it should not 
be considered a “single” project—even though certain construction projects may have been 
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more-or-less coherent, planned building programs. Early in the 1650s, for instance, Kangxi 
stated a definite need to create coastal forts to protect harbors and anchorages against 
possible enemy landings along the Guangdong coast. He further pointed out that such an 
undertaking would have to be planned and supervised by experienced generals and military 
architects. 351  As a result, many paotai were constructed along China’s southeastern coast 
after the first one was built in Guangzhou in 1661. 352 Thereafter, the construction of armed 
forts proceeded at a moderate pace. Following on Kangxi’s emphasis on coastal 
fortifications, Yongzheng and Qianlong both considered the network of forts a vital 
component of the empire’s defense network along the maritime frontier.   
 
The “land-sea protection” devised in the high Qing represented a developed form of 
coastal defense on the part of an Asian empire. Until the 1780s, the Qing court 
demonstrated distinctive cohesion in coordinating dragon navies and coastal fortifications. 
Yet during the nineteenth century, the system was toppled when the empire was beset by 
internal rebellion and, later, Western and Western-inspired imperialistic incursions burst 
onto Asian waters. Although some domestic rebellions had been quelled in the 1820s, 
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Emperor Jiaqing (r. 1796–1820) and his successors felt incapable of restoring a powerful 
“land-sea” system of protection. Like the Islamic rulers who used ribat fortifications, the 
Manchu monarchs shifted to “passive defense” by forming a chain of paotai in military 
strongholds. 353 As a result, a remarkable surge of pautai construction took place between 
the 1820s and the 1840s. However, the architectural design of paotai built in the nineteenth 
century fell considerably short of the “modern” standard used by Western Europeans. 
Moreover, it has long been argued that heavy reliance on “passive defense” was no longer 
viable, as demonstrated in the Korean and Japanese cases, where Western iron-clad 
steamships armed with batteries and carronade triumphed in sea battles. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
By standards of durability and combat effectiveness, the Qing Empire was weaker 
than European seafaring powers in the nineteenth century. Western sea powers such as 
Spain, Portugal, France, and Britain had mastered Mediterranean, Atlantic, and Arctic sea 
spaces remarkably well in “the age of enhanced maritime capability.” 354  The British, for 
example, were almost without rival at sea, which proved to be the “key arena of expansion.” 
355  Compared with seafaring European powers, the Qing displayed neither an appetite for 
nor success at sea. Those who adhere to a Eurocentric perspective are even prone to 
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attribute this to “Chinese flatulence,” suggesting that the Qing, being the dominant state in 
Asia, cared little about the sea and naval affairs.  
 
 In the eyes of these Eurocentric critics, by subjecting “weaker” and “less civilized” 
subordinate nations to highly ritualized displays of respect, the Qing merely projected itself 
as more civilized and powerful. For them, it had only acquired a continental dynastic 
empire underpinned by a single hierarchy and set of bureaucratic precedents—the tribute 
system, a Chinese model of foreign relations which was premised on a higher and lower, 
lord-vassal relationship. As this chapter has shown, this assessment is not convincing 
because it ignores Qing maritime policies and naval strategies. Even though the tribute 
system had broad hegemony, this does not mean that the Qing never projected its power 
over Asian seaways. Indeed, applying the ideology embodied in the tribute system to the 
high Qing’s political decisions concerning naval development would help clarify things.356 
The eighteenth century Qing court clearly understood the significance of the long seacoast 
to the empire. This empire required deliberate justification to develop a sophisticated 
maritime strategy (yijing haijiang). 357   The relationship between China’s foreign relations 
model and maritime consciousness is patently not as clear cut as commonly assumed. The 
maritime strategy put in place by the Qing court before the 1800s served an important role 
in projecting Qing power in East Asian seas, and was considered one of the measures of her 
sovereignty and protective capacity across her home territory. 
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According to Nicholas Rodger, maritime strategies and naval power have long been 
assumed to support overseas expansion. 358  The Japanese scholar Takekoshi Yosaburo even 
equates the “heritage of a maritime country” with the “idea of national expansion.” 359  
Although imperialistic Europeans owed their maritime dominance over their neighbors in 
more southern waters, and ultimately over most of the water surface of the world, to the 
outburst of maritime expansionism, Stephen Conway reminds us that the primary concern 
and purpose of a country’s maritime strategy was “unquestionably home defense.” 360 Like 
the Ottoman Empire and some Mediterranean seafaring powers, the function of the Qing 
navy was mainly policing, defense of commerce, and protection against piracy. Generals of 
coastal provinces were ordered to discipline a variety of naval squadrons to guard against 
the blue frontier from (potential) incursions, and certain coastal provinces were even 
policed by stronger naval forces. One significant example is the Manchu government’s 
establishment of a triangular-shaped protection site in the Bohai Bay simply because the 
Manchu monarchs viewed it as very close to the heartland of the central authority (jingjie), 
extending to Beijing, Chengde, and Mukden. 361 As Xue Chuanyuan pointedly argued in the 
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Qianlong period:  
Regarding previous studies on coastal defense, scholars 
generally saw the coast of Guangdong as the most strategic 
and important, followed by the coast of Fujian, Zhejiang, 
Jiangnan, and finally Shandong and Liaodong (i.e. Bohai 
Bay). However, in my viewpoint, the importance of the 
Bohai region should come first mostly because it is the 
nearest sea space guarding Shengjing (the Manchu 
homeland) and Beijing (the center of the Qing Empire) 
against external threats and dangers. 362   
 
 
Another example is the imperial navies arrayed along the Fujian and the Zhejiang coasts, 
which aimed at striking the Japanese pirates (wokou, or wako in Japanese). For instance, 
Emperor Yongzheng  was particularly aware of potential threats from Japanese pirates. As a 
result, he asked Li Wei, one of his trusted officials, to gather relevant information in the 
Jiangsu region for a given period of time. In Li’s memorial, he linked Japan’s efforts to 
acquire sensitive information about China to the pirates of the mid–sixteenth century:  
 
Although Japan is a small country on remote islands, its 
copper cannon can attack distant places, and its knives and 
swords are also of unusually high quality. Thus, Japan 
became a serious maritime threat to China during the Ming 
and its pirates dominated the Eastern Ocean. 363    
 
After reading Li’s report, Yongzheng believed that Japan could invade China easily. He 
thus reminded Li Wei, the relevant provincial officials, and other naval officers to pay 
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particular attention to Japanese activities along the coast. 364  Therefore, in stark contrast to 
the elites of the Manchu conquest, with their largely self-contained economy (based on 
agriculture and hunting) and insignificant intercourse with the ocean, 365 the high Qing 
emperors distinctly managed the sea space under a rather diverse and multifaceted maritime 
strategy. As the Qianlong Emperor mentioned in 1748, “the maritime frontier is of utmost 
importance. We can never ignore or neglect it (haijiang guanxi jinyao, bushi liuxin jicha).” 
366 We learn that the maritime militarization actualized in the eighteenth century under Qing 
rule was not merely “fortress protection,” commonly regarded as a passive perimeter to 
discourage rivals and intruders on the sea. Instead, naval deployment, or the mobilization of 
warships, also aimed at policing certain areas of the sea and deterring (potential) enemies 
from pursuing maritime intrigues. 367 It must be noted once again that the Qing did not 
require as extensive naval policies as eighteenth century Western seafaring powers for 
several reasons. First, the Qing faced fewer threats from rivals than Mediterranean powers. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
364 Ibid.  
 
365 David Christian outlines five distinct ecological adaptations in succession responded to the ecological and 
geographical characteristic in northern latitude area with cold weather and low rainfall, that is hunting, 
pastoralism, pastoral nomadism, agrarian autocracy and command economy. See David Christian, “Inner 
Eurasia as a Unit of World History,” Journal of World History, vol. 5, no.2 (1994), pp. 173-213. In fact, 
hunting for the Manchus was a form of military training and an expression of tribal community, as it had been 
for the Khitans, Jurchens, and Mongols. And it should be noted that the tradition of huntings was not forgetten 
even after the conquest of China. In 1684, for instance, emperor Kangxi ordered the garrison generals at Xi’an, 
Suiyuan, Nanjing, Hangzhou, and Jingzhou to otganize local hunts. Kangxi announced, “if the officers and 
soldiers at the provincial garrisons are not made every year to go hunting to practice their martial skills, they 
will eventually become lazy.” See Baqi tongzhi chuji, juan 31, p. 583. For the significance of hunting, please 
also refer to Qianlong chao Manwen zhupi zouzhe, juan 72, Uhetu, “Qianlong 3 nian, April 9.”  
 
366 Qinglong’s word was recorded in his response to Wang Deng’s memorial. See Wang Deng 王澄 ([chief 
commander of the Jiangnan Susong naval force] 江南蘇松水師總兵官), “zoubao xuncha haijiang suijing 
qingxing 奏報巡海疆綏靖情形,” Junjichu dangan (Qianlong 13 nian, June 30; no. 002501).  
 
367 For instance, when Yongzheng replied Wang Chaoen’s memorial in 1728, he highlighted his concern about 
the potential dangers from the Japanese via the ocean. See Wang Chaoen 王朝恩 (Shengjing hubu shilang 
shuli xingbu shi  [盛京户部侍郎署理刑部事), “yizou Riben dengguo fengfan haijiang deng shi 議奏日本等
國防範海疆等事,” Junjichu dangan (Yongzheng 6 nian, October 13; no. 402015712).  
   
 
	  
159	  
It had relatively little to fear from the sea in peace time. The primary threats were Japanese 
pirates and local, including Chinese, pirates and anti-Qing rebels. Compared with the 
situation a century later, the Qing in the eighteenth century was less preoccupied with 
internal and external crises. This afforded the empire with more resources and initiative for 
naval efforts and enabled it to maintain its superiority and hegemony across the East Asian 
Sea.  
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Chapter Four 
The Customs Office 
 
Abstract 
 
This chapter seeks to offer an analysis of a neglected branch of the high Qing 
administration – the maritime customs office – that underlines its significance for the Great 
Qing imperial enterprise. Well aware of the intimate connection between economic 
development and empire’s stability, the Qing court in the eighteenth century spent 
considerable energies to establish an efficient customs regime across their maritime frontier. 
Periodic shifts between more open and more restricted maritime trade policies reflected 
changing strategic exigencies in a framework of “guarded management” rather than hint at 
ignorance or irrational swings in attitudes toward the maritime world. Drawing on a series 
of imperial archives, I detail and examine in this chapter the institutional development and 
investment of the Qing into this customs organization, such as its personnel recruitment and 
management strategies. Such guarded management reveals the fact that the high Qing 
administration never lost sight of the harsh strategic and logistical realities of ruling a vast 
maritime landscape. 
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Introduction 
 
An institutional innovation that emerged after emperor Kangxi annexed Taiwan in 
1683, the maritime customs provided the Qing court with a more systematic and centralized 
approach to the management of sea trade and maritime security. As a result, maritime 
activities along the China coast were deliberately regulated, policed, and governed under an 
organized administrative framework set up by the Qing court in the beginning of the long 
eighteenth century. To illustrate a more detailed picture of this first government institution 
for managing domestic as well as overseas trade in the eighteenth century, this chapter 
focuses on the founding, development, and transitions of the four major custom offices from 
the late seventeenth century to the eve of the First Opium War. In tracing the history of the 
customs offices (but not the customs service chaired by foreigners such as Sir Robert Hart 
[1861–1911] in the mid–nineteenth century),368 the present chapter also aims at reminding 
readers that the ties between high Qing maritime politics and the Customs office have been 
more significant than we might realize. Since national security and economic well-being 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
368 This objective is mentioned here because the general history of the Chinese Customs has been dominated 
by the period when foreigners took up positions as Inspector Generals starting from the mid-nineteenth 
century, whereas what had happened during the long eighteenth century is often overlooked, if not omitted, by 
historians. See for example the statistical research about the Customs Service conducted by Andrea Bréard 
(“Robert Hart and China's Statistical Revolution,” Modern Asian Studies, vol. 40, issue 3 [July 2006], pp 605-
629), Richard O’Leary’s research on the relationship between Robert Hart and his Irish connection (“Robert 
Hart in China: The Significance of His Irish Roots,” Modern Asian Studies, vol. 40, no. 3 [July, 2006], pp. 
583-604), as well as Richard Horowitz’s examination on how Robert Hart rise to power (“Politics, Power and 
the Chinese Maritime Customs: The Qing Restoration and the Ascent of Robert Hart,” Modern Asian Studies, 
vol. 40, no. 3 [July, 2006], pp. 549-581). Of course, Stanley Fowler Wright’s researches on Robert Hart and 
the Customs Service cannot be missed. See his Hart and the Chinese Customs (Belfast: Wm. Mullan, 1950); 
China’s Customs Revenue since the Revolution of 1911 (New York: AMS Press, 1973); China’s Struggle for 
Tariff Autonomy: 1843-1938 (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1938). Indeed, more researches need to be 
undertaken on the connective tissue between the Customs Offices and the High Qing government – and that is 
exactly what I hope to demonstrate in the present chapter.  
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along the maritime frontier are symbiotically related, the maritime policy of the Qing court 
was very much orientated by their attainment and coordination. It is perhaps understandable 
why high Qing monarchs had to expend tremendous energies on administrating the customs 
networks which covered “eight major coastal trading routes”369 stretching from the Bohai 
basin to the coast of Guangdong. In projecting imperial control over the maritime frontier 
by institutionalizing customs affairs, such maritime policy did not only yield a significant 
evolution in sea trade management of late imperial China, but also enshrine the Great Qing 
as what Charles Hucker has termed the “last golden age”370 from a maritime-economic 
perspective. However, it should be taken into account that the Manchu leaders bestowed a 
modicum of autonomy on a sizable number of local commercial elites in establishing and 
running the customs offices because the central government, lacking the historical tradition 
of interaction with the sea, depended upon a deliberative group of local merchants to make 
key decisions. As Emperor Yongzheng once mentioned,  
I am not that familiar with the ocean and maritime affairs, I 
therefore appreciate any advices from my officials and those 
local experts (provincial officials and sea merchants).371 
 
Such “reciprocal cooperative policy,” in which a merchant’s allegiance to the government 
was reciprocated by the monarch’s legal obligation to provide him business interests and 
protection that ranged from monetary rewards to social privileges, somewhat contributed to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
369 Huang Guosheng, “The Maritime Customs in Transition,” pp. 183-185, Akira Matsuda (ed.), Jindai dongya 
haiyu jiaoliu shi xubian (Taipei: Boyang wenhua shiye youxian gongsi, 2011), pp. 7-13.  
 
370 Charles O. Hucker, China’s Imperial Past: An Introduction to Chinese History and Culture (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1975), p. 295.  
 
371 See “Shandong xunfu Chen Shiguan, Dengzhou zongbinguan Huang Yuanxiang zouwei jingchen caifang 
shiyi 山東巡撫陳世倌、登州總兵官黃元驤奏為敬陳採訪事宜 [Yongzheng simian bayue chusi ri],” in 
Yongzhengzhao zhupi yuzhi [Collection preserved in the Kyoto University], no. 8, ‘Huang Yuanxiang,’ p. 93a. 
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the remarkable growth of domestic sea trade between the northern and the southern sectors 
of the coastal economy and also the gradual, unprecedented development of overseas 
shipping between China and the rest of the world.372 
 
From Sea Ban to Sea Passes 
  
As mentioned in the preceding chapters, a series of sea bans were implemented to 
the Southeastern Chinese coast between the Shunzhi and the Kangxi eras. The strict ban on 
navigation and the coastal evacuation policy not only caused depopulation but also created 
untold hardship for coastal families and maritime businesses.373 During the period of the 
severe prohibitions, smuggling along the coast of Fujian and Guangdong increased 
drastically. Many officials who were supposed to enforce the maritime prohibition were 
even involved in smuggling themselves; while many others were bribed or bullied into 
cooperation.374 Therefore, after Taiwan was seized, a cluster of scholar-officials complained 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
372 In fact, the Customs office also strengthened the commercial ties between the coast and the interior 
regional economies via riverine and caravan transport. But in this chapter, I will merely pay heed to the 
maritime commerce between the coastal provinces as well as the expansion of Chinese overseas trade in East 
and Southeast Asia, as well as Western Europe. For more details on riverine transport, see Grant Andrew 
Alger, “The Floating Community of the Min: River Transport, Society and the State in China, 1758 – 1889” 
(Unpublished PhD thesis, Johns Hopkins University, 2003). 
 
373 During the period of the sea ban policy, Macau holds a different story. Since the early Qing era, Macau 
already became an important gateway for Sino-foreign sea trades. Similar to other sea ports, Macao was first 
included in the 1661 evacuation program, and the provincial officials planned to deport all foreigners and 
move all Chinese settlers along the coast back to the interior region. Yet it soon became evident that the 
logistics of such an undertaking were undeasible. In 1671, therefore, Kangxi officially exempted Macao from 
the sea ban policy and allowed Chinese traders to conduct businesses in Macao. For more details, see John E. 
Wills, Embassies and Illusions: Dutch and Portuguese Envoys to Kang-his, 1666-1687 (Cambridge, MA.: 
Harvard University Press, 1984), pp. 116-144; Tang Kaijian, Ming Qing shidafu yu Aomen (Macao: Aomen 
jijinhui, 1998), pp. 158-183.  
 
374 Lo-shu Fu, A Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Western Relations (1644-1820), vol. I, pp. 43 and 46. 
Cushman skillfully shows how restrictions were imposed when security problem arouse, and how the 
prohibitions harmed the coastal economy. But she also observes that the Kangxi government in general 
supported the sea traders. See Jennifer Wayne Cushman, Fields from the Sea: Chinese Junk Trade with Siam 
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about the sea ban and petitioned Kangxi to rescind the restriction.375 After reading the 
memorials submitted by the officials who petitioned to cancel the sea blockade policy, 
Kangxi decided to dispatch a team of officials, including Du Zhen (jinshi 1658), Si Ju, and 
Jin Shijian (1647–1689), to investigate the situation in Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang, and 
Jiangnan. Few years later, investigations were done and reports from these coastal 
provinces read alike. Most officials advised the emperor to revive sea trade so as to relieve 
the worsening economic misery.376 In 1684, Kangxi instated an “open sea edict,” allowing 
Chinese traders to sail legally to some foreign sea ports, 
 
I decide to lift the ban of sea trade simply because it would 
benefit my people settling along the coast of Fujian and 
Guangdong. If the economic misery of these two counties 
could be solved, the circulation of money and goods will also 
benefit the neighboring provinces……In short, I agree that 
maritime businesses are important and beneficial to the 
development of the empire, and I therefore lift the ban on 
maritime trade.377  
 
The edict shows that the Qing court under the Kangxi reign (even during the haijin era) was 
not seeking to close China off; nor were they insisting that they did not need to trade with 
other countries by isolating the empire from the maritime world. Instead, Kangxi 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
during the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries (Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 
160-187.  
 
375 Most of them complained about the lack of funds ever since the Manchus began the southern campaigns by 
blaming the maritime ban and suggesting lifting it. See Ng Chin-keong, Trade and Society: The Amoy 
Network on the China Coast, 1683-1735 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983), pp. 249-303 
 
376 However, it is useful to consider that some officials hold a very different attitude. For example, in his 
report submitted to Kangxi, Si Ju suggested to postpone lifting the sea ban for a couple of years. Si believed 
the government should be vigilant about the newly conquered territories including Taiwan, Jinmen and 
Xiamen. But Kangxi rejected his suggestion and soon decreed the resumption of sea trades. See Da Qing 
Shengzu renhuang shilu (Kangxi) [Taipei: Huawen shuju, 1964], juan 116, pp. 3b-4a.  
 
377 Qing Shengzhu shilu, vol. 166, p. 212. See also Dou Ruyi and Sun Rong, Huangchao wenxian tongkao 
(Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1983), vol. 33, pp. 10b-11a.  
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recognized that maritime trade would benefit both his people and his rule, and the people 
would be able to make money which he would then be able to tax. By lifting the strict ban 
on sea trade, the Kangxi Emperor was attuned to the fact that his empire would largely 
benefit from the circulation of money and goods across East and Southeast Asia (haisheng 
maoyi yuyi yu shengmin),378 with residents of diasporic merchant communities such as Arab 
Muslims, Hindus, Persian Muslims, Parsis, Jews, Armenians, Chinese, or more recently 
arrived Portuguese, Dutch, Spaniards. The emperor also realized that those who could 
operate junk trade overseas were the wealthy Chinese merchants instead of the lower 
classes. Without burdening the poor, the government could tax merchant shippers heavily 
and invest the revenues for military and administrative purposes, and the country would 
then enjoy peace and prosperity.379 As a consequence, Chinese were allowed to return to the 
coast of South China when the maritime world was officially re-opened for sea trade. 
Whereas Leonard Blusse would argue that such relaxation of coastal businesses was an act 
of “liberalization,”380 I would suggest that the “re-opening policy” launched by the Kangxi 
government contained many confinements. In other words, the Manchu authorizes did not 
liberalize sea trade entirely with a “free-hand.” Rather, they intended to control and 
supervise maritime commerce intensively by setting up four main customs bureaus in 
Guangdong (substations in Guangzhou, Xiangshan, and Macau), Fujian (Fuzhou, Nantai, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
378 Neige qiju zhu, “Kangxi lingzhuoding haiyang maoyi shoushui zeli 康熙令酌定海洋貿易收稅則例
[Kangxi ershisan nian liuyue chuwu ri],” in Zhongguo diyi lishi dangan guan (ed.), Ming Qing gongcang 
zhongxi shangmao dangan (Beijing: Zhongguo dangan chubanshe, 2010), juan 1, p. 127.  
 
379 DaQing Shengzu renhuangdi shilu (Kangxi), juan 116, p. 18a (1555); see also juan 117,p. 10b. See also 
Zhang Bincun, “Shiliu zhi shiba shiji Zhongguo haimao sixiang de yanjin,” in Zhongguo haiyang fazhanshi 
lunwen ji, vol. 2, pp. 39-58. 
 
380 Leonard Blusse, “Chinese Century: The Eighteenth Century in the China Sea Region,” Archipel 58, Paris 
(1990), pp. 107-129.  
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and Xiamen), Zhejiang (Ningbo and Dinghai), and Jiangsu (Huating, Chongque, and 
Shanghai).381 As Kangxi clearly mentioned,  
 
“Without a regular way of collection, leying duties would 
trouble maritime traders. Thus, it is necessary to establish the 
same system as the inland one (quguan) in the coastal regions 
and appoint special officials to deal with the related affairs…. 
 
The state establishes customs office for collecting taxes in 
order to increase wealth, to develop trade, and ultimately to 
enrich the people. In the process of handling customs affairs, 
customs officials must follow rules and avoid mistakes. If they 
do so, all goods will circulate smoothly, and the society will 
become prosperous.”382 
 
As part of the ruling strategy over the maritime frontier, the four customs offices 
consisted of three layers (see Table 1) and were subordinate to the Imperial Household 
Department (neiwufu 內務府) under direct interference from the central authority.383 This 
institution subsequently became the necessary mechanism to establish imperial control over 
trading matters across the seaboard. Even though no customs offices were formally 
established in Shandong and Zhili (the two coastal provinces in the north), a set of 
regulations regarding sea trade were likewise implemented.384  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
381 Meanwhile, according to the DaQing Shengzu renhuangdi shulu, it was recorded that “all four coastal 
provinces – Jiangnan, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong – have been opened, and foreigners are now permitted 
to enter and trade in any of their ports.” See DaQing Shengzu renhuangdi shulu, juan 5, p. 205.  
 
382 The first quote, see Jin Duanbiao, Liuhe zheng jilüe, compiled in Zhongguo defang zhi jicheng, volume 9 
(Nanjing: Jiangsu guji chubanshe, 1992), juan 3, 14b; the second quote, see Da Qing shengzu renhuangdi 
shilu, juan 5, p. 327. 
 
383 He Zhangling, “Si queguan zhi shiyi yu shibo zhi she,” in He Zhangling (ed.), Huangchao jingshi wenbian 
(Taibei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1972), juan 83, p. 10b (2958).  
 
384 Zhongguo renmin daxue, Qingshi biannian, vol. 2, p. 485; see also Yao Meilin, Zhongguo haiguan shihua 
(Beijing: Zhongguo haiguan chubanshe, 2005), p. 108.  
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Customs Offices in the Kangxi Era 
 
The maritime customs established in the four southeastern coastal provinces evolved 
from the Kangxi to the Qianlong period. After abolishing the sea ban in 1684, the Manchu 
government aimed at restoring and facilitating the coastal economy so as to maintain the 
empire’s stability. As Kangxi mentioned,  
 
Why did I open trade along the coast? The development of 
maritime trade will largely benefit the people of Fujian and 
Guangdong. As the people of these two provinces become 
rich and commercial commodities circulate smoothly, this 
prosperity will benefit other province and our empire.385 
 
In order to enrich the state by means of properly regulating sea trade, emperor 
Kangxi first introduced “uniform” procedures to inspect and tax merchant ships and cargo 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
385 Kangxi yuzhi wenji 康熙御製文集 [Imperial poems written by emperor Kangxi] (Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 
1966), juan 14, 8a.  
 
Table I: Three Layers of the Customs Offices 
Main Customs House daguan 大關  Provincial headquarters, housing the 
offices of the superintendent of customs 
(haiguan jiandu 海關監督) 
Customs Stations shuikou 水口 It was divided into large stations (dakou 
大口) and small station (xiaokou 小口) 
Inspection Stations jicha kouan 
檢察口岸 
An office that is responsible for the 
suppression of smuggling and 
maintaining order in commercial 
activities. 
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(based on tonnage) to minimize exactions, smugglings, swindles, and illegal conduct of 
trade. Subject to these regulations, ship merchants, either incoming or departing, had to 
register their names, the size of their vessels, and their final destinations.386 Meanwhile, one 
of the most important functions of the maritime customs was to issue licenses to sea 
merchants. First of all, traders and ship-owners had to present to the local officials their 
commercial plan and a document drawn up by the head of their local communities 
confirming that they did not commit any crimes before. Once an application was approved, 
the trader would then receive a license from the customs office. Such license contained 
some personal information such as age, birthplace, and appearance of the bearer, together 
with some details about the ports of departure and arrival. Maritime traders could only leave 
or enter a Chinese sea port by showing their licenses to the customs inspectors.387  
 
Furthermore, in cooperation with the navies deployed along the coast, customs 
officials were supposedly responsible for inspecting almost every vessel on a regular basis, 
though the inspection process sometimes did not work out as smoothly as claimed. 
Meanwhile, it should be noted that the situation in Fujian was different from that of other 
coastal provinces before 1720. In order to deal with the remaining security problems that 
loomed after the Zheng’s force was “suppressed,”388 the commander of the Fujian Navy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
386 Customs offices were usually differentiated according to their functions and duties (i.e.: tax collection 
[zhengshui], inspection [jicha]; and registration-patrolling [guahao]). For example, inspection stations were 
responsible to examine cargoes and the vessels’ registration documents as well as the bills of landing. After 
that, the Customs inspectors would issue a security receipt called “danya” designating the amount of fees to be 
paid, and directed the merchants to the nearest tax collection station. In most cases, the tax collection stations 
were protected by the inspection stations and the navy. 
  
387 Qinding daQing huidian 欽定大清會典 (Taipei: Xinwenfeng chuban wenhua gongsi, 1969), p.240. 
 
388 The tension between the Fujian communities and the Qing regime grew strongly after the suppression of 
the Zheng resistance in 1683. Therefore, the Qing government also deployed a great number of Banner and 
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was assigned to administer the customs office concurrently. Apart from regular patrolling 
duties along the coast, the Fujian Navy was in charge of the inspection and registration of 
private shippers as well as the management of grain trade between Taiwan and Fujian.389 
Additionally, the Fujian Navy was in a position to mobilize local merchant elites to assist 
customs administration.390 Only during the mid-Kangxi period – when the emperor believed 
most regions were completely under control – did the central authority appoint specific 
superintendents to manage the Fujian customs offices and the related substations along the 
southeastern sea front.391 
 
In examining the interrelationship between the central government and the customs 
offices, Huang Guosheng described that the four customs offices “develop[ed] out of local 
practices.” Huang’s observation can be further interpreted in light of Jerry Dennerline’s 
argument that “the key factor in the successful establishment of any regime in imperial 
China was the forging of an alliance between the local gentry and the central 
bureaucracy.”392 As Dennerline argued, cooperation of the local gentry was necessary to the 
consolidation process of an empire across different provinces. In a similar vein, the Qing 
court relied upon the help of commercial elites in stabilizing local projects and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Green Standard troops on Fujian during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century.  
 
389 Zhun Tai 準泰 (Acting general of Fuzhou and the supervisor of the customs office [shuli Fuzhou jiangjun 
yinwu haiguan jiandu langzhong]), Junjichu dangan (Yongzheng 13 nian, April 24; no. 402001300). 
 
390 Ng Chin-keong, Trade and Society: The Amoy Network on the China Coast, 1683-1735, pp. 42-79.  
 
391 But in the Qianlong era, the Customs office in Fujian was sometimes administrated by the naval general 
(Fujian haiguan shuiwu, zhe jiangjun guanli 福建海關稅務, 著將軍管理). See Tuojin, et. al. (eds.), Da Qing 
huidian shili (Jiaqing chao) 大清會典事例 (Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1991-1992), juan 189, “hubu juan.” 
 
392 Jerry Dennerline, “Fiscal Reform and Local Control,” in Frederic Wakeman and Carolyn Grant (eds.), 
Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 86-120.  
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management of the four customs offices. In other words, commercial elites were one of the 
critical voices in shaping the Customs network as a lot of secret edicts and memorials 
ranging from the Kangxi to the Qianlong era reflect this situation. For example, in 
Guangzhou and Fujian, local elites not only invested money in setting up the infrastructure 
of the Customs stations, but also helped advising the inspecting and taxing procedures.393 
Perhaps the two customs offices would not have experienced a gradual development 
without the strong alliance between the Beijing authorities, the local government, and 
provincial merchants in its initial stage. Conceived in this broad frame, the customs office 
was perhaps working in tandem with the local communities to rebuild and foster the coastal 
economy, which in turn crucially related to the imperium’s goals of pacification and 
security across the maritime frontier.394 
 
The release of the sea ban in 1684 also resulted in substantial developments of 
maritime trade between China and other Asian, European countries in terms of patterns, 
scales, and complexities. The renowned maritime historian Zhu Delan has estimated a total 
of 7 Chinese junks called at Nagasaki in 1684, plying routes between Japan, Jiangsu, and 
various southeast Asian ports, and the figure climbed up to 57 in 1685 and reached an 
impressive 153 three years later.395 Yu Dingbang and Yu Changsen also calculated the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
393 Liang Tingnan, et. al. (eds.), Yue haiguan zhi 粵海關志 (Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1975), juan 25, 
“hangshang,” pp. 47-51; Peng Zeyi 彭澤益, “Qingdai Guguangdong yanghang zhidu de qiyuan 清代廣東洋
行制度的起源,” Lishi yanjiu (1957), vol. 3, p. 16. 
 
394 For instance, the local elites also helped constructing waterways, harbor’s facilities, and warehouses near 
the customs stations. Some customs officials even placed operational aspects of trade management in the 
hands of coastal commercial groups. For fuller details (especially the cooperation in Fujian), see Ng Chin-
keong, Trade and Society: The Amoy Network on the China Coast, 1683-1735, pp. 95-152. 
 
395 Zhu Delan, “Qing kaihai linghou de Zhong-Ri changqi maoyi yu guonei yanhai maoyi,” in Zhang Yanxian 
(ed.), Zhongguo haiyang fazhanshi lunwenji, vol. 3, pp. 369-416; See also Lan Daju, Xuannao de haishi 
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number of Chinese vessels that called upon the Philippines from the late seventeenth to the 
early eighteenth century. According to their statistics, fewer than 7 Chinese vessels departed 
from Guangzhou and sailed to the Philippines by the time in 1684. However, almost 20 
vessels annually anchored in Manila during the period between 1685 and 1716.396 With 
reference to another meticulous research conducted by the Thai historian Sarasin Viraphol, 
the number of Chinese junks calling at Siam also increased steadily from the year 1685 to 
1689. 397  In light of these quantitative analysis, economic conditions in China were 
considerably moving out from the “sea-ban depression” that spread across coastal China in 
the mid-seventeenth century. And Kangxi was much more than satisfied to learn that sea 
trade flourished across the seaboard of his empire,  
 
The growth of private sea trades is a reflection of the 
richness of our country and a reward bestowed by our 
ancestors and the grand heaven.398 
 
As the relaxation of the sea ban stimulated the continued expansion of sea trade 
between China and the rest of the world in terms of the amount of shipping business, the 
four Customs offices, understandably, were responsible to oversee the unprecedented 
growth of all these coming and going vessels across the Asian Sea. However, as mentioned 
earlier, the Customs office was not the only protagonist in the arena. The Qing court had to 
cooperate with local merchants in administrating and handling shipping affairs. One 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(Nanchang: Jiangxi gaoxiao chubanshe, 1999), p. 166. 
 
396 Yu Dingbang and Yu Changsen, Jindai Zhongguo yu dongnan ya guanxi shi [The history of modern China 
and Southeast Asia] (Guangzhou: Zhongshan daxue chubanshe, 1999), pp. 386-387. 
 
397  Sarasin Viraphol, Tribute and Profit: Sino-Siamese Trade, 1652-1853 (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard 
University Press, 1977), p. 55. 
 
398 Du Zhen, Yue Min xunshi julue (Taipei: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1986), juan 2, 21a. 
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significant example is the baoshang zhidu established by Kangxi in 1704. It was a system 
aimed at designating local merchants the exclusive rights to trade with foreigners within a 
selected framework. In return, the Chinese merchants who received such “privileges” had to 
assist the Custom offices to collect revenue from overseas merchants. Over time, the 
baoshang system proved to be a successful synergy in aligning the central government with 
local merchants throughout the late-Kangxi reign, and also laid the foundation for the 
establishment of the cohong system later in 1725.399 
 
By 1716, the year before the second sea ban was imposed, Chinese junk trade within 
“the Asian network” experienced a vibrant growth in both scope and magnitude. However, 
the notorious “Rites Controversy,” as Yangwen Zheng points out in her recent monograph, 
profoundly altered the Manchu’s attitude and policy towards foreign maritime business, 
which later resulted in another enactment of sea-blockade in 1717.400 Changes in political 
philosophy and control mechanism thus required new institutional adaptations and 
approaches to the management of provincial customs operations. In order to deal with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
399 Ramon H. Myers and Yeh-chien Wang, “Economic Developments, 1644-1800,” in Dennis Twitchett and 
John King Fairbank (eds.), The Cambridge History of China, vol. 9 part I: The Ch’ing Empire to 1800 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 589.  
 
400 The most relevant statement made by Kangxi regarding the Rites Controversy and the second sea ban that 
followed is his reaction after hearing from the Pope. Kangxi stated in 1704 that, “Reading his (the pope’s) 
proclamation, I can only say that the European are really small-minded. They don’t read and understand 
Chinese, how can they have an opinions and lecture us about China? This is one of the most ridiculous and 
nonsense things I have ever heard of……To avoid further trouble, we should not allow them to preach in 
China starting from today.” See Gu Weimin, Zhongguo yu Luoma jiaoting guanxi shilue (Beijing: Dongfang 
chubanshe, 2000), p. 79. For details about the Rite Controversy, see D.E. Mungello (ed.), The Chinese Rites 
Controversy: Its History and Meaning (Nettetal: Stezley Verlag, 1994); Benjamin Elman, On Their Own 
Terms: Science in China, 1550-1900 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), pp. 160-168; Ricci 
Institute for Chinese-Western Cultural History, 100 Roman Documents Concerning the Chinese Rites 
Controversy (1645-1941) (San Francisco: Ricci Institute for Chinese-Western Cultural History, 1992); Paul A. 
Rule, K’ung-tzu or Confucius: The Jesuit Interpretation of Confucianism (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1986), 
pp. 88-149.  
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problems brought by the Rites Controversy between the Catholic Church and the Qing court, 
Kangxi – the aging emperor at that time – decided to keep his empire within a certain 
distance from European traders who had established considerable influence in China as well 
as the “Southern Ocean” (in particular in Siam, Java, and Luzon). In January 1717, he 
announced:  
 
Merchant vessels can merely go and trade in the Eastern Ocean 
(dongyang), while sailing to the Southern Ocean (nanyang), 
namely Luzon and Java, is prohibited. All merchant ships are 
required to stop at Nan’ao and go no further west or south. 
Customs officials and the coast guard of Guangdong and 
Fujian are given the power to arrest and punish those who 
break the sea ban…. Foreign vessels can continue to trade in 
China but should be strictly supervised…..From now on, those 
who make ships must report to the Customs Offices 
immediately. Ship makers are told to sign a contract indicating 
details of their vessels; and customs officials have to check, 
categorize, and file all details every single month.401 
 
Yet the “1717 sea ban” was in fact a flexible and adaptive one. Using his vermilion 
brush, Kangxi only stated that this particular sea ban was imposed on Java and Luzon, 
though the area of the “Southern Ocean” was much boarder in scope. Because the emperor 
did not mention other Southeast Asian countries such as Siam and Vietnam, maritime 
merchants could adroitly pretend and report to the Customs offices that their final 
destination was Siam but made a quick stop at Java. More importantly, how could the 
Customs officials insure that all Chinese vessels had followed the rules and stopped at 
Nan’ao? It was almost impossible to do so especially when Java and Luzon were at that 
time controlled by the Dutch and the Spaniards respectively. Although superintendents of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
401 Zhonghua Shuju, Qing Shengzhu shilu, vol. 271, p. 658; see also Dou Ruyi and Sun Rong, Huangchao 
wenxian tongkao, vol. 33, pp. 26a-26b.  
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the Customs offices also realized these “loopholes” and reported to Kangxi where the 
problems lay, the emperor responded to these memorials merely with a simple “noted” – 
which is not resounding at all – and did not come up with any substantial actions. Given 
such a context, how shall we interpret the “arbitrary” management attitude of the emperor? 
Some scholars might simply explain it as inconsistency, but I suspect the story is more 
complicated. Indeed I would argue that the trajectory of Kangxi’s attitude towards sea trade 
was neither arbitrary nor sloppy, but marked by a dual-standard. On one hand, it was pretty 
clear that Kangxi had some qualms about the potential dangers from foreign missionaries 
and traders after the Rites Controversy, even though he himself respected Western 
astronomy and mathematics.402 For instance, according to an imperial edict, it was recorded 
that the emperor had nightmares of the Qing empire being threatened on all sides by 
European countries,  
 
The Russians, Dutch, and Portuguese, like the other Europeans, 
are able to accomplish whatever they undertake, no matter how 
difficult. They are intrepid, clever, and know ho to turn a profit. 
As long as I imagine there is nothing to worry about from them 
for China, yet if our country became weak, or if we failed to 
control the Chinese in the southern provinces who had 
numerous contacts with foreigners, what would happen to our 
empire? With the Russians to the north, the Portuguese from 
Luzon to the east, the Dutch to the south, [they] would be able 
to threaten China in numerous ways.403 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
402  See Benjamin A. Elman, “Who is Responsible for the Limits of Jesuit Scientific and Technical 
Transmission from Europe to China in the Eighteenth Century?,” in Clara Wing-chung Ho (ed.), Windows on 
the Chinese World: Reflections by Five Historians (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009), pp. 45-66. 
  
403 This imperial edict was translated and preserved in a letter by Father Anthony Gaubil (1689-1759), a Jesuit 
who served at the Qing court during the Kangxi’s reign. This edict was later translated in English by Laura 
Hostetler. See her Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2001), p. 40. 
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Apart from the imminent danger from those foreigners, Kangxi even became aware 
of the potential threat for Qing subjects to travel abroad and involve themselves in 
subversive activities. As a result, he set up time limits on the length of staying abroad, 
prohibitions on Chinese emigrations, and restrictions of foreign sea trade.404 Yet, on the 
other hand, the emperor realized the enactment of an absolute sea ban would make life 
difficult for coastal communities as shown in previous experiences. It might have a 
disruptive influence on the coast and was threatening to national security. Such an attitude, 
in fact, closely resembled the trade policy of seventeenth-century western European nations, 
where sea trade was considered one of the major sources of state power and wealth.405 
Therefore, by maintaining a flexible and adaptive sea blockade policy, Kangxi believed that 
it would allow his empire to straddle a comfortable line between the mission of checking 
potential dangers from foreigners and maintaining peace and prosperity along the coast.  
 
Kangxi strove hard to maintain the older equilibrium policy, but the sea ban was 
forced to be relaxed in June 1722, six months before the emperor passed away. In 1721, a 
series of shortages of rice and grains swept across Guangdong and Fujian, and the two 
provinces could no longer rely on the import of rice from neighboring or inland counties.406 
A number of officials in South China thus promptly advised Kangxi to authorize the import 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
404 John E. Wills, Pepper, Guns, and Parleys: The Dutch East India Company and China, 1622-1681 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 194-198. Jane Kate Leonard, Wei Yuan and China’s 
Rediscovery of the Maritime World, p. 72. 
 
405 Jacob Viner, “Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuies,” in Douglas A. Irwin (ed.), Trade in the Pre-Modern Era, 1400-1700 (Brookfield: Elgar, 1996), p. 
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406 See Zheng Yangwen, China on the Sea: How the Maritime World Shaped Modern China (Leiden: Brill, 
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of rice from Southeast Asia (mainly from Siam). As Gao Qizhuo, the Governor–General of 
Fujian, appealed: 
The cultivable land in Southeastern China is limited, but the 
population is large. Since the pacification of Taiwan, the 
population has increased day by day. What eventually 
followed is a shortage of rice to feed the people. The only way 
to resolve the problem is to “open the ocean (kaiyang) so that 
surpluses from trade can supplement the insufficiency in 
farming, and both the rich and the poor will benefit from 
it…Such a benefit will further increase by instructing seagoing 
junks to carry certain amounts of rice on their return journey to 
Fujian.407 
 
Intending to alleviate the worsening jeopardy as quickly as possible, Kangxi did not hesitate 
to endorse foreign rice imported from Southeast Asia and permitted maritime merchants to 
sail across the “Southern Ocean” to purchase edible grain.408 As a result, the sea ban was 
once again relaxed (yet not cancelled) in June 1722. But it is important to emphasize that 
imperial control over sea trade (especially rice trade) via the customs system was not 
lessened once the sea ban was relaxed. Governmental control over the customs network was 
instead much tightened after the death of Kangxi in December, 1722 – which marked the 
second wave of transition of the customs administrative framework in the Yongzheng era. 
 
Customs Offices in the Yongzheng Era 
 
An energetic and astute ruler, emperor Yongzheng was quite a different man when 
compared to his father. He was ruthless towards his brothers and officials who opposed his 
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408 Indeed, this seems to be the first time the Qing government authorized a rice import to alleviate the 
worsening situation which could lead to unrest and rebellions. 
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accession and endured rumors that he was a usurper. By all accounts, “he was blunt, strict, 
and severe, with little of Kangxi’s showmanship and aesthetic tastes.”409 In spite of all these, 
however, Yongzheng was a prominent figure (or “an early-modern state-maker of the first 
order” 410 ) who left an indelible mark on the Qing history by further rationalizing 
bureaucratic administration and centralizing imperial control. His initiative was to make 
every administrative unit more structured under governmental supervision. As a 
consequence, central, if not authoritarian, power was extended over the four customs offices 
throughout his thirteen-year stewardship. Announcing that the hallmark of his empire would 
be discipline and efficiency, Yongzheng introduced a set of regulatory and institutional 
changes in provincial customs agencies so as to establish greater uniformity in 
administrative practices over maritime affairs (haiyang zhi shi). In 1724 he ordered 
maritime officials to publish the tax law and circulate copies among maritime merchants. At 
the same time, he ordered customs officials to post the official law and crack down on those 
who did not comply.411 Meanwhile, each Customs superintendent was required to report in 
precise details on shipping conditions in its respective province, the amount of revenue 
collected, as well as the registration of vessels at all provincial substations on a seasonal 
basis.412 Such “reporting practice” was largely different from the one during the Kangxi 
years. As commented by Liu Yuyi, the Fujian governor, in 1742: 
 
Before 1729, the Fuzhou customs did not have to submit 
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  William T. Rowe, China’s Last Empire: The Great Qing, p. 66.  
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411 Qingding DaQing huidian shili (Taipei: Xinwenfeng chuban wenhua gongsi, 1969), p. 8259. 
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detailed reports regularly to the Beijing government since 
Emperor Kangxi embraced a comparatively flexible 
managing style. During the Yongzheng period, we were told 
to report every single figure to the emperor without any 
excuse and delay.413 
 
Yongzheng was so persistent to supervise the amount of customs revenue not only because 
he intended to centralize imperial power over every administrative unit of his empire, he 
also saw the importance of stabilizing the coastal commercial market through maintaining a 
steady flow of silver. Throughout the eighteenth century, Chinese used silver ingots instead 
of paper currency in large market transactions. As a result, the stability of sea trades, either 
domestic or long-distanced, largely depended upon the circulation of silver within the 
market.414 By regularly surveying the statistic of the monthly amount of maritime imports 
from the Customs offices, the central government could therefore decide whether or not to 
impose a corresponding levy and control the price of maritime goods at a stipulated quantity. 
These policies displayed how the Yongzheng government engaged, if not intervened, 
actively in sea trades by adjusting the amount of imposition so as to obtain specific goods 
but prevent a deleterious outflow of silver. Similar to Tokugawa Japan,415 the Yongzheng 
government aimed at maintaining the stability of commercial markets over sea trades by 
using such intervention strategy to moderate the circulation of silver across East Asia. 
Apparently, this fastening measurement served as one of the examples to demonstrate the 
increasing role that the Manchu government played in mid-eighteenth century Asian 
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modern period] (Tokyo: Meicho shuppan, 1988), pp. 21-27.  
 
   
 
	  
179	  
maritime commerce.  
 
In addition to monitoring the flow of silver, Yongzheng was equally concerned over 
the issue of accountability and the selection process of customs superintendents. Before 
Yongzheng came to power, the selection of customs superintendents was based on a so-
called “lottery system (lunbang cheqian)” traditionally employed in the internal customs 
offices (queguan). Early in the Shunzhi period, the lottery was administrated by the Grand 
Secretariat; and the selection pool of candidates was overwhelmingly Manchus who worked 
in the six ministries (liubu), and mainly the neiwufu.416 Throughout the Kangxi era, the 
emperor maintained the system but decided to reduce the secretariat’s power by transferring 
the “control of lottery” to the Manchu commanders stationed in Beijing. In contrast to his 
predecessors, Yongzheng eliminated the lottery system during the first few years of his 
rulership and established a much more sophisticated selection process. To ensure the 
recruitment of capable officials for the Customs offices, Yongzheng formulated his own 
strategy. According to his plan, every new appointment of a customs superintendent 
required recommendations from high ranked provincial civil or military officials; after that, 
the emperor would evaluate the shortlisted candidates before making any direct official 
appointment.417 In practice, this institutional change proved to be a remarkable reform for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
416 Within the first decades after the Customs offices were established, Manchu were the officials who 
dominated the system. For example, the first supervisor of the Fujian and the Guangdong customs offices 
were Usiba (Wushiba), a former director of the Ministry of Revenue (hubu langzhong), and Irgetu, another 
Manchu officer who had long been responsible for collecting “land tax” in South China. Although Kangxi 
once ordered that in Fujian and Guangdong the customs offices should be supervised by one Manchu and one 
Han-Chinese official in a parallel way, in most of the case the Manchu supervisor was the one to make the 
final decision. 
 
417 Nonetheless, as Yongzheng aimed at enhancing the degree of centralization of imperial power, customs 
offices were also staffed by personal clients of the emperor rather than by those recommended candidates. See 
DaQing shizong xianhuangdi shilu (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985), juan 7, p. 52. 
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the customs administration. It did not only lessen the problem of incompetency, but also 
diminished nepotism and bribery.418 However, although the selection process was revised, 
the customs offices were still dominated by officials who were ethnically Manchu. For over 
half a century, most Han-Chinese were employed in Customs only in subordinate positions. 
If we look at the forty supervisors in the Guangdong offices before 1735, for instance, 
twenty-four were ethnic Manchu, fourteen were Chinese bannermen, and Mao Keming and 
Zheng Wusai were the only two Chinese without banner affiliation (because of their trading 
knowledge).419 In Fujian, thirty-seven out of forty-four supervisors were Manchu between 
1684 to 1735, while there were five Chinese bannermen, one Han-Chinese, Shi Qixian 
(1686 in office), and one Mongolian, Samha (1711 in office). The case in Zhejiang was 
very similar. Of seventy-four supervisors between 1686 and 1733, fifty-three were Manchu, 
eight to thirteen Chinese bannermen, and only seven Han-Chinese were appointed (which 
includes Tu Yi [?–1723; 1722 in office], Yan Shao [1724 in office], Wang Yidao [1725 in 
office], Jiang Chengjie [1727 in office], Sun Zhao [?–1733; 1727 in office], Cao Bingren 
[1732 in office], and Wang Tan [1733 in office]).420 Even though Yongzheng and his son 
Qianlong saw that greater use of Chinese officials should be made (since most of Han-
Chinese were much more familiar with maritime affairs), most of the palace officials were 
conservative and slow to make changes. As late as the 1770s it was still the official policy 
that no Manchu should serve under a Chinese in the bureaucracy in which the latter were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
418 Ibid.  
 
419 See Yue haiguan zhi, juan 7, pp. 20 b-51a. 
 
420 Ibid. See also Fujian tongzhi, juan 107, pp. 21b-22a; Yu Chenglong, Wang Xinming (eds.), Jiangnan 
tongzhi, juan 105, pp. 20b-21b; and the Zhejiang tongzhi, juan 121, pp. 14b-16a. See also Huang Guosheng, 
Yapian zhanqian de dongnan sisheng haiguan (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2000), pp. 41-46.  
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excluded from the highest official positions. It was not until the 1820s that more Chinese 
were appointed customs superintendents when a torrent of external and internal crises 
threatened Manchu domination.   
 
Yet we should be careful not to divide the customs system too neatly between those 
who were bannermen and those who were not (just like the customs historians, who focus 
on the history of the late nineteenth century, have tended to divide the customs officials into 
Han-Chinese and foreign circles). Although the Manchu supervisors were given the 
jurisdiction over the seaports where the customs headquarters were located, their 
superintendencies were largely dependent upon provincial civil and military officials who 
were Han-Chinese. In most cases, the Han-officials shared many of the customs 
administrative duties and jointly memorialized the throne on critical customs issues. More 
importantly, those Han-Chinese officials were the linchpin in co-operating with local 
commercial elites in managing coastal and anchorage affairs. In the Zhenjiang customs, for 
instance, Chinese provincial officers outside the customs offices were the key men allying 
local merchants and the customs offices to overcome the problems of dangerous tides and 
consequent siltation along the Zhejiang coast.421 Even in the Guangdong customs, where the 
emperor continued to appoint special (Manchu) superintendents to oversee critically 
important foreign overseas trades through Canton, the special intendants had to work 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
421 The Zhejiang branch customs located at the mouths of rivers were subject to tidal bores and siltation. 
Vessels from Fujian and Guangdong often could not anchor in these sea ports and were forced to off-load 
cargoes to shallow-draft craft, or had to proceed to more distant customs ports for inspection and payment of 
duties. To solve the problem, the provincial Han-officials (on behalf of the merchant groups) advised the 
Zhejiang customs to adopt flexible arrangements for the inspections and payment of duties of inbound vessels. 
After a series of negotiations, the customs office agreed that if the destined harbors of the ship merchants were 
not navigable, they were allowed to anchor in the harbor nearby in order to expedite the customs procedures. 
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closely with the yamen personnel (mostly Han-Chinese) in order to maintain commercial 
prosperity.  
 
Compared to his father, Yongzheng was more suspicious of sea trade with Western 
Europeans. The Jesuit Matteo Ripa (1682–1745), one of the favorite painters of Kangxi, 
once illustrated the difference between the two emperors,   
 
A few months after (the death of Kangxi), all Europeans 
were summoned to appear before the Too–yoo–soo (Board 
of the Imperial Household), when the mandarins informed 
us in the name of the Governor, who was the seventeenth 
brother of the Emperor, that for the future, when they 
wanted anything, they must no longer go to the palace, but 
communicate with the Board. In consequence of this 
measure, which has certainly emanated from the Sovereign, 
the Europeans were excluded from the imperial residence, 
to which they had hitherto been admitted; and from that day 
forward no one of them was allowed to enter it unless by his 
Majesty’s special permission, as in Scipel’s case and my 
own.422 
 
Apart from establishing rules to restrict the power of Europeans in Beijing, 
Yongzheng was equally worried about the potential dangers from foreign traders scattered 
across the coastal region. It is possible to catch a glimpse of Yongzheng’s attitude towards 
foreign sea trades from Kong Sunxun’s memorial dated in 1723.423 In order to facilitate the 
import of rice from Southeast Asia and further rekindle the prosperity of the coastal 
economy, Kong proposed to “open the sea” for maritime business by completely cancelling 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
422 Matteo Ripa, Fortunato Prandi (trans.), Memoirs of Father Ripa during Thirteen Years’ Residence at the 
Court of Peking in the Service of the Emperor of China: With an Account of the Foundation of the College for 
the Education of Young Chinese at Naples (New York: AMS Press, 1979), p. 124.  
 
423 Kong Sunxun was by that time the Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi. 
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the “1716-sea ban.”424 Similar to Kong, Lan Dingyuan (1680–1733), a specialist on 
overseas trade frequently consulted by officials who worked in Fujian and Guangdong, also 
criticized those who supported the embargo. Lan argued that those countries in Southeast 
Asia were too small to become a threat of the Qing empire, when compared to Japan and 
other European powers,  
 
Japan devastated Jiangsu and Zhejiang during the Ming 
dynasty. Many people still have clear and painful memories 
of the massacres. The weapons of the red barbarians [the 
Dutch] and of Western countries such as Britian, Spain, and 
Portugal were more advanced than China’s. Their ships 
could withstand storms, and their people were ambitious, 
cunning, and aggressive. They set out to conquer every land 
they visited. When we set about protecting China, we should 
be concerned about Western countries and Japan, but not 
Southeast Asia.425  
 
In spite of these critical observations, Yongzheng was hesitate to give a green light as he 
was inclined to prevent any potential threats from foreigners. Suspicious by nature, he 
asserted that, 
 
We must be extremely careful and always heed the warning 
about the lack of safety routines; thereby we can avoid any 
potential concern (about foreign encroachments) to come 
true.426  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
424 But ironically, Kong turned to be anti-foreigner in the year that followed, as he wrote to Yongzheng, “those 
foreigners who came without a reason should not be allowed to stay, even they came to trade and make money, 
they cannot settle in China here and mix with our people.” See Diyi lishi dang’an guan (ed.), Ming Qing shiqi 
Aomen wenti dang’an wenxian huibian (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1999), vol. 1, p. 144.  
 
425 Lan Dingyuan, Luzhou quanji, juan 3, 2a-b.  
 
426 See his reply to Liang Wenkai’s memorial, the colleague of Kong Sunxun. Cited in Diyi lishi dang’an guan, 
Ming Qing shiqi Aomen wenti dang’an wenxian huibian, p. 140-141. 
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As far as those potential crises were concerned, Yongzheng was at the same time 
convinced that Chinese who had been staying abroad would be exposed to and return with 
evil designs for their motherland. As he wrote, 
 
I do not really mean that I want to see these people [Chinese 
maritime traders who departed from China] come back. 
What I am concerned with is those who left and settled in 
foreign lands since they must harbor the idea of returning to 
China one day. Once they return home [China], we cannot 
guarantee there are no traitors among them who might 
harbor bad designs.427 
 
Nonetheless, parallel to all the above uneasiness and vexation, Yongzheng, similar 
to his father, also learned the lesson about being too harsh and hasty. He was aware of the 
danger of a domestic, economic crisis if strict sea-ban was once again imposed. If coastal 
merchants were prohibited from sea trades as during the Shunzhi and the early Kangxi 
period, Yongzheng feared those “rejected” would turn to piracy or even collude with 
foreigners in clandestine activities ranging from undercover trade to illicit exchanges of 
metal wares and weapons.428 Moreover, as the supply of rice had been stretched to its limit 
in 1723 and 1724, there was a demand to open foreign rice markets to relieve the 
unevenness, and above all, the local disorders that soon followed. As Gao Qizhou, the 
Governor–General of Fujian and Zhejiang, reported,  
   
In Nantai county of Xinhua prefecture, people have plundered rice shops…in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
427 Taipei Gugong Buwuyuan, Yongzheng zhupi yuyhi (Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1965), vol. 8, pp. 49-51; 
see also Wang Hongbing, Qingdai qianqi haifang, pp. 39-46.  
 
428 Kong Yuxun, “Xiurong yanhai botai yinfang shi 修茸沿海礮臺營房事 [Yongzheng liunian san yue ershier 
ri],”in Yongzheng zhao zhupi yuzhi, no. 1, “Kong Yuxun,” p. 26b - 27a. 
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Fuzhou, people have demanded that the price of rice be lowered,…when Governor Mao 
Wenquan refused to lower the price, people broke into his office compound and destroyed 
his official sedan. In Jianning county of Zhaowu prefecture, people have a large scale of 
protest……In Tingzhou, people have chased and harassed the magistrate He Gudong, and 
in Shanghang they have plundered the rice depot.429 
 
Patently, lifting the restrictions in regard to foreign sea trades would facilitate rice 
imports from Southeast Asia, thereby immediately feeding the poor. Taken the above 
discussions into account, Yongzheng and his Grand Council more or less agreed to lessen 
the maritime restrictions. The only question that concerned the emperor was how to 
properly regulate the connection between coastal merchants, foreigners conducting business 
in Southeast Asia, and the wider maritime world. In response to all these, Yongzheng 
decided to entail a more statutory web of commercial management by intensifying imperial 
control over the Customs offices with administrative measurements, thereby to reconcile the 
diversity of “foreign dangers” and “local interests” with the bureaucratic impulse to 
uniformity. From that time onwards, all trading routes, as well as the conducts and 
behaviors of foreign traders, predominantly the British East India Company (EIC) and the 
Chinese trading overseas, were intensely supervised and policed by customs officials.430 For 
instance, each foreign vessel had to register at the Customs houses and pay taxes on its 
cargo upon its arrival; all shiploads imported by foreign merchants had to be scanned prior 
to sale, otherwise goods would be labeled as illegal and unwarranted, in which the Customs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
429 Taipei Gugong Buwuyuan, Yongyheng zhupi yuyhi, vol. 8, pp. 49-51.  
 
430 DaQing Shizong Xianhuangdi shilu (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985), juan 7, p. 52; see also Yongzheng 
Ningbo fuzhi (1741), juan 12, 67b.  
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office was allowed to confiscate the bulk, regardless of its value or quantity. Unregistered 
foreign vessels would possibly get sacked if the customs officials found out they had been 
moonlighting.431 In some key commercial hubs (e.g. Canton and Fuzhou), the customs 
officials, primarily working with some prominent local merchants, were even told to keep a 
watchful eye on foreigners’ settlements so as to prevent crime and disorder.432 
 
Foreign vessels that approached the China’s coastline in the eighteenth century often 
called at trading ports in Southeastern China because of their favorable geographic locations. 
However, even if foreigners were allowed to trade in Fujian (Xiamen) and Zhejiang 
(Dinghai),433 most European traders chose to stop at Canton, the perfectly positioned way-
station which is much closer to Southeast Asia, simply because it was not profitable to sail 
north. As a result, Canton began to handle a growing volume of long-distance trade and the 
Canton Customs swiftly became one of the most active offices as well as the key nodal 
points in the trans-maritime network between China, Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean 
region, and Western Europe. Against the backdrop of this situation, Chinese commercial 
elites who excelled in dealing with European traders also proliferated apace in Canton from 
the 1720s. In response to the growing number of “overseas trading experts,” Yongzheng 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
431 See 柏之蕃 Bo Zhifan (Jiangnan Songjiang tidu zongbing guan 江南松江提督總兵官), Junjichu dang’an 
(Yongzheng 6 nian, December 5, no. 402008790). 
 
432 See DaQing Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu, juan 5, p. 205. 
 
433 Since the opening of four customs offices under the rule of Kangxi, the coastal region of Southeastern 
China, using the description of Gang Zhao, was “completely opened.” See Gang Zhou, The Qing Opening to 
the Ocean: Chinese Maritime Policies, 1684-1757 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2013), pp. 79-98. 
Compared to the Ming empire (only Macao was open to foreign vessels and Guangzhou and Yuegang were 
open to tribute vessels), merchants from Asia and Europe were first allowed to anchor at Shanghai, Ningbo, 
Dinghai, Wenzhou, Quanzhou, Chaozhou, Guangzhou, or Xiamen. See DaQing Shengzu renhuangdi shilu, 
juan 5, p. 205. 
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soon refined the aforementioned “baoshang zhidu” in 1725 by establishing an umbrella 
organization, known to foreigners as the cohong system,434 to organize these mercantile 
elites who engaged in Sino-European sea trade. In cooperation with the Canton customs, the 
cohong was legally responsible for regulating trading matters, in particular with the British 
and the French, under governmental control. Thanks to the structured customs network and 
the cohong practice, international commerce between China and the rest of the world 
continued to grow steadily – without significant incident – under the thirteen-year rule of 
emperor Yongzheng. Over the fifty year span from 1685 to 1735, more than 1,500 ships 
traded between Southeast Asia, Japan, and twenty five coastal Chinese ports, and this 
volume of foreign trade was arguably unprecedented in the history of imperial China.435  
 
Customs Offices in the Qianlong era 
 
Yongzheng was succeeded by his fourth son Qianlong in 1735, the time when China 
was experiencing an explosive growth of domestic sea trade. According to the archives of 
the Zhejiang customs office, at least fifteen thousand vessels were checked and registered 
by the different branches of the Zhejiang offices. Over seventy percent were domestic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
434 Some scholars point out that the cohong system is similar to the “maritime trade bureau” during the Tang-
Song-Yuan era. See for example Liang Jiabin, Guangdong shisanhang kao (Shanghai: Guoli bianzhiguan, 
1937); Li Guorong and Lin Weisen (eds.), Qingdai Guangzhou shisanghang jilüe (Guangzhou: Guangdong 
renmin chubanshe, 2006); Diyi lishi dang’an guan & Guangzhou shi liwanqu zhengfu (eds.), Qinggong 
Guangzhou shisanhang Dang’an jinxuan (Guangzhou: Guangdong jingji chubanshe, 2002), “preface.”  
 
435 See Iwao Sei’ichi, “Kinsei Nisshi boeki ni kansuru suryoteki kosatsu 近世日支貿易に關すゐ数量的考察 
[A quantitative study of Sino-Japanese trade in the seventeenth century],” Shigaku zasshi, vol. 62, no. 11 
(1953), pp. 981-1121; and Yamawaki Teijiro, Nagasaki no Tojin boeki 長崎の唐人貿易 [Chinese trades in 
Nagasaki] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 1964). 
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trading ships.436 In fact, by the time Qianlong came to power, cargo ships that routinely 
hugged the coastlines carried goods chiefly on eight main routes, with an interlocking series 
of regional circuits that facilitated the movement of commodities, people, and information 
along the maritime highways. In their textured studies of coastal sea trades in eighteenth 
century China, Akira Matsuda and Huang Guosheng amply demonstrated the eight 
prominent regional networks in the mid-eighteenth century: (i) The first one was from 
Fujian to Taiwan, which centered on the exchange of Taiwanese rice, sugar, oil, and dear 
products437 for porcelain, clothes, salt, and iron from the mainland. (ii) The second was a 
short-distance one between Fujian and Guangdong. Fujian traders, mostly from Futai, 
shipped rice, wheat, and ox-bones to Guangzhou so as to trade for miscellaneous products. 
(iii) The third route operated between Fujian and the Jiangzhe region, in which Taiwan and 
Fujian traders carried sugar products to Jiangsu and Zhejiang, returning with olives, oils, fir, 
cotton cloth, silk, satins, and yarn. (iv) The fourth one linked Fujian and the Bohai region. 
Southern traders took sugar, paper, pottery, pepper, and wood products to trade for bean 
dough, melons, red pears, yellow beans, medicines, and salt meat. (v) The fifth one ran 
between Guangdong and the Jiangzhe region, in which sugar products and pines from 
Guangdong were shipped to Jiangsu in return of cotton, local silks, and a certain amount of 
bean dough (imported from Tianjin). (vi) The sixth was from Guangdong to Shandong and 
Tianjin, the longest domestic maritime trade route compared to the others. Traders from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
436 Matsuura Akira, “Shincho zenki no Sekko kaikan to kaijo boeki,” Shien, vol. 85 (1997), pp. 19-32. 
 
437 Dear products were hot commodities. Since hides were sold in Japan for tremendous profits, and venison 
fetched high prices in China, as did horns and genitals sold as medicine. For details, see Murray A. Rubinstein 
(ed.), Taiwan: A New History (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2007), p. 92; Emma Jinhua Teng, Taiwan’s 
Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures, 1683-1895 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2004), p. 33; John Robert Shepherd, Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan 
Frontier, 1600-1800 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 365.  
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north carried yellow beans, wheat, and bean dough to Guangdong in exchange for pottery, 
paper, and sugar goods. (vii) The seventh connected the Jiangzhe coast (Jiangsu, Zhejiang) 
and the Bohai Bay (Fengtian, Shandong). Bohai traders brought bean dough and wheat to 
Shanghai, and yellow beans, green cakes, pears, and melons to Ningbo and Zhenhai, in 
return for tea, cotton, and southern silk products. (viii) The final one was the shortest sea 
route, linking Jiangnan and Zhejiang, which focused on the exchange of Jiangnan porcelain 
and Zhejiang pears, tofu, and walnuts.  
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Map 5.1 Eight major sea routes I [highlighting sea routes 1, 3, and 4] 
 (All maps are prepared by Professor Jane Kate Leonard and used by permission) 
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Map 5.2 Eight major sea routes II [highlighting sea routes 2, 5, and 6] 
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Table II: Summary of the eight domestic trading routes 
 
In response to the momentous growth of domestic sea trades across the four sea 
zones, emperor Qianlong decided to establish more satellite substations over the entire 
customs network. These newly established substations not only reinforced and stimulated 
the growth of the eight shipping ties within and between the seven maritime provinces, but 
also served as commercial hubs and distribution centers for small sea ports and their 
immediate hinterlands, thereby spurring the development of “a commodity economy in 
more remote locations on the coast.”438 Using Fujian as an example, in the last few years of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
438 Huang Guosheng, “Chinese Maritime Customs in Transition, 1750-1830,” p. 178. 
No. From To Trading goods 
1 Futai (Fujian) Taipei (Taiwan) Processed goods (Fujian) 
Rice, oil, sugar, deer products (Taiwan) 
2 Futai (Fujian) Guangzhou 
(Guangdong) 
Rice, wheat, ox–bones (Fujian) 
Mulberry silk, persimmon, plum, 
longan (Guangdong) 
3 Futai (Fujian) Jiangsu and Zhejiang 
(Jiangzhe) 
Sugar product (Fujian) 
Indigo, olives, various oils, dir, cotton 
cloth, silk, satins, yarn  
4 Futai (Fujian) Shandong, Tianjin 
and Fengtian (Bohai 
region) 
Sugar, paper, pottery, pepper, wood 
products (Fujian) 
Bean dough, melons, red pears, 
medicines, salt meats (Bohai region) 
5 Guangzhou 
(Guangdong) 
Jiangsu and Zhejiang 
(Jiangzhe) 
Sugar product, pine (Guangdong) 
Cotton, cotton cloth, bean dough 
[shipped from the north], local silks 
(Jiangzhe) 
6 Guangzhou 
(Guangdong) 
Shandong and 
Tianjin (Bohai 
region) 
Sugar product (Guangdong) 
Bean dough, yellow beans, wheat 
(Bohai region) 
7 Fengtian, 
Shandong 
(Bohai 
region) 
Shanghai (Jiangsu), 
Ningbo, Zhenhai 
(Zhejiang) 
Beans, wheat (Bohai region) 
Yellow beans, green cakes, pears, 
melons (Shanghai) 
Tea, cotton, cotton cloth, silk (Ningbo 
and Zhehai) 
8 Jiangnan Zhejiang Porcelain (Jiangnan) 
Pears, tofu, walnuts (Zhejiang)   
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the Yongzheng era, there were about twenty substations responsible for the collection of 
ship taxes and the registration process of merchant vessels. But the number increased 
significantly during the Qinglong period. According to the report prepared by Celeng, the 
Customs superintendent in Fujian, sixty more “collection stations (the so called “money and 
rice ports” [qianliang kou 錢糧口] or “red-receipt ports” [hongdan kou 紅單口])” were 
found at locations extended over 2,000 li along the coast by the time of 1743.439 These 
newly established customs ports were designated to handle sea trades from particular cities 
and locales; while in some substations, special customs officials or commercial firms 
(minfang 民坊) were appointed to take care of and protect the interests of local traders.440 In 
return, provincial merchants were expected to assist the Customs office and police 
themselves by maintaining stability in pricing, supply, and quality of their commodities.441  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
439 “Qianlong zhao neige huke tiben guanshuixiang,” no. 5.  
 
440 Although local merchants relied on the protection provided by the government, they organized to enforce 
commercial rules among themselves, protecting their interests against being cheated. See Ping-ti Ho, 
Zhongguo huiguan shilun 中國海關史論 [Historical essay on Chinese native place associations] (Taiwan: 
Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1966) and Peter Golas, “Early Ch’ing Guilds,” in G. William Skinner (ed.), The City 
in Late Imperial China (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1977), pp. 555-580. Arguably, such 
mercantile networks were critical to maintaining and regulating a much safer and equal commercial situation 
between local merchants in the eighteenth century. Yet Chinese merchants were not the only traders aiming to 
establish a set of “local justice,” other examples appear in many locations. For example, Maghribi Jewish 
merchants also formed mutual agreements between themselves. If any one of them cheated another who had 
entrusted him with business, the entire group would boycott the cheater until he made restitution. See Avner 
Greif, “Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders,” Journal of 
Economic History, vol. 49 no. 4 (December, 1989), pp. 857-882. American merchants from New Julfa, 
likewise, agreed to blacklist any member who acted dishonestly when employed by another New Julfan. See 
Sebouh Aslanian, “Social Capital, Trust, and the Role of Networks in Julfan Trade: Informal and Semi-formal 
Institutions at Work,” Journal of Global History, vol. 1 no. 3 (2006), pp. 383-402. The Chinese, Maghribi, or 
New Julfan example thus revealed that the merchants themselves worked with each other and swiftly collected 
information about merchants’ behavior. Similar examples can be found in Mexican California, and the trans-
Saharan slave trade of Western Europe. For details, see Karen Clay, “Trade without Law: Private-Order 
Institutions in Mexican California,” Journal of Law Economics, and Organization, vol. 13, no. 1 (1997), pp. 
202-231 and Sebastian Prange, “Trust in God, But Tie your Camel First: The Economic Organization of the 
Trans-Saharan Slave Trade between the Fourteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,” Journal of Global History, vol. 
1 no. 2 (2006), pp. 219-239. 
 
441 This is in fact very similar to how the bakufu leaders in Tokugawa Japan forbade non-sanctioned merchant 
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Map 5.3 The Fujian Province 
 
The expansion of the customs network also occurred in Guangdong almost around the same 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
group from infringing upon the activities of the chartered merchant houses in the eighteenth century. By 
receiving the “protection” provided by the government, members of the charted trade association (kabu 
nakama) had to pay fees to the bakufu and regulated their trading behaviors. For details, see Conrad Totman, 
Early Modern Japan (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 300-301.  
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period. Prior to the 1750s, the Guangdong province comprised and was shored up by eight 
prefectural customs offices, locating in Chaozhou, Huizhou, Guangzhou, Zhaoqing, 
Gaozhou, Qiangzhou, Leizhou, and Lianzhou respectively. But this institutional framework 
expanded in Qianlong’s time. For example, in Chaozhou, located in the northeast corner of 
the Guangdong coast, eighteenth customs stations, including ten registration passes and 
eight tax collection ports, were established across seven coastal counties of Raoping, 
Chenghai, Chaoan, Haiyang, Jieyang, Chaoyang, and Huilai. Likewise, ten additional 
collection stations in Lufeng, Haifeng, and Guishan counties were set up in Huizhou 
prefecture. Meanwhile, thirty satellite inspection and registration stations were found across 
the delta counties of Dongwen, Xin’an, Panyu, Nanhai, Xiangshan (Macau), and Xinhui 
(Jiangmen) across the customs network of Guangzhou. In turn, ten branch stations were 
established in Leizhou and Qiangzhou; six in Gaozhou, three in Lianzhou, and one in 
Zhaoqing.442  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
442 Xi Yufu, et. al. (eds.), Huangchao zhengdian leizuan: guanshui 皇朝政典類纂: 關稅 [Sources on the 
governmental institutions of the reigning dynasty, arranged by categories] (Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 
1969), juan 85, pp. 7-10. 
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Map 5.4 The Guangdong coast 
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The situations in Jiangsu and Zhejiang went through very similar processes. By 1750s, 
eighteen customs ports were set up across the Jiangsu province, all within 600 li of the 
headquarter based in Shanghai. Among the eighteen stations, Shanghai (on the Huangpu 
River) and Liuhe (on the south bank of the Yangzi in Taicang) were the busiest, while the 
former served as an entrepôt for vessels arriving from Fujian and Guangdong; the latter was 
the key harbor for merchants engaged in northeastern sea trade.443 In order to alleviate the 
workload of the two customs stations, three additional checkpoints were later established on 
the Chongming Island, and ten more stations on three estuary counties, namely Taicang, 
Suzhou, and Changzhou. Similar to Jiangsu, the Zhejiang customs also experienced a rapid 
growth of the number of substations. Apart from the customs head office at Ningbo, there 
were six customs ports set up in Zhapu, Ganpu, Zhenhai, Dinghai, Jiazikou, Wenzhou, and 
Ruian in the beginning. As maritime traffic continued to increase across the Zhejiang sea 
zone within the second quartile of the mid–eighteenth century, an additional eleven 
substations and fifteen branch ports were founded at the river mouth of the Yangtze River 
so as to handle the intra–provincial trades between Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, and 
Guangdong.444 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
443 The maritime customs located in Shanghai functioned as an entrepot in cotton trade. Ever since the Song 
period, and likely much earlier, the Jiangnan region had long been the center of cotton-spinning and weaving 
in China. During the eighteenth century, Shanghai gradually became the biggest distribution and 
transshipment sea port for the cotton trade with neighboring provinces as well as the foreign market which 
connected East and Southeast Asia, India, Western Europe, and America. By the early nineteenth century, a 
series of sand junks sailed north from Shanghai and Zhapu carrying cotton products to the Bohai region, in 
return of white beans, salt pork, bean oil, and bean dough. See Zhang Zhongmin, Shanghai cong kaifa 
zouxiang kaigang, 1368-1842 (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chnbanshe, 1990).  
 
444 It should be reminded that the location of substations, in particular in Zhejiang, Jiangsu and Fujian, 
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Map 5.5 The coast of Jiangsu 
 
  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
changed frequently with trade patterns and geographic situation. For example, when the port of Zhapu became 
silted, an additional port station would set up and served as a so called “nearby port.” In Fujian, when 
Quanzhou declined, the port of Hanjiang rose in commercial importance and consequently, was made an 
inspection collection station and designated as the mainland terminus for the bilateral trade with the 
Taiwanese port of Luzigang (Zhanghua). See Xi Yufu, et. al. (eds.), Huangchao zhengdian leizuan: guanshui
皇朝政典類纂: 關稅  [Sources on the governmental institutions of the reigning dynasty, arranged by 
categories] (Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1969), juan 86, p. 4. Huang Guocheng, Yapian zhanzheng qiande 
dongnan sisheng haiguan, pp. 59-61, 131-136. 
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Map 5.6 The coast of Zhejiang 
 
The increased number of substations also implies the enlargement of the customs’ personnel, 
thereby tripling the number of customs officials stationed in the four coastal provinces. In 
order to operate and maintain a largely expanded structure, the Qianlong government had to 
pour extra funding to underpin the newly established Customs stations, while it was not 
enough to simply generate resources from the customs revenues. And we need to keep in 
mind that the large sum of money did not only cover the salaries of official customs staffs, 
but also included a set of surcharges for supporting the sub-bureaucratic, or extra-
bureaucratic, custom officials outside the customs stations. As mentioned previously, the 
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operation of the customs offices depended largely upon the performance of a range of 
complex tasks that were, for most of the time, handled by a group of sub-bureaucratic Han-
functionaries (including the yamen 衙門  staffs). Their responsibilities included the 
recruitments of labor, boatmen, and interpreters, the purchase of provisions for foreign 
merchants, document editing, and the collection of general port maintenance fees. 
Additionally, they acted as the conduits for the official customs officers to collect special 
donations and gifts from local businessmen to cover some segments of the customs’ 
expenses.445 In the 1760s, the Qing court was still able to provide these expanding 
maintenance fees by imposing extra and heavy taxes on local and foreign traders. But the 
Qianlong government faced difficulties to afford such expenditures when the Qing state was 
beset by the decline of land tax revenues, the disruption of the currency system, and a series 
of economic crises starting from the 1770s. The lion’s share (almost over 60 percent) of 
these exactions was then imposed on the European shippers who were eager to trade with 
China at that time.446 
 
 As discussed in the preceding section, European traders were allowed to sail up the 
coast to conduct businesses. However, when the British decided to set up and secure a 
permanent trading base for tea and silk trades near Zhejiang and Fujian in 1756, they 
received a stern imperial rebuke from the Qianlong government.447 As mentioned by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
445 Xin Zhu, et al., Shiliao xunkan (Beijing: Peiping Palace Museum, 1930), part 5, p. 159. 
 
446 See Huang Guosheng, “The Maritime Customs in Transition,” p. 185. 
 
447 Perhaps it was because Qianlong discovered a new pocket of illegal Christian missionaries in the late 1750s. 
He feared a renewed wave of heterodox proselytizing in his empire. As William Rowe comments, “[n]ow 
turning fifty and some twenty-five years into a reign that all around him understood to be a nearly 
unprecedented prosperous age, Qianlong was not unreasonably nervous lest something unpredictable, such as 
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Qianlong,  
Some sea ports in Zhejiang (such as Ningbo) and Fujian 
(Fuzhou) are the same as Macao in terms of developing 
overseas trades. But if we open the port, it will lead more 
and more foreigners to make their homes in the interior, 
which is a strategic area. This is not consistent with our 
principle of eradicating all problems at the earliest 
opportunity......We shall therefore confine the foreigners to 
Guangzhou and will not allow them to come to Ningbo.448  
 
Thereafter, all Western trading activities were restricted to Canton and foreign merchants 
were only permitted to do businesses through the cohong merchants supervised by the 
Customs office. The year 1756 thus becomes a watershed for foreign relations in which the 
Qianlong government began to interact with the outside world based on a refined and 
selected framework of “guarded engagement”449 that would also define later Qing trading 
policy until the Treaty of Nanjing was signed in the nineteenth century. 450 Even though the 
Qianlong government sought to trade with the outside world, as commented by Joanna 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
a massive influx of foreigners with wild and unconventional ideas, undermine what he and his forebears had 
so gloriously achieved.” See William Rowe, China’ Last Empire: The Great Qing, p. 144.  
 
448 DaQing gaozong chun huanggdi shilu (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985), juan 15, pp. 1023-1024.  
 
449 Robert I. Hellyer also uses the term “guarded engagement” to describe the trading policies with foreigners 
initiated by the Tokigawa leaders. See Robert I. Hellyer, Defining Engagement: Japan and Global Contexts, 
1640-1868 (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2010), pp. 73-115. In fact, it is worth comparing the 
Qing and the bakufu in terms of their trading policies, but it could be another doctoral project. 
 
450 Meanwhile, Qianlong also refined a more flexible policy in controlling how long overseas traders from 
China could stay abroad after reading Chen Hongmou’s, the governor of Fujian, memorial. Chen stated that, 
“almost half the people of Fuzhou, Zhangzhou, and Quanzhou rely on overseas trade to make a living…Since 
Chen Yilao [a Chinese trader who failed to return to China on time after conducting business in Southeast 
Asia] was sentenced to exile, the Chinese in Southeast Asia have been terrified to return home. Meanwhile, 
even though traders have routinely failed to return on time in the past, this is in most cases a result of the 
complexity of the business, variable weather, delays in receiving payment, and other commercial factors. 
These people who return late should be given amnesty......I therefore suggest that those merchant who have 
remained abroad for too long as a result of commercial problems be permitted to return no matter how long 
they have lived abroad.” DaQing gaozong chun huangdi shilu (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985), juan 14, p. 
1012. See also William Rowe, Saving the World: Chen Hongmou and Elite Consciousness in Eighteenth-
Century China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 302-303.  
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Waley-Cohen, the Manchu authority was reluctant to repeal official restrictions that 
checked the potential dangers (i.e. it is mostly about fear of disruption and ceasing off 
monopoly benefits) that might be provoked by foreigners from afar, whom were often 
stereotyped as warlike and greedy in official documents. The Canton System (or the so-
called “One Port Trading Policy”) was therefore a means developed from the baoshang 
zhidu to interact with the global market in a measured – and from the Qing perspective, 
more beneficial-manner. To put it another way, the Canton System emerged because the 
Manchu government decided to remain connected with the vital global market connected by 
the sea but in a more managed and less threatening way.  
 
Because of the emergence of the Canton system, a sizable number of historians 
conclude that Qianlong’s trading policies were passive and retrograde as they hindered the 
direct access of Fujian, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu traders to Westerners.451 In his The Walled 
Kingdom: History of China from 2000 B.C. to the Present, Witold Rodzinski even argued 
that Sino-foreign trade was solely dominated and stimulated by Western Europeans:  
 
Trade relations between China and the West had increased 
considerably from the middle of the eighteenth century, and 
it is indisputable that the initiative in this development rested 
solely with the latter. In view of the economic self–
sufficiency of its immense empire, the Ch’ing government 
had no particular interest in favouring a further growth in 
foreign trade, which it regarded as a marginal 
importance…….the bulk of the China trade rested in British 
hands, with the East India Company playing the principle 
role, until its demise in 1834.452 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
451 See for example Dai Yi, “Qingdai Qianlong chao de Zhong Ying guanxi 清代乾隆朝的中英關係,” 
Qingshi yanjiu, no. 3 (1993), p. 3.  
 
452	  Witold Rodzinski, The Walled Kingdom: History of China from 2000 B.C. to the Present (Flamingo: 
Fontana, 1984), pp. 177-178.  
   
 
	  
203	  
 
While Rodzinski observed that the High Qing remained a passive respondent to foreign sea 
trades – as if she retained a remarkable disinterest in maritime affairs, the explanation he 
advanced is unfortunately deceptive and unsatisfactory as to call for careful scrutiny. Far 
from “being self-sufficient all the time (e.g. rice production),” the Great Qing was eager to 
establish trading networks as foreign sea trade was critical to their survival.453 The policy of 
the Manchu emperors managing sea trades actually contributed to the sensibility expressed 
by Charles de Montesquieu that “the natural effect of commerce is to lead to peace.”454 It is 
therefore inappropriate to follow Rodzinski’s idea to thoroughly define the political outlook 
of the High Qing government. Moreover, even though the Qianlong authority promulgated 
a set of regulations of overseas shipping, as John E. Wills suggests, the Qing court in fact 
reacted flexibly and responsive to the needs of foreign traders. For example, although all 
foreign vessels on one hand were strictly supervised by the Customs Office, the Qianlong 
government, on the other, increased the number of Western headmen (as assistants to the 
Customs) to accommodate the presence of private foreign traders – especially for those with 
limited connections, or even no connection, with the British East India Company. 
Furthermore, contrary to the old practices, Western traders (including the EIC merchants) 
were allowed to stay in Canton during winter time. It was no longer compulsory for them to 
move to Macau as they were previously forced to do from the 1760s onwards.455 According 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
453 Zheng Yangwen, China on the Sea: How the Maritime World Shaped Modern China, p. 9. 
 
454 Charles de Montesquieu; Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller, and Harold Stone (eds. and trans.), The Spirit of 
the Laws (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 338. 
 
455 Paul A. Van Dyke, The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700-1845 (Hong Kong: 
Hong Kong University Press, 2005).  
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to the Customs documents, special tax exemptions were also given for the import of food, 
supplies, and refreshments for foreign traders who resided in Canton. In addition to several 
tax deductions, some measurements were at the same time taken to protect the basic rights 
of foreign merchants as well as their property.456 But yet, these flexible responses to the 
needs of Western traders, ostensibly for peaceful sea trades with foreigners, did not produce 
fruitful results. Western merchants, especially the British, were not satisfied with the 
Canton System since they were keen on penetrating the lucrative markets of East Asia as 
much as possible.457 When the British failed to convince the Manchu leader to alter their 
established trading policies through the Macartney Mission in 1794 and the Amherst Visit 
in 1816,458 both sides found themselves on steep curves to reach a stage of mutual 
agreement. The British’s demand for “free trade privileges” thus led to a confrontation 
between the two empires in 1839, followed by a century of Western economic imperialism 
in various port cities and special trading sphere.459 After the Opium Wars, the Customs 
office was once again reshaped in terms of its administrative structure and included Western 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
456 Yao Xianhao (ed.), Zhongguo jindai duiwai maoyi shizi liao 中國近代對外貿易史資料  (Beijing: 
Zhonghua shuju, 1962), vol. 1, pp. 222, 227, and 231. 
 
457 From a commercial perspective, China was considered a relatively important part of the British Empire. 
According to the description of H.B. Morse, the British “had striven for a third of a century to obtain entrance 
to China trade, and had had no success.” See H.B. Morse, The Chronicles of the East India Company, 1635-
1834 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926-1929), vol. 1, p. 31. As a matter of fact, the British are not the only 
Europeans who were eager to explore the commercial and trading market in China. C.G.F. Simkin also 
observed that from the eighteenth century onwards, European powers fought against each other in order to 
take part in the Chinese market, a struggle for profit which continued over the centuries and which economic 
historians recognize as a “historical constant.” See C.G.F. Simkin, The Traditional Trade of Asia (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 251-260.  
 
458 For a revisionist account of the Macartney Mission, which is influenced by postcolonial theory, see James 
L. Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793 (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2005).  
  
459 On Western, in particular British, imperialism and gunboat diplomacy in Asia, see Christopher Munn, “The 
Chusan Episode: Britain’s Occupation of a Chinese Island, 1840-46,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History, vol. 25 (1997), pp. 82-112; Barry Gough, Gunboat Frontier: British Maritime Authority and 
Northwest Coast Indians, 1846-1890 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1984). 
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officials.460 Constituting the front lines of engagement with foreign traders, the Customs 
offices experienced another wave of transformation from established channels and guarded 
practices of sea trades to a focus on more direct commercial ties with the aggressive 
Western powers. Indicative of its growing political weakness, the Qing monarchs were 
compelled to reassess the manner and attitude they used to manage maritime businesses and 
commercial activities.461 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
 As the above discussion illustrates, the establishment of the four Customs Offices 
and later the articulation of guarded engagement with Western merchants demonstrates that 
Manchu leaders possessed their own understanding of their position across specific sea 
spaces during the long eighteenth century. Seeking to enunciate a state-centric view of 
sovereignty over a wide swathe of domestic seawaters, High Qing monarchs made use of 
the Customs structure to supervise, manipulate, and monitor maritime shipping under their 
stewardship.462 The development of the Customs office thus unfolds that the Manchu 
maritime politics was not defined by an overriding ideology of seclusion and stagnation, as 
is conventionally argued, but rather by particular imperial agendas of different historical 
moments – which can possibly be framed by three main waves of transitions from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
460 Subjected to Article 10 of the Rules Supplementing the Treaty of Tianjin, Qing China had to employ 
foreigners to establish and maintain a new form of Customs system at all trading ports. 
 
461 For details, see Hans van de Ven, “Robert Hart and the Chinese Maritime Customs Service,” Modern Asian 
Studies, vol. 40 no. 3 (Jul., 2006), pp. 545-548; Robert Bickers, “Purloined Letters: History and the Chinese 
Maritime Customs Service,” Modern Asian Studies, vol. 40 no. 3 (Jul., 2006), pp. 691-723.  
 
462 In comparison with the mid and late Ming Dynasty who saw sea commerce as an evil, something that 
might at best be tolerated, the Manchu fostered it in a comparatively active way. 
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Kangxi to the Qianlong reign. As both domestic and foreign sea trade grew dramatically 
after 1700, boosted by expanding sales of Chinese tea, silks, and porcelains in Western 
Europe,463 the rapidly globalizing economy encouraged High Qing monarchs to take a more 
activist approach to Customs affairs. Similar to the Ottoman and Russian emperors,464 the 
Manchu leaders regarded their domestic sea space neither as a castled-like buffer zone nor a 
distanced irrelevant geographic sector. They instead conceptualized and regarded the inner 
sea as a frontier of strategic and commercial importance which required deliberate ruling 
tactics. Yet in the parleys with the British merchants, who sought to establish more trading 
bases near Zhejiang and Jiangsu, the Qianlong emperor decisively adjusted the trading 
policies in response to the challenges of another new global commercial and cultural wave. 
Indeed it is quite noticeable that the Canton System indicates a more guarded and “Sino-
centered” approach to monitor sea trades with Western countries than previous forms of 
monitoring commercial networks.   
 
 If we look at the development and transformation of the Customs office in the High 
Qing from a broad chronological spectrum (spanning from the late seventeenth century to 
the early twentieth century), it would not be exaggerated to argue that High Qing monarchs 
paved the way for Chinese participation in a world later dominated militarily and 
economically by European-based empires in several ways that have too often been ignored 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
463 Jacob M. Price, “The Imperial Economy,” in P. J. Marshall (ed.), Oxford History of the British Empire II : 
The Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 101 (table 4.4). 
 
464 For instance, in exploring the significant, yet often overlooked, linkages between the Ottoman Empire and 
the sea, Giancarlo Casale argues in his recent monograph that scholars have underestimated the importance of 
the Ottoman's “soft empire,” which as he writes as “based not on territorial expansion, but instead on an 
infrastructure of trade, communication, and religious ideology.” For further details, see Giancarlo Casale, The 
Ottoman Age of Exploration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).  
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by historians. First of all, the Customs System was the first governmental institution, which 
was coherent and fairly streamlined, for managing domestic as well as overseas trades in the 
history of the Manchu empire. Without a doubt, the Customs office was the most prominent 
institution that stimulated and contributed to the explosive and dramatic growth of sea 
trades between northern and southern China (especially from the 1750s to the 1830s), yet 
more importantly, it served as an significant preparatory role in China’s participation in the 
modern global economy followed by high imperialism and semi-colonization.465 Secondly, 
as Jane Kate Leonard suggested, the emergence of the Customs system also stimulated the 
co-operation between the central government and local commercial elites. Apart from the 
baoshang zhidu or the cohong practice, local commercial groups began to play a more 
significant part in urban port governance, harbor management, and a variety of trading 
affairs. This kind of cooperation proved to be effective and continued during the early treaty 
ports era (ca. 1843 – 1870) when coastal China was sucked into a new form of global 
historical process.466 It was only during the 1900s that the mutually dependent relationship 
between the central government and the local merchants began to attenuate as local 
businessmen could undertake overseas shipping without the administrative and financial 
support from the central authority but on their own terms.467 Last but not least, the 
institutionalization of the Customs offices also represented a major step in connecting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
465 But, of course, to focus on the Customs structure alone is to overlook the existence of other important 
conduits that played a key role in facilitating the eighteenth-century growth of trade. These conduits include, 
for example, the significance of overseas Chinese, improving shipping technologies, maritime expertise, and 
the aforementioned huiguan connection.  
 
466 See, for instance, Jane Kate Leonard, “Coastal Merchant Allies in the 1826 Sea Transport Experiment,” in 
Wang Gangwu, Ng Chin-keong (eds.), Maritime China in Transition, pp. 271-286. 
 
467 After the Boxer Uprising, the central authority in Beijing almost lost the control of some key economic 
provinces. The emergence of the “joint defense of Southeast China 東南互保 [dongnan hubao]“ serves as a 
very good example. 
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China’s overseas trade to Western nations. The path to this event, involving negotiations 
with foreign envoys and internal political machinations (mostly in 1770–1800), has been 
described in many previous studies. However, this chapter has in particular highlighted that 
the High Qing government, similar to Tokugawa Japan, did not isolate the empire from the 
wider maritime world – that was mature and sophisticated – but moved toward a more 
guarded engagement with Westerners.468 What is important to emphasize here, however, is 
that the policy of guarded engagement does not equal anti-foreignism or xenophobia. For 
many historians, it is generally accepted that the Canton System, which is assumed to be 
unable to evolve beyond a certain point, profoundly indicates China’s repudiation of 
Western trade and technology.469 In practice, the High Qing government was not resistant to 
contact with Europeans, nor was she merely a passive respondent to mounting external 
pressure to sea trade. It was not the case, then, that the Machu leaders lacked the means or 
the interest in operating foreign trading via their maritime frontier in the long eighteenth 
century. Even after the Canton System was initiated, the Qing court continued to deal with 
Western merchants on a justifiable, if not rationalized, basis by adjusting to the needs of 
Western traders in numerous respects prior to the First Opium War. In view of this, the 
frictions between the Qing and those seaborne European empires might indicate the two 
sides adapted a different set of engaging policies that varied in strategic concern and 
economic calculation, but does not essentially mean that the latter had to trade with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
468 My argument hopes to echo with Peter Perdue’s observation that “China was never completely isolated 
from the global processes.” See Peter C. Perdue, “Comparing Empires: Manchu Colonialism,” The 
International History Review, vol. 20 no. 2 (June, 1998), p. 256.  
 
469 See for example David Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some are so Rich and Some so 
Poor (London: W.W. Norton, 1998), pp. 335-349; Maxine Berg, “Britain, Industry and Perceptions of China, 
1792-94,” Journal of Global History, vol. 1 (2006), pp. 269-288.  
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former “on humiliating and frustrating terms,”470 and thus results in a torrent of diplomatic 
conflicts and military confrontations. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
470 See W. Travis Hanes III and Frank Sanello, Opium Wars: The Addiction of One Empire and the Corruption 
of Another (Naperville: Sourcebooks, 2002); Jack Beeching, The Chinese Opium Wars (New York: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, 1975), pp. 18-19. 
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Chapter Six 
Writing the Waves 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This chapter returns from the realm of policy to a more conceptual level. To bolster my case 
for the significance of the maritime world to the Qing imagination, I excavate three non-
official texts composed by Chen Lunjiong (?-1751), Wang Dahai, and Xie Qinggao (1765-
1821), which dedicated to the maritime world and China’s place within it. Unlike the 
literary texts that depicted the sea as a poetic trope or mysterious sphere full of mythical 
fantasies, maritime writings in this period invariably reflected a sense of the physical and 
cultural geography of the empire’s maritime frontier and its impact on littoral societies and 
coastal defense. Compared to earlier maritime writings, these works introduced new ways 
of looking at the political, economic, and social conditions in coastal regions and the spaces 
that affected sea trade and military strategies. Influenced by geo-historical studies, and 
supplemented by evidential and cartographical research, the three maritime writers 
produced detailed and verifiable descriptions of the maritime sphere. They hoped their 
writings could contribute to coastal governance. To make such a contribution, they studied 
the haijiang district (maritime frontier), rediscovered the traditional nanyang region (South 
China Sea), and added important information about the wider world that went beyond, and 
challenged, the conventional tianxia order. Relying mainly on their personal experiences, 
they revised and updated Chinese knowledge of maritime Asia and gave special attention to 
issues of maritime affairs, such as how to stabilize the maritime frontier, how to guard 
against pirates and potential dangers from the sea, how to properly manage domestic and 
foreign sea trade, as well as how to keep domestic sea space sound and safe. 
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Introduction 
 
A breath of airy being 
Floating in the universe 
Where from ancient times 
The sun and moon’s spheres 
Have been immersed.471 
—Zhang Zhao (1691-1745), “Gazing at the Sea (Guan hai)” 
 
  
 In his verse “Gazing at the Sea,” Zhang Zhao, a native of Jiangsu in the 
Qing, conceptualized the sea as the cradle of nature, embodying the sun and moon since 
prehistoric times.	  With the touch of Zhang’s brush, the often seemingly peaceful and silent 
ocean was filled with unfathomable energies. But he was not the only writer within China’s 
poetic and cultural landscape to feature the sea. In fact, the sea played an important role in 
Chinese cultural history from early antiquity. From ancient times, when the Shanhai jing 
(Classic of the mountains and seas) was compiled circa 4th century BC, the Chinese never 
looked upon the sea with indifference.472 Like mountains and forests and other natural 
landscapes, the sea was recorded, imagined, conceptualized, and written about in a variety 
of ways within Chinese literature.473 Cursed as a mythical, hostile monster, worshipped as a 
superior, impervious deity, or seen as a protective frontier, the sea was taken as something 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
471 Zhang Zhao, “Guan hai,” in Xu Shichang (ed.), Wan qingyi shihui (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1996), juan 
58, p. 2335. The original text is Qiankun fu yiqi, jin gu jin shuangwan (乾坤浮一氣, 今古浸雙丸).  
 
472	  Guo Pu, Shanhai jing (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985); see also Richard E. Strassberg, A Chinese Bestiary: 
Strange Creatures from the Guideways through Mountains and Seas (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University 
of California Press, 2002), p. 41. 
	  
473	  See Liang Erping, Zhongguo gudai haiyang ditu juyao (Beijing: Haiyang chubanshe, 2011), pp. 1-4. 
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inextricably linked to Chinese society. Whatever passion and conceptualization the textual 
records may have conveyed about the sea, it was a presence that could not be ignored in the 
Chinese context.  
 
Although the literature reveals the intimate link between the sea and Chinese culture 
from ancient times, outlining all of the ancient texts that mention the sea would be 
impossible within the confines of this chapter. I have therefore focused my attention on 
three maritime writings474 composed respectively by Chen Lunjiong (?-1751), Wang Dahai, 
and Xie Qinggao (1765-1821) in the high Qing.	  Unlike the literary texts which depicted the 
sea as a poetic trope or mysterious sphere full of mythical fantasies, the three maritime 
writings selected for this chapter invariably reflected a keen sense of the physical and 
cultural geography of the empire’s maritime frontier and its impact on littoral societies and 
coastal defence. Compared to maritime writings published in previous dynasties, the three 
texts selected for this article introduced a new way to look at the political, economic, and 
social conditions in coastal regions and the spaces that affected maritime shipping and 
military strategies. Surprisingly, despite their considerable contributions to the 
conceptualization of sea space, most of their writings have not been studied sufficiently by 
Chinese and western historians. One of the reasons for this neglect, I suspect, is that 
contemporary scholars have been inclined to study geo-historical writings that focused on 
inland frontier regions during the early and high Qing.475 By geo-historical studies I refer to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
474 By maritime writings I mean the writings that can be read as a projection of consciousness, ideas, and 
sentiments onto the sea. These writings often reveal themselves to be mirrors of the writer’s own concerns 
about the maritime world. 
 
475	  Most of the geo-historical writings in the high Qing deal with the foreign world centered on Inner Asia, 
which reflects the Manchu intense concern with the threatening posture of the western Mongols and the 
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a broad range of practical subjects, including local customs, topography, history, politics, 
and economic conditions.476 By analyzing how Chen Lunjiong, Wang Dahai, and Xie 
Qinggao conceived of maritime space, I believe we can understand their significant 
contributions to geo-historical scholarship as well as how the Qing’s intellectual and 
cultural borders expanded to incorporate the wider maritime world. We can also obtain a 
more complete understanding of the meaning that the maritime world had for the Qing by 
examining these maritime writings in conjunction with a series of imperial official 
documents. 
 
My focus on just three maritime writers inevitably raises the question: Were they 
representative of the Chinese scholar-officials as those we have discussed in the previous 
chapters? The short answer to this is no. Wang Dahai and Xie Qinggao never held 
government offices. And although Chen Lunjiong served in the Guangdong naval forces, 
neither he nor the other two maritime writers enjoyed special social or economic status. 
They were people whom historians of early modern Europe would refer to as a “middling 
sort.”477 During their lifetimes, their writings had only limited circulation in some coastal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
expanding Russian empire. Imperial studies such as the Qinding Huangchao wenxian tongkao and the DaQing 
yitong zhi mirrored the dynasty’s strategic interests in Inner Asia, as did some privately written accounts, such 
as the works of Song Yun (1752-1835), Xu Song (1781-1848), and Gong Zizhen (1792-1841). See Liang 
Qichao, translated by Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, Intellectual Trends in the Ch’ing Period (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1959), pp. xxvii-xxviii; David M. Farquhar, “Origins of the Manchus’ Mongolian Policy,” in 
John King Fairbank (ed.), Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 198-205; Nicola Di Cosmo, “Qing Colonial Administration in Inner 
Asia,” The International History Review, vol. 20, no. 2 (Jun., 1998), pp. 287-309; and Hou Deren, Qingdai 
xibei bianjiang shidixue (Beijing: Qunyan chubanshe, 2006). 
	  
476 Zou Yilin, Zhongguo lishi dili gaishu (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1993), pp. 1-2. Some scholars 
might also include travel writings (yuzhi) within the scope of geo-historical studies. For more details on the 
development of travel writings in imperial China, see Richard E. Strassberg, Inscribed Landscapes: Travel 
Writing from Imperial China (Berkeley and Los Angles: University of California Press, 1994), pp. 1-56. 
 
477 See, for example, Margaret R. Hunt, The Middling Sort: Commerce, Gender, and the Family in England, 
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provinces, such as Guangdong and Fujian. Only after the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries did their ideas circulate widely. It was during the Opium Wars (1839-
1842) that some prominent officials and literati, such as Lin Zexu (1785-1850) and Wei 
Yuan (1794-1856), began citing their works.478 Unfortunately, Chen, Wang, and Xie were 
not renowned political figures, theorists, or writers of the sort that historical accounts are 
usually confined. Regarding themselves as intellectuals in the Chinese context, the three 
maritime writers did hope to be successful officials or prominent leaders; but like most 
people they never achieved that goal. Their lack of prominence should not be taken as a 
measure of the worth of their writings, however. I have chosen to write about them because 
I think that their ideas and patterns of thought grew out of the social and cultural 
environment in which they lived, reflecting how the maritime world was conceptualized 
from that perspective. Although they were not as well-known as Gu Yanwu (1613-1682) or 
Gu Zuyu (1631-1692) and other geo-historians, their conceptualizations of the ocean as a 
geographical, political, cultural, and trans-regional landscape were exceptional. What makes 
them even more notable is that they incorporated the customs, religions, and commercial 
practices of other maritime countries (haiguo; e.g., Japan, some Southeast Asian and 
Western European countries) into their conceptualizations of the seascape. As keen 
maritime observers, they may have been among the first writers to report on the growth of 
European sea powers and their navigation and expansion overseas, and to identify the 
global thrust of European commercial expansion in Africa, Latin America, and Asia in the 
long eighteenth century. Their work provided a more detailed account of European 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1680-1780 (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996).  
 
478 It should be noted that Wang Dahai’s Haidao yizhi was even translated into English by an English 
Congregationalist missionary, Walter Henry Medhurst (1796-1857), in 1848. 
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seaborne powers, thus subtly altering the Chinese worldview during the age of 
improvisation.479 We must keep in mind that, in illustrating a number of maritime countries, 
these maritime writers were decisively influenced by the “Sino-nanyang” connection. 
Nanyang (South Ocean) refers to the sea surrounding Southeast Asia; and the Sino-nanyang 
connection is the tie indicating the historical connection between the Chinese coast and 
Southeast Asia. And because of this Sino-nanyang connection, maritime writers were 
customarily interested in depicting the history, economy, and culture of the “South Ocean” 
region. As one of the significant gateways that connected Europe and East Asia in the 
eighteenth century, the nanyang region thus became the lens through which the three 
maritime writers described and examined the Far West (i.e., Europe). 
 
By viewing the sea as an open-ended space and generating geographical knowledge 
on a global scale, they were forging links not only between the Qing and the rest of the 
world, but also between the familiar and the unfamiliar. Although some of their illustrations 
were insufficiently meticulous or accurate to covey the exact circumstances of the western 
world – at a time when some exegesis of the West underestimated the potency of their own 
naval power – these writers nevertheless had begun to rethink their worldview from a 
maritime perspective, positioning the Qing as an empire coexisting with other countries, but 
not as the greatest power in the world. This Sino-centric worldview had dominated Chinese 
political and cultural ideology since the Zhou era. In short, one of the reasons I decided to 
write about these maritime writers is because I believe their writings can help us rethink the 
connection between geo-historical studies and maritime writings predating the First Opium 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
479 The term “age of improvisation” was first introduced by Timothy Brook in his Vermeer's Hat: The 
Seventeenth Century and the Dawn of the Global World (London: Bloomsbury Press, 2007). 
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War that deserve further consideration by historians. With the rise of geo-historical studies 
in the early Qing, which emphasized the importance of evidence-based frontier 
studies, many scholars began studying the inner Asian frontier region, while only a few of 
them were interested in the maritime frontier. A sense of “maritime consciousness” is one 
of the things that set the three maritime writers apart from other writers who were part of 
this new trend in frontier studies. Yet before turning to the maritime writings composed by 
Chen, Wang, and Xie in detail, we must first consider the Chinese geographical tradition 
before the long eighteenth century so as to situate these writings in broader historical 
perspective. 
 
Chinese Geographical Tradition and the Conception of tianxia 
  
 Maritime writing is a genre of literature with a tradition dating back to the Warring 
States Period (476 B.C.−221 B.C.). That it is closely connected with the history of geo-
historical studies in imperial China is well known. Among the various significant features 
of Chinese geo-historical scholarship are studies of foreign and unfamiliar regions, which 
illustrated how the Han-Chinese projected and represented their cultural identity across the 
known space of the world. Such features showed that the Chinese regarded themselves as 
highly civilized, and believed that other social groups surrounding them were inferior and 
uncivilized. This worldview was based on the concept of tianxia.480  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
480 See Nicola Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies: The Rise of Nomadic Power in East Asian 
History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 1-12; ; Roger V. Des Forges, Cultural Centrality 
and Political Chang in Chinese History: Northeast Henan in the Fall of the Ming(Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2003), pp. 1-14; Lydia Liu, The Clash of Empires: The Invention of China in Modern World 
Making (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2004), pp. 31-69. 
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The first mention of tianxia, literally “all under heaven,” was recorded in the Yu’s 
Tribute (Yugong), a text traditionally attributed to Da Yu (Yu the Great, ca. 2205 B.C. – 
2105 B.C.) – the legendary hero who was best remembered for taming an epic flood.481 In 
this conceptualization of tianxia, the world was divided into five zones (wufu) and nine 
geographic divisions (jiuzhou), with the midstream region of the Yellow River being at the 
center. It should be noted that this center was not just a geographical index used to 
differentiate the five zones (as they were established in accordance with their respective 
distances from the Yellow River) but also an index for measuring their cultural levels. The 
farthest region, occupied by people who were considered to be the most uncivilized, was 
identified as the desert zone (huangfu), whereas the center, which was populated by the 
most civilized group, was known as the privileged zone (houfu). Because most ancient 
Chinese believed that they inhabited the center of the world, “civilizing the rest” became 
their “natural” mission.482 Richard J. Smith has pointed out that the “cultural superiority” 
assumed by the Chinese was the cornerstone for establishing relationships with neighboring 
tribes and civilizations.483 As such, the tianxia ideology encoded China and its surrounding 
states along a “superior center − inferior periphery” axis, dating back to the early imperial 
epoch. And most of the geographical writings up to the Ming-Qing transition were arguably 
part of this same established tradition. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
481 See Mark Edward Lewis, The Flood Myths of Early China (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
2006), pp. 52-53.  
 
482 Ban Gu (32-92), Hanshu (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1962), chapter 28, pp. 1523-1537; see also Helwig 
Schmidt-Glintzer (ed.), Lebenswelt und Weltanschauung im frühneuzeitlichen China (Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag, 
1990). 
 
483 Richard J. Smith, Fathoming the Cosmos and Ordering the World: The Yijing (I ching, or Classic of 
Changes) and Its Evolution in China (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2008), p. 29. 
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 Unlike the voyaging empires of Western Europe that realized the importance of 
maritime navigation and exploration during the Age of Discovery, the late Ming still 
embraced a Ming-centered perspective to conceptualize the world. Although, as the 
supreme Asian power, it was likely to come into direct contact with other civilizations 
across the ocean, most geographers and literati in the Ming were nevertheless almost 
unaware of the Mediterranean or the Atlantic regions, let alone the numerous studies of 
those places. Guided by the concept of “all under heaven,” Chinese intellectuals in the Ming 
were largely dependent on traditional sources of information on the wider world generated 
centuries earlier.484 Even though detailed maps of the world were being produced, such as 
the Jesuit Matteo Ricci’s famous map, these geographical materials only circulated inside 
the imperial court, not among ordinary citizens.485  
 
The Chinese began to explore the wider world, starting in the late seventeenth 
century, when a new trend in geo-historical studies emerged. This trend must be briefly 
discussed in light of the geographical texts that were written by Gu Yanwu and Gu Zuyu 
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  From a certain perspective, however, there should be nothing particularly surprising about this. To take an 
analogous example, no one would expect navigators or learned scholars from late medieval Genoese to be 
intimately familiar with Scandinavian geographical studies. Quite naturally, the lands of the Baltic had their 
own intellectual traditions and a shared set of practical concerns that were distinct from those of southern 
Europe, so even if individual pilgrims, church officials, or merchants traveled from one place to the other, it 
would be unreasonable to assume that because of this the two regions had access to exactly the same body of 
knowledge about the world. In the similar way, Chinese in imperial times simply embraced a basic 
understanding of the world that was common and familiar to them. As such, some distant sea spaces such as 
the Mediterranean, the Western Pacific, and the Atlantic remained a remote and unfamiliar region in their 
geographical studies before the Ming-Qing transition. 
	  
485 See Cordell D. K. Yee, “Traditional Chinese Cartography and the Myth of Westernization,” in J.B. Harley 
and David Woodward (eds.), Cartography in the Traditional East and Southeast Asian Societies (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 174-175. . 
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and other geo-historians in the late Ming and early Qing periods.486 The studies conducted 
by the two Gu not only faithfully recorded the history of the frontier regions but also 
reflected a changing consciousness that indirectly altered their conceptualization of tianxia 
as well as frontier regions. These writings are best remembered for their analyses of the 
history, geography, and society of the Qing Empire’s inner and southwestern Asian 
frontiers.487 Their method of examining the frontier influenced many subsequent geo-
historical studies. Some of these latter works were compiled by scholar-officials or 
supervised by the imperial court,488 while others were made “beyond the purview of 
imperial supervision” and published by private publishing houses. 
 
The development of geo-historical studies in the early Qing not only stimulated 
comprehensive reexaminations of various inland regions and Inner Asia, it also provided a 
way for Chinese intellectuals to (re)conceptualize the maritime spaces along China’s shores. 
As a consequence, geo-historical research fostered a kind of “sea consciousness” among 
some Qing scholars. They came to view the sea as a fundamental, yet tangible space that 
linked them to faraway lands. Although the Qing court was principally concerned with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
486	  It would not be an exaggeration to say that Gu Yanwu and Gu Zuyu revolutionized the methodology of 
conducting geo-historical researches and laid the foundation for future studies. For more details about the two 
Gu, see Willard J. Peterson, “The Life of Ku Yen-wu (1613-1682),” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, vol. 
28 (1968), pp. 114-156 and vol. 29 (1969), pp. 201-247; Gu Zuyu, Dushi fangyu jiyao, juan 1, p. 4a; See also 
Peng Minghui, Wanqing de jingshi shixue (Taipei: Maitian chubanshe, 2002).  
	  
487 Hou Deren, Qingdai xibei bianjiang shidixue (Beijing: Qun yan chubanshe), pp. 1-16. 
 
488	  Laura Hostetler has argued that in the course of the eighteenth century, as the size of the Qing empire 
almost doubled, the Manchus showed considerable cartographic interest in the people recently subjugated by 
them. She also mentions that the quest for knowledge about non-Chinese tribes on the empire’s internal 
frontiers was mostly carried out by official representatives of the Qing court with increasingly rigorous 
empirical methods. See Laura Hostetler, Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and Cartography in Early 
Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), p.5. 
	  
   
 
	  
220	  
westward inland expansion in the eighteenth century, some members of the educated elite, 
such as Lan Dingyuan, Li Yuandu, and Li Yuandu I introduced in the previous chapters, 
and maritime writers that we are going to discuss were interested in the ocean. Rather than 
viewing the sea as a barrier leading to nowhere or as a hindrance to communication, they 
regarded the ocean as a trans-regional contact zone that “led everywhere.”489 Before the 
outbreak of the First Opium War, Chen Lunjiong, Wang Dahai, and Xie Qinggao realized 
that there were a growing number of economic and cultural encounters between the Qing 
and the world across the sea. Regarding the ocean as a passage of connections linking two 
or more geographical spheres, they thought that the Qing should be (re)positioned in a 
multi-cultural, or multi-layered, world model.  
 
While maritime writings in the eighteenth century were influenced by the 
outstanding geo-historical research of Gu Yanwu and Gu Zuyu, they were simultaneously 
heir to a legacy of maritime accounts published during the Ming period. After the great 
expeditions led by the famous Admiral Zheng He (1371-1433) from 1405 to 1433, the 
exotic “Southern Ocean (nanyang),” stretching from the China Sea to the east coast of 
Africa, was painted in vivid detail in the Yingya shenglan (The overall survey of the ocean 
shores). This was compiled by Ma Huan, a voyager who accompanied Zheng on three of his 
seven expeditions.490 The widely circulating Yingya shenglan was important because it gave 
the Chinese images of unfamiliar oceanic regions, extending outwards from China to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
489 Compared to the Chinese, the Europeans changed their attitude towards the ocean early in the sixteenth 
century. Before the fifteenth century, according to Daniel Boorstin, “the Ocean led nowhere, in the next 
centuries people would see it led everywhere.” See Daniel Boorstin, The Discoverers (New York: Random 
House, 1983), p. 154. 
490 Ma Huan, Yingya shenglan (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985). 
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east coast of Africa – apparently remote and distant places from the perspective of 
traditional writings. It thus injected new emotion into the historical imagination regarding 
the outer sea, by situating, if not authenticating, Ma’s personal experience in context.491 In 
addition to the Yingya shenglan, the substantial part of the section on foreign countries 
recorded in the Xu wenxian tongkao (Encyclopedia of the history and biography), edited by 
Wang Qi (1530-1615), as well as the private jottings such as the Dongxi yangkao (Study of 
the eastern and western oceans), written by Zhang Xie (1574-1640), also influenced the 
style and context of maritime writings in the high Qing.492 For instance, maritime writers in 
both the Ming and Qing did not compile their studies merely out of personal interest in 
geography. Most of their writings were a practical response to problems related to coastal 
governance and the empire’s security. In the prefaces of their accounts (e.g., xuyan),493 most 
maritime writers express their hope that their works could be handbooks and guides that 
would contribute to political and social-economic stability across the maritime frontier 
(jinghai). As Chen Lunjiong, one of the maritime writers we will address in the upcoming 
section, clearly stated,  
 
Apart from dedicating it to Emperor Kangxi and my father, 
this work (the Haiguo wenjian lu) aims at providing 
valuable information for the officials in charge of the 
maritime frontier areas (ren haijiang zhe) to govern the 
coastal region properly.494 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
491 J.V.G. Mills (ed. and trans.), Ying-yai sheng-lan: ‘The Overall Survey of the Ocean’s Shores’ (1433) 
(Bangkok, Thailand: White Lotus, 1997), pp. 1-23. 
 
492 Jane Kate Leonard, Wei Yuan and China’s Rediscovery of the Maritime World (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard 
University Press, 1984), p. 95. 
 
493	  Yet not all prefaces of these maritime writings were written by the authors of the texts themselves. While 
some prefaces were written by them, some were prefaced by their friends or colleagues. 
	  
494 Chen Lunjiong, Haiguo wenjian lu, “preface,” p. 11b. We will discuss what Chen meant by “to govern the 
coastal region properly” in the next session. 
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Maritime writers in both periods also used similar keywords for maritime matters (haiyang 
zhi shi). For instance, they delineated outer sea spaces as the “Large Western Ocean” 
(daxiyang), the “Little Western Ocean” (xiaoxiyang), and the “Southwestern Ocean” 
(xinanyang). They also tended to use the term yangren to refer to foreigners, waiyang to 
indicate regions beyond the orbit of the Qing Empire, haiyu for “sea words” (languages 
spoken by crewmembers), and haitu for sea charts. As another example, when Wang Liu 
(1786-1843) stressed the need to obtain extensive background information on maritime 
countries to help statecraft writers better safeguard the country, he used the term “waiyang 
yudi,” following Zhang Xie, for maritime countries in the far west.495 In his writings, Xie 
Qinggao carefully and effectively used the sea charts produced in the Ming period, thereby 
producing a relatively accurate picture of the seascape in Southeast Asia.496 Furthermore, 
maritime writers in the Ming and Qing assiduously used names from ancient Chinese 
records to indicate places during the Qing. For example, they would use the Han-era term 
DaQin to refer to Rome in the eighteenth century. Whatever similarities might be found in 
their approaches to statecraft or uses of terms, the above examples suggest that the methods 
of exploring the sea among local elites in the eighteenth century partly reflected the 
established predilection for such exploration dating from Ming times.  
Eighteenth Century Maritime Writings 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
495 Xie Qinggao, Hailu, “Wang’s preface on Hailu,” p. 2. 
 
496 Xie Qinggao, Hailu, p. 4, 6, 11, 18, 22, 24. 
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The first maritime writing we will address is the Record of Things Seen and Heard 
among the Maritime Kingdoms (Haiguo wenjian lu), which was completed in 1730. The 
author, Chen Lunjiong (who also went by courtesy names Cian and Zizhai), was a native of 
Tong’an who served as a general in various places along the southeastern coast (e.g. Suzong, 
and Wuzong). Born into a merchant family in Fujian, Chen had numerous opportunities to 
interact with the maritime world from early childhood.  The Chen family’s close connection 
to overseas trade distinguishes Chen from other maritime writers.  
 
His father, Chen Ang, was a successful businessman who conducted frequent sea 
trade with the Japanese and the Southeast Asians. As Chen Lunjiong himself stated,  
My father was born into a poor family, but he was a trained 
businessman in overseas shipping across the outer ocean. 
Apart from that, he was good at sailing. He could identify 
the most favorable wind direction and the wave action for 
his voyages: not every experienced sailor was able to do 
that.497   
 
Because of Chen Ang’s maritime expertise, Shi Lang invited him to join the campaign to 
annex Taiwan. After Taiwan was conquered in 1683, Chen Ang was appointed an assistant 
general (fudutong) in Guangdong to train the navy.498 Chen Lunjiong’s family background 
enabled him to develop a sophisticated knowledge of the maritime world and follow in his 
father’s footsteps into officialdom. He received his first posting as Brigadier (canjiang) of 
Southern Taiwan in 1721 and served in several positions at that rank before being promoted 
to Regional Commander (zongbing) of the Eastern Guangdong naval force. From the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
497 Chen Lunjiong, Haiguo wenjian lu, “preface,” p. 10a- 11a.  
 
498 Ibid, p. 10b. 
 
   
 
	  
224	  
Kangxi to the Qianlong period (1721-47), Chen was transferred to different coastal cities, 
where he collaborated with a number of sea merchants and Westerners who provided him 
with firsthand information about the customs and lifestyles of many foreign regions. 
Inspired by the practical geo-historical research of the late seventeenth century, Chen 
searched for facts about unfamiliar parts of the world that would enlighten the intellectuals 
and ruling elites. He then began to compile the Haiguo wenjian lu, using his personal 
experience as well as some Ming writings mentioned earlier. Notwithstanding his expertise 
and firsthand knowledge, his work did not gain wide circulation in his lifetime. It was only 
in the mid-nineteenth century that his work was frequently cited in official documents and 
private writings, such as the renowned Haiguo tuzhi (Illustrated Treatise on the Sea 
Kingdoms), written by Wei Yuan (1794–1856) and the Sizhou zhi (Geography of the Four 
Continents), by Commissioner Lin Zexu (1785-1850). The impact of Chen’s work in the 
nineteenth century, as Jane Kate Leonard argues, surpassed that of all subsequent unofficial 
writings about the sea during the eighteenth century and was considered one of the most 
authoritative works on the maritime world during the Opium War period.499 
 
Chen made illustrations of the maritime space that was accessible to him in south 
China. In his Haiguo tuzhi, the renowned scholar Wei Yuan excerpted long descriptive 
passages from Chen’s study on Southeast Asia, Japan, and especially India. Wei Yuan 
praised Chen’s work as a dependable source for finding foreign places and locations.500 To 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
499 Jane Kate Leonard, Wei Yuan and China’s Rediscovery of the Maritime World, p. 96. 
 
500 In fact, Wei Yuan drew long descriptive passages from Chen’s work on Southeast Asia, Japan, and 
especially India. Wei appeared to have regarded the study conducted by Chen as the authoritative sources on 
these regions. And what makes Wei Yuan’s research much more compelling is that he did not rely on those 
“outdated” Ming geographies, as most Qing writings did.  
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compile his work, Chen made use of the maritime writings published in the Ming, including 
the aforementioned Dongxiyang kao and the Xu wenxian tongkao, as well as his extensive 
maritime connections. But Chen did not realize that some of the information in those Ming 
materials was inaccurate. As Zhang Weihua has pointed out, some parts of Chen’s work 
“portrayed, often imperfectly, the maritime world as it was known in the previous 
dynasty.”501 In spite of these deficiencies, however, Chen’s work represented how a 
scholar-official living along the coast conceptualized the maritime space in the eighteenth 
century. It presents the sea along the China coast as a medium connecting a variety of 
concerns, such as littoral governance and territorial control. 
 
Chen’s Haiguo wenjian lu contains a wide range of materials about the maritime 
world. It introduces some measurements and navigational directions to promote the 
consolidation of Qing sovereignty across the ocean. In describing the geography of the 
maritime frontier and interpreting miscellaneous reconnaissance of European seafaring 
powers, Chen provides valuable insights into Chinese perceptions of the sea and guidelines 
for Chinese maritime strategy. In the fifteen-page opening chapter of the Haiguo wenjian lu, 
entitled tianxia yanhai xingshilu (Maritime condition along the sea front),502 Chen relates 
the geography of the Bohai area. He then moves on to detail the southern coast of the 
empire, covering Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong. To weave an extensive dragnet 
for maritime defense, Chen envisioned a comprehensive protection strategy extending up 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
501 Zhang Weihua, Ming shi Folangji Lüsong Helan Yidaliya si zhuan zhu shi (Taibei: Dongfang wenhua 
shuju, 1973), p. 43.  
 
502 Chen Lunjiong, Haiguo wenjian lu, shang juan, pp. 1a- 8a. 
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the entire China coast and including important sea ports, coastal cities, as well as the 
entrances to China’s inland waterways. Chen believed that concerns over coastal cities and 
access to inland waterways mainly stemmed from violence inflicted by pirates, with Jiangsu 
and Zhejiang being considered the most problematic districts. 503  He thus suggested 
establishing more fortifications in key areas along the coast (e.g., Congmin, Langshan, 
Dinghai, Zhapu, Wuzong, and the Island of Pi [Pidao]) in order to “sweep away all potential 
dangers.”504 Chen introduced to his readers the importance of having an effective system of 
sea patrols to secure and maintain coastal communications, as well as arming and fortifying 
these strategic strongholds. However, the introduction does not provide a comprehensive 
solution to achieve these ends. In fact it only focuses on the strategic importance of key 
locations along the coast — something which Chen gave considerable weight. As he 
mentions in his preface, “if China would like to strengthen its maritime militarization, the 
ruling elites must first thoroughly analyze the coastal geography before launching a long-
term development of coastal defense.”505  
 
In the chapter following the introduction, Chen shifts his focus to the outer sea space. 
In setting the scene, Chen arranges the geography of the sea into five parts to correspond to 
his perception of the five major divisions, or ocean regions, of the maritime world beyond 
the inner ocean (as described in figure 1). Although Chen might have been aware of the 
geographical divisions of the maritime world used in Western sources, he did not adopt that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
503 Chen Lunjiong, Haiguo wenjian lu, shang juan, p. 2b. 
 
504 Ibid, pp. 3a-4b.  
 
505 Chen Lunjiong, Haiguo wenjian lu, “preface,” p. 11b.  
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framework as it did not conform to the Chinese view of the ocean. Instead, he used the 
traditional vocabulary yang to describe these maritime regions. He arranged the major 
ocean regions in sequence, from east to west, beginning with the Qing’s close neighbor 
Japan in East Asia, moving then to tributary states in Southeast Asia, and concluding finally 
with Europe.  
 
 
Ocean regions Number of Pages 
The Eastern Sea (dongyang) 8 (shangjuan, pp. 9a-12b) 
Southeastern Ocean (dongnanyang) 9 (shangjuan, pp. 13a-18a) 
Southern Ocean (nanyang) 18 (shangjuan, pp. 19a-27b) 
Small Western Ocean (xiaoxiyang) 6 (shangjuan, pp. 28a-30b) 
Great Western Ocean (daxiyang) 10 (shangjuan, pp. 31a-35b) 
Figure 1: Chen’s “maritime categorization” 
 
Chen’s ocean-based geographical categorization is worth consideration because it did not 
use a “civilized” versus “barbaric” yardstick to divide the world along the lines of the 
tianxia matrix, in which geographical distance mattered most. Even though the West, or the 
Great Western Ocean, is located far away from the Chinese cultural sphere, Chen did not 
depict it as culturally inferior. For Chen, these places were, in some regards, comparable to 
the Qing in terms of history and cultural development (jianyou yu Zhonguo xiangsi).506 In 
other words, the Qing was not singularly superior to these maritime countries located in the 
Far West. In stark contrast to the conception of tianxia, Chen’s maritime geography made 
geographical distance less important in measuring cultural difference between China and 
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other civilizations.  
 
The Yanhai quantu 
 
In addition to writing the text for his Haiguo wenjian lu, Chen was a cartographer. 
One of his famous coastal diagrams (haitu), entitled Yanhai quantu (The Complete 
Overview of the Coastal Region), was an undated and colored scroll map. The preface was 
by Peng Qifeng (1701–1784) and Chen Lunjiong himself. The map was delicately drawn on 
a paper scroll from right to left. According to a description in the Nanjing Museum, where 
the original map is preserved, the height between the margins is 30 cm, and the total length, 
from right to left, is 928 cm. Like the Sihai quantu (Map of the Four Seas), another sea 
chart prepared by Chen and appended to the Haiguo wenjianlu,507 the Yanhai quantu was 
followed by four other coastal maps depicting the Pescadores, the west coast of Taiwan, the 
Inner Mountains of Taiwan, and the Hainan region. Judging from the sea space described in 
the Yanhai quantu, this maritime diagram clearly delineates the areas of the seawater that 
Chen conceptualized as part of the domestic sea space of the Qing Empire. A significant 
feature of most of the coastal diagrams and atlases produced under official supervision in 
the Qing such as the Guangdong yanhai tu (Map of Guangdong Coast) and the Zhe Tang 
jianbian tu (Simplified Map of Zhejiang and the Qiantang River) is that if the area was 
beyond governmental control, it would not be described in detail and might even be left 
blank.508 Unlike the sea spaces that had “not yet entered the map” (weiru bantu), the 
Taiwan Strait, Bohai Bay, Hainan Island, and the west coast of the Pescadores (though 
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without clear geographical limits) were introduced thoroughly in this Yanhai quantu. These 
maritime sectors arguably served as part of the domestic sea space under administrative 
governance. In order to maintain peace and control throughout the region, Chen was 
convinced that considerable attention should be paid to the Shandong coast and the Leizhou 
Peninsula (the southernmost part of Guangdong), the two strategic regions that guarded two 
“key entries” of the coastline.  
 
The Haidao yizhi 
 
In addition to Chen’s study, the Desultory Account of the Islands of the Sea (Haidao 
yizhi) by Wang Dahai in 1791 was another significant maritime work that was published in 
the high Qing. It is important as the first comprehensive study by a Chinese scholar 
focusing specifically on Dutch control of Java and the Straits of Sunda, as well as their 
powerful hold on Asian trade in the Indonesian archipelago. Leonard Blussé has called 
Wang “one of the very few Chinese who traveled overseas and left an account of his 
adventures in [Southeast Asia].”509 
 
Wang Dahai (who also went by courtesy names Biqing or Liugu) was a native of 
Longxi in Fujian Province. After failing the civil service examination in 1783, Wang 
worked as a sea trader in Southeast Asia and lived in Java for almost ten years.510 Although 
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510 Between 1783 and 1793 Wang also served as preceptor to the children of the Chinese captain of 
Pekalongan, a port city on the north coast of Java. From his writings, we can see that Wang decided to settle 
down in Java. He married an overseas Chinese woman from a moderately affluent family.  
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Wang devoted most of his energy to sea trade, he never stopped writing. His associate Li 
Wei wrote this in the preface to the Haidao yizhi,  
My townsman, Wang Dahai, in his youth possessed 
irrepressible vigor of mind, and scorning to submit his 
lucubration to the criticisms of the examining official, gave 
up his prospects of advancement to official rank, and 
contented himself with the publication of private essays.511 
 
During his lengthy stay in Southeast Asia, he kept assembling primary sources about the 
culture and history of islands in Southeast Asia, and eventually compiled six volumes of his 
Haidao yizhi in 1791. Although some might take Wang’s work to be nothing more than a 
personal account, I submit that it is personal only in the sense that he provided a succinct 
record of his daily experiences — whom he met, what he ate, the seascapes, and the weather. 
For instance, in the chapter “Fruit and Flowers,” Wang introduces various species of plants 
such as champaka, Lawsonia Americana, plantain, and sugar cane.512 The main purpose of 
this account, however, appears to have been recording the distances between different sea 
ports, noting where hazardous weather conditions might be encountered and where 
aboriginal peoples were particularly irksome, and whether stopping ports afforded food and 
clean water. In his preface, Wang writes:  
 
We have heard that districts have their statistics, just as 
kingdoms have their histories. No statistics are records, 
giving an account of the hills and rivers, appearance of the 
country, antiquities, production, inhabitants, works of art, 
regions and superstitions of a district; in short nothing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
511 Li Wai’s “preface,” in Wang Dahai, Haidao yizhi (Jiaqing edition), p. 6a.   
 
512 See W. H. Medhurst, Ong Dae Hae [Wang Dahai], translated by W. H. Medhurst, The Chinaman Abroad: 
or a Desultory Account of the Malayan Archipelago, Particularly of Java (Shanghai: The Mission Press, 
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should be omitted……European countries are originally on 
the outside margin of civilization, and their being 
assimilated now to the villages of our inner land, is entirely 
owing to the virtuous influence of our august government, 
which transforms those distant and unknown regions, by 
the innate force of its majesty…… Although far from being 
intelligent, I dare not refuse carefully to record the things 
which I have seen and heard, together with some references 
to the country and its inhabitants; in short every individual 
word and action worthy of being noted down; thus 
publishing the whole, in order to render some small 
assistance towards correcting men’s minds, and spreading 
right principles in the world.513 
 
This excerpt shows that Wang wanted to better acquaint China, Southeast Asia, and the 
western world with each other. Although those maritime countries (e.g., Java and the 
Malaccas) were located beyond the domestic sea space of the Great Qing, they influenced 
the Empire, economically and culturally, through the medium of Wang’s record as he 
traveled over the seas. In addition to identifying sea routes, port cities, and stopping places 
with names transcribed into Chinese, Wang detailed the strict Dutch trade monopoly, their 
base at Batavia in western Java, the northern Javanese ports, Banjarmasin, Makassar, Banda, 
and above all, how these business centers were connected with the Qing Empire.514 The 
nature of these descriptions suggested that Wang’s study was not merely a personal 
handbook but a treatise that expressed deep concern for practical matters for managing the 
Qing’s relations with maritime Asia. Zhou Xuegong in the eighteenth century had this to 
say about the book:  
 
Wang Dahai’s work is calculated to make up the 
deficiencies of our former accounts, being equally clear 
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and perspicacious as the Records of Things Seen and Heard 
in the Western Regions (Xiyu wenjian lu).515 This one little 
work serves extensively to testify that the instructions of 
our august dynasty are gracefully wafted over the sea.516  
 
Like Chen’s Haiguo wenjian lu, the aim of the Haidao yizhi was to serve as a substantial 
guidebook for those who were interested in exploring the wider maritime world and coastal 
governance by providing them with firsthand, accurate information that reflected political 
and economic realities in Southeast Asia.  
 
The Hailu 
 
 In 1820, twenty-nine years after Wang published his Haidao yizhi, Xie Qinggao 
completed his Records of the Sea (Hailu) in Macau – which is considered by later Qing 
writers such as Wei Yuan to be one of the most important works on “current” maritime 
affairs in the long eighteenth century. Born into a middle gentry family in eastern 
Guangdong, somewhere near present-day Meizhou, Xie was an astute polyglot. Even 
though he did not take the civil service examination, he learned a variety of European 
languages as well as some Southeast Asian ideographs. One of his closest friends, Yang 
Bingnan, recalled, “[Xie] was smart, brave and multilingual since his early years.”517  
However, despite his talents, Xie had no interest whatsoever in an official career but was 
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  Xiyu wenjian lu was a writing written by a Manchu named Qishiyi in 1777. This book describes in 
detail the history and culture of the western frontier region of the Qing dynasty during the mid- and late 
eighteenth century. 	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instead committed to Canton’s sea-trade.518 Sprawling along the Pearl River’s banks, late 
eighteenth-century Canton was a vibrant coastal city with a long history of commercial 
interaction with foreign merchants. For conducting overseas business, it was the place to be. 
Canton, which had a significant European population, was the only Chinese sea port open to 
western traders in the late eighteenth century.519 This gave Xie plenty of opportunities to 
interact with Westerners. When he was eighteen, Xie’s life changed suddenly when, en 
route to Southeast Asia, he was shipwrecked. Rescued by a Portuguese captain, he was 
escorted all the way to Lisbon, Portugal. Xie did not immediately return to China but 
decided to stay in the West to broaden his horizons.520 Unlike most of his Chinese 
contemporaries, Xie’s willingness to spend ten years travelling throughout western Europe 
made him exceptional. This enabled him to witness the political, economic and cultural 
differences between China and this part of the world between 1783 and 1793. In Hailu, a 
record of his European travels, Xie later demonstrated that he was a man of learning as well 
as a merchant, with personal experience of the “New World” far beyond the Chinese 
homeland. In 1793, Xie returned to the Qing and settled down in Macau, but his sight 
gradually grew worse and he eventually became totally blind. His friend Yang Bingnan 
assisted him in writing down his remarkable travel story in Hailu (which was later 
published as a slim volume in 1820) in order to “perpetuate his knowledge and 
experience.”521 
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  “Preface written by Lü Tiaoyeng,” in Xie Qinggao, Hailu, p. 331. 
 
519 For details, see Gang Zhou, The Qing Opening to the Ocean: Chinese Maritime Policies, 1684-1757 
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 Comprising three chapters (juan), the Hailu touched upon geographical locations, 
politics and trading conditions in both Southeast Asia and Europe. In the first two chapters, 
Xie examined the history and culture of Borneo, Java, Sumatra and the southern part of the 
Malay Peninsula. For an insightful traveller such as Xie, who had travelled to southeast 
Asia, he recorded the changing political and trading conditions on the Straits of Malacca 
and the rise of European influence across the Southern Ocean (nanyang), covering the 
trading kingdoms of Srivijava and Malacca. Xie cautioned that rapid developments brought 
by western influence in Southeast Asia might become a threat to the Qing Empire in the 
near future.522 Xie’s concern with the Malacca Straits is significant, since it reflects the 
longstanding Chinese interest in the region as a centre of Asian interaction and 
communication, an interest that extends back as far as the seventh and eighth centuries.523 
Xie’s observations in this section are reasonably positive. It is precisely this kind of 
observation that makes his study a sophisticated early Chinese re-conceptualization of the 
non-Chinese world, increasingly influenced by western Europeans, in the eighteenth 
century.  
 
In the final chapter, Xie described some of the cultures he had encountered in the 
Far West as well as their spread across the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. Xie 
explored several countries located in what we now call “Europe,” which raises the question 
of whether he himself viewed these countries collectively as “Europe” or as part of 
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“Europe.” In other words, did Xie use a specific term to label Europe as a unity? As far as I 
can tell, Xie did not employ a standard term to refer to all the western regions he explored 
together, but he loosely applied glosses such as xiyang (Western Ocean), daxiyang (Great 
Western Ocean), wai daxiyang (Outer Great Western Ocean) and xinanyang (Southwestern 
Ocean). On the other hand, Xie did not use the word ouluoba, the Chinese word for Europe 
as a unity, which was commonly used by scholar-officials later in the late nineteenth 
century.524 Although he did not consistently use a term or label for Europe as a unity, Xie 
was aware of the connectedness of the countries he described, if only vaguely. This sense of 
connectedness resembled the traditional connections that were understood to exist in China, 
Korea and Japan in East Asia. If Xie had not perceived such — largely implicit — 
connections, he would not have used the notion of a series of “oceanic categories” (e.g., 
daxiyang or xinanyang) to categorize those selected western European polities he discussed 
in the third chapter of his Hailu. Although Xie expressed this sense of connectedness, he 
was sensitive to the regional diversity among the maritime kingdoms in the Far West. He 
observed, for instance, that the Dutch shared similar customs with the Portuguese, the 
French and the Prussians, but also maintained their cultural uniqueness in many ways.525 So 
even though Xie did not use a specific standardized term to identify the vast landmass that 
we now call “Europe,” he did understand that the regions he lumped together as “western” 
were not simply a randomly diverse collection of territories, but could be regarded, at least 
to some extent, as a coherent region located in the Far West. 
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Illustrating Maritime Countries (haiguo) 
  
 For the three maritime writers, the sea was not only a region requiring maritime 
militarization to ensure the security of the empire, it was also a geographical contact zone 
connecting the wider world that was unfamiliar to Chinese audience. As such, the maritime 
writers were not only forging links between the Qing and the domestic sea space; they were 
also mediating the familiar and the unfamiliar. Although their descriptions of the unfamiliar 
were somewhat selective and stylized, they no longer regarded the ocean as a mythical, 
untouchable space or an unknown barrier which kept other peoples apart from themselves 
geographically, but a spatial medium for exploring other accessible civilizations.  
  
 Like the geo-historians who researched Inner Asia, such as Gong Zizhen (1792–
1841), Sun Zhengze (1593–1676), and Shao Yuanping (1662–1735),526 maritime writers in 
the eighteenth century understood the problem of conceptualizing the world from a Sino-
centric perspective. They consequently devoted much of their studies to the evaluation of 
other Southeast Asian and European countries, from which a sizable number of advanced 
civilizations had emerged. Most of the maritime writers wrote about the early origins of 
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  In his Chronological Account of the Emergence of the Yuan Dynasty (Yuanchao diangu bianniankao), Sun 
Chengze’s collected detailed materials about the geography, architecture, economy, social customs, education, 
and political institutions in Mongolia. See Nicola Di Cosmo, “Beasts and Birds: The Historical Context of 
Early Chinese Perceptions of the Northern Peoples,” in his Ancient China and Its Enemies: The Rise of 
Nomadic Power in East Asian History, pp. 93-126.  Additionally, Shao Yuanping’s abridged and reorganized 
the History of the Yuan Dynasty (Yuanshi), which was written by official historians in the Ming times, and 
finally published the Topical Studies of Mongolian History (Yuanshi leibian ). Shui Yuanping, Yuanshi 
neibian (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1987), juan 1, pp. 1-7. In his thorough study of the Yuan 
Dynasty, Shao reexamined the distinctive traditions and customs of the herdsmen, and further underlined the 
historical significance of the Mongol Empire. Showing great affinity to evidential research and geo-historical 
studies, Wang Huizu (1730-1807), Qian Daxin (1728-1804), and Wei Yuan also made considerable efforts to 
rectify dubious and inaccurate details in the Yuanshi. They even indicated that the Mongolian cultural tradition 
was very similar to the Han’s because they were both moulded by a long history. Wei Yuan, Yuanshi xinbian 
(Yangzhou: Jiangsu guangling guji keyinshe, 1990). 
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these states, tracing the history of their first maritime contacts with China. These writers 
also examined the institutional organizations that accounted for the wealth and power of 
these states, and outlined their cultures and customs.   
  
 The Qing was no longer seen as the center of the world in the accounts of these 
maritime writers. Through texts, illustrations, and/or maps, Chen, Wang, and Xie each 
introduced to their readers the physical features of the known globe, including its continents 
and its watery surface. Usually beginning with Asia, they recognized that the northeastern 
corner of Manchuria was connected to Russia, while Kokonor was located in the southeast 
frontier of the Qing Empire. Turkestan in the northwest were composed of many states, as 
noted in early Han records of the western Region (xiyu) — whereas the various tribes, such 
as Kirghiz and Burut from beyond the frontier, were seen as traditional tributary peoples. 
The tribute countries such as Korea, the Pescadores, as well as the various countries 
bordering on the south (i.e., Cochin China, Siam, Burma, Laos, and Nepal) were connected 
to China by the East Asian Sea. Located across the Eastern Sea (dongyang), Japan was one 
of the Asian states that did not subordinate itself to Qing authority. But, according to these 
writers, Japan had sent envoys to China and studied Chinese culture and had remained 
intimately connected with China for centuries. 
  
 Aside from these Asian states, there are islands situated in Southeast Asia, including 
Java and other islands in the Indonesian archipelago. These regions, except the sea off the 
eastern coast of Australia, were often described as trading spheres frequented by numerous 
merchant vessels and connected by major sea ports, such as Jakarta, Banten, Manila, and 
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Malacca. And this trading sector was closely connected to the Qing, especially the 
southeastern coast. As Wang Dahai observed, “Those who ply the oar and spread the sail 
[in Southeast Asia] are principally the inhabitants of the Fujian and Guangdong provinces, 
who have been in the habit of emigrating, for the space of 400 years. From the early part of 
the Ming Dynasty up to the present day, while those of our countrymen who have remained 
and sojourned in those parts, after propagating and multiplying, amount to no less than 
100,000.”527 
  
 Europe was usually referred to as the “Great Western Ocean (daxiyang)” in these 
maritime writings. Although this continent was bordered by a series of mountain ranges, it 
was essentially a maritime sphere otherwise encircled by the sea. Depicted as almost the 
same size as Asia, Europe was conceptualized by maritime writers as a region composed of 
many civilizations that came and went long before the Han dynasty (206 B.C. − 220 A.D.). 
For example, to Chen and Xie, Europe had been inhabited even before the Qin-Han eras, 
when its people roamed and hunted for their livelihood. Indeed, during the early Han period 
the state of Rome in Italy founded a governmental system and opened up territory on the 
four sides to form a unified power in the Occident. The state called “DaQin” in Han 
histories probably referred to the Roman Empire. However, Chen and Xie failed to provide 
an overview of European history from antiquity; they focused instead on more recent 
history (xiangjin lüeyuan). By the eighteenth century, Western Europeans who came from 
the “Great Western Ocean (daxiyang)” were described as foreign, yet superior, as they had 
produced machines and were accomplished at sailing ships. These technologies enabled 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
527 Wang Dahai, Haidao yizhi, pp. 1b-2a. 
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them to reach almost every corner of the globe across the seven seas and accomplish their 
expansionist missions.528 For instance, in his description of British expansion, Xie Qinggao 
asserted that: 
 
Maritime commerce is one of the chief occupations of the 
English, and wherever there is a region in which profits 
could be reaped by trading, these peoples strive for them, 
with the result that their commercial vessels are to be seen 
on the sea. Commercial traders are to be found all over the 
country. A large foreign mercenary army is also maintained. 
As a consequence, although the country is small, it has 
such a large military force that foreign nations are filled 
with fear.529  
 
Some maritime writings briefly mentioned Africa; but generally this huge continent 
was sketched as a triangular-shaped landmass surrounded by the ocean.530 Because Zheng 
He had reached the eastern coast of Africa in three of his voyages, in the context of bridging 
the familiar and unfamiliar, the continent was supposed to be historically connected to 
China from a Chinese cultural perspective. The Dutch and Portuguese conquest of some 
western and southern coastal areas of this landmass was also recorded. Though very sketchy, 
most of the descriptions by the maritime writers casted the people of Africa as black 
barbarians, or black ghosts (wugui). They were thought to be chaotic and barbaric — 
notions that Europeans used to exploit them.531  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
528 Chen Lunjiong, Haiguo wenjianlu, shangjuan, p. 25a.  
 
529 Xie Qinggao, Hailu, p. 251. The text is translated by Jeanette Mirsky. See her “The Great Chinese 
Travellers,” in Mark A. Kishlansky, ed., Sources of World History (New York: HarperCollins College 
Publishers, 1995), pp. 126-128.  
 
530 In the Haiguo wenjian lu, Africa is named as “the country of black monsters (Wugui guo)”.  
 
531 For details, see Xu Yongzhang, “Haiguo wenjian lu zhong Feizhou diming kaoshi,” Huanghe keji daxue 
xuebao, vol. 4, no. 4 (December, 2002), pp. 91-97. 
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In considering various states and civilizations, several remarkable features in these 
maritime writings are worth mentioning. First of all, even though place names were listed or 
introduced, the world was generally categorized according to oceans. One significant 
example is the categorization Chen Lunjiong used in Haiguo wenjianlu, which I addressed 
in the previous section. Chen deliberately divided the world outside China into five zones, 
using the names of five oceans as his indicators (i.e., the Eastern Sea, the Southeastern Sea, 
the Southern Ocean, the Little Western Ocean, and the Great Western Ocean). By 
categorizing the world on the basis of a maritime model, Chen’s study shows the author’s 
emphasis on the importance of oceans, which cover seventy percent of the globe. Secondly, 
the works of maritime writers usually begin with descriptions about the Qing Empire (or the 
DaQing guo).532 They then describe Korea, Japan, the Pescadores, the states of the South 
China Sea (nanyang), the various countries of Southeast Asia and the islands of the South 
Pacific; then they address the political and social features of India, the states that border 
India and Tibet, and Western and Central Asia. The final section is usually dedicated to 
descriptions of Western Europe (and sometimes Africa), with particular attention to the 
Atlantic seafaring powers such as the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Spain, Portugal, and 
Britain. Although the maritime writers were generally sensitive to their Qing identity in 
mapping geography, this did not make them exaggerate the importance of the Qing Empire. 
In his xihai zongtu, for instance, Chen Lunjiong even suggested that the Da Qingguo (the 
Great Qing) was not at the center on the map; it rested on top of the Asian continent in a 
corner.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
532 See his “sihai zongtu” for instance.  
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From nanyang to Europe 
 
As Jane Kate Leonard has cogently demonstrated, the Chinese conception of the 
maritime world was decisively influenced by the “Sino-nanyang connection (China-South 
Sea connection)” dating back to the Eastern Zhou period.533 Against the backdrop of this 
traditional Sino-nanyang framework, maritime writers in the eighteenth century were 
customarily interested in depicting the image of nanyang, which shaped Chinese 
geopolitical perceptions of maritime Asia. Most writers devoted the lengthiest section of 
their studies to the history, geography, and current situation of this maritime location. This 
Sino-nanyang connection was, in fact, the lens through which these eighteenth-century 
maritime writers conceptualized the West and the quickening pace of European commercial 
and political expansion in Southeast Asia.534  
  
 These maritime writers usually focused on Vietnam, Siam, Burma, and Java because 
these states were connected to the Qing by tributary politics and ongoing sea trade. They 
argued that Southeast Asian states had had their own governmental structures since the Han 
dynasty. But at the same time, they paid tribute to China in order to maintain a peaceful 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
533 Jane Kate Leonard, Wei Yuan and China’s Rediscovery of the Maritime World, p. 35. 
 
534	  The Chinese traditional relations with the nanyang developed with the growth of the nanhai trade (trade 
with Southeast Asia countries). In the beginning, around the Tang Song period, trade was based on luxuries 
associated with court demands for exotic goods and encouraged by both court and officials who used the 
tributary system to promote trade. This pattern was dramatically altered from the late Song to the Qing period 
by the expanding Chinese junk trade, which came to control and dominate both the Chinese coastal trade as 
well as that of maritime Asia. For fuller details, see Jane Kate Leonard, Wei Yuan and China’s Rediscovery of 
the Maritime World, pp. 33-62 
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relationship with the Chinese Empires.535 The history of Vietnam (also known as Annam 
and Champa), for example, was sketched out in relation to China’s dynastic periods by 
historians since the Qin era, the time when China first controlled part of Vietnam; Siam, 
Burma, Sungora, Patani, and Trengganu were also listed as loyal tributaries of China since 
ancient times.536 Yet maritime writers also realized that the tributary connections between 
China and these Southeast Asian countries had gradually begun to change when Europeans 
began encroaching on the region. Writers such as Wang Dahai and Xie Qinggao 
commented upon the European threat to Southeast Asia. The practical question that 
concerned them was what the Qing could do to maintain a balance of power in the nanyang 
region. As such, both of them subtly proposed that the Qing should use trade links with 
these states more effectively to exert political influence and counteract Western influence. 
In light of these circumstances, Wang and Xie sought to send the message that the Qing 
could no longer take its security for granted or, above all, remain oblivious to changes in the 
East Asian geopolitical sphere. Maritime countries previously described as weak and 
inconsequential tributary states were now treated as substantive civilizations. They 
developed semi-independently, according to individual patterns, and had become 
increasingly influenced by Europeans over the preceding decades.  
  
 Chen, Wang, and Xie all considered Europe exotic, in contrast to the states that had 
established tributary relations with the Qing. Across the European continent, they were 
particularly alerted by the historical, sociological, and expansionist development of Spain, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
535 Xie Qinggao, Hailu, pp. 13-24; Wang Dahai, Haidao yizhi, pp. 1a-4b. 
 
536 Xie Qinggao, Hailu, pp. 37-40. 
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France, Spain, Portugal, England, and the Netherlands. They believed these maritime 
kingdoms had gained eminence because they possessed a technology capable of 
“harnessing guns and cannons (jingyu huojiao),” which, they thought, the Qing should 
imitate as much as possible.537 With the use of new weapons and accurate, scientific 
techniques in navigation and cartography, Westerners had extended their influence around 
the world. They successfully invaded the Americas, Africa, Australia, the Pacific islands, 
and South Asia, as well as numerous places in Southeast Asia. As a consequence, these 
major states in Europe shared the benefits of policy of overseas expansion. With each state 
aiming at specific political and power-orientated goals, the people maintained a close 
identity with the state and fought with patriotic zeal that made even small states like the 
Netherlands powerful.538 These states, according to Chen, Wang, and Xie, also possessed 
impressive sea ports and public services, such as banking, water systems, and educational 
institutions, and other amenities that suggested a high level of cultural accomplishment (wei 
haiwai qinshan ye).539 The cultural level implied by the provision of such services in 
Western Europe put it closer to China than Inner Asian or Southeast Asian states.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
537 Chen Lunjiong, Haiguo wenjianlu, shang juan, p. 25a. 
 
538	  For example, when Xie Qinggao mentioned the administrative structure of the Dutch, he admired it a lot. It 
appeared to the author that the Dutch government was now ruled by four ministers rather than a particular 
monarch. Having noted considerably that the power of the king was taken away from those ministers, Xie was 
amazed to see that the country was still able to maintain its strength and power across the continent and even 
the seven seas. Other than their overseas achievements, the author was very much impressed by the Dutch, 
even though it is only a small country, in managing their country with such a good and deliberated 
administrative strategy – in which successfully consolidate the loyalty of their peoples. See Xie Qinggao, 
Hailu, juanxia, p. 6. 
	  
539 Taking once again the Hailu as an example, one of the public services that much amazed Xie was the water 
system designed by the mayor in London. According to the author’s description, the water system of London 
was made up of a sizable number of small pipes hidden behind the walls of the buildings. These small pipes 
were directly linked to the river Thames so that citizens in town could simply collect useable water from their 
water taps. And the government would monthly collect “water taxes” so as to maintain this water service. See 
Xie Qinggao, Hailu, juanxia, p. 11. 
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Yet, although the three maritime writers realized the institutional and military 
superiority of Western powers, they failed to offer a comprehensive strategy that could help 
protect the Qing from the growing menace posed by those same powers. Their endeavor to 
redefine these Atlantic powers moreover failed to evoke a favorable response from most of 
the officials and literati in high Qing China. Ultraconservatives believed that contact with 
westerners would contaminate Chinese culture unless it were strictly regulated. For instance, 
Li Wei regretted to see that “Wang Dahai had given his attention [in Haidao yizhi] to such a 
strange and distant region [under European control], which had not yet come under the 
influence of our civilizing teaching.”540 To mainstream literati in the early nineteenth 
century, the broader vision of the maritime world could not compete with the Confucian 
classics and canons. As such, the worldview embraced by Chen, Wang, and Xie failed to 
generate a viable and substantial alternative for the Qing court in preparing to deal with the 
fierce aggressions of various imperialistic powers during the Opium War period, when the 
Qing Empire continued to debate whether it would open its doors to the wider world or 
remain an isolated, sleeping dragon in the East. It is only until the mid-nineteenth century 
(after the Opium Wars) that their worldview being reviewed deliberately by scholar-
officials who intended to refine the existing maritime policies in response to a set of 
external crises approaching from the sea.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Influenced by geo-historical studies, and supplemented by evidential and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
540 Li Wai’s preface, in Haidao yizhi, p. 7a.  
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cartographical research, Chen, Wang, and Xie produced detailed and verifiable descriptions 
of the maritime sphere. Similar to the imperial court in Beijing, they did not neglect the 
ocean and hoped their writings could contribute to coastal governance. To make such a 
contribution, they studied the haijiang district (maritime frontier), rediscovered the 
traditional nanyang region, and added important information about the wider world that 
went beyond, and challenged, the conventional tianxia order. Relying mainly on their 
personal experiences, they revised and updated Chinese knowledge of maritime Asia and 
gave special attention to issues of maritime affairs, such as how to stabilize the maritime 
frontier, how to guard against pirates and potential dangers from the sea (shizhi tuzei), how 
to properly manage domestic and foreign sea trade, as well as how to keep domestic sea 
space sound and safe (potao fujing).  
 
Their examinations of other maritime countries (haiguo) in Southeast Asia and 
Europe conformed to the statecraft approach. Unlike such administrative documents as 
imperial edicts and official memorials, which mainly focused on maritime militarization 
and customs management along the coast, the works of the three maritime writers discussed 
the historical and geographical significance of regions lying beyond the maritime frontier. 
In this regard, the ocean provided Chen, Wang, and Xie with an opportunity for charting a 
world connected to the Qing via the sea (geographically) and numerous maritime activities 
(trade and travel). In their conceptualizations, the sea was an interconnected chain of 
separate regions, accessible and ready for exploration. They used the sea as a starting point 
to illustrate and examine the world of maritime countries outside of Qing borders, to locate 
those haiguo in the Far West (i.e., the Atlantic and the Mediterranean regions), and to 
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formulate strategies to protect their country. All of these arguably went to motivate later 
generation in the mid-nineteenth century to rethink the role of the Great Qing in a world full 
of interactions, synergies, and contestations across a vast, interconnected maritime 
landscape. 
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Conclusion 
 
The defeat of the Qing navy during the Opium Wars, the Battle of Fuzhou, and the 
Battle of the Yellow Sea paved the way for the downfall of the Qing dynasty.541 For many 
decades scholars and laymen alike have been inclined to believe that the Qing, because of 
the above humiliating defeats on the sea, lacked a “maritime consciousness.”542 As the 
previous chapters have demonstrated, however, their defeats in sea battles throughout the 
nineteenth century did not necessarily mean that the Qing court in the eighteenth century 
was unable to rule and understand the maritime world. The efforts made by the Manchu 
leaders via maritime militarization and customs institutionalization should remind us that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
541 Julia Lovell makes a lucid account of the First Opium War by using a variety of primary and secondary 
sources. See her The Opium War: Drugs, Dreams and the Making of China (London: Picador, 2011). The 
most illuminating study on the Second Opium War in english remains Catherine Lamour and Michel R. 
Lamberti, Peter and Betty Ross (trans.), The Second Opium War (London: Lane , 1974). For details about the 
Battle of Fuzhou in 1884, see David Pong, Shen Pao-chen and China’s Modernization in the Nineteenth 
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 241-243; 261. On the impact of the Sino-French 
War, see Benjamin A. Elman, “Naval Warfare and the Refraction of China’s Self-Strengthening Reforms into 
Scientific and Technological Failure, 1865-1895,” Modern Asian Studies, vol. 38 no. 2 (May, 2004), pp. 315-
381. On the inadequacy of the Qing’s navy during the First Sino-Japanese War, see Allen Fung, “Testing the 
Self-Strengthening: The Chinese Army in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95,” Modern Asian Studies, vol. 30 
no. 4 (1996), pp. 1007-1031, Richard J. Smith, “Foreign Training and China’s Self-Strengthening: The Case 
of Feng-huang-shan,” Modern Asian Studies, vol. 10 no. 2 (1976), pp. 195-223. On the Self-Strengthening 
Movement and most of the Sino-foreign battles in the mid-nineteenth century, see Kwang-Ching Liu, 
“Nineteenth-Century China,” in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou (eds.), China in Crisis (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1968), vol. 1, pp. 93-178.  
 
542 Meanwhile, in the Oxford Encyclopedia of Maritime History, even if China’s (as a continental power) 
maritime consciousness is introduced, what had happened during the high Qing is completely ignored. See 
John B. Hattendorf (ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of Maritime History (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2007), vol. 1, p. 397. 
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the very idea of “ruling the sea (jinhai or dinghai),” guided by the principle of an “inner-
outer spatial conception,” has remained among the nervous system of the Qing court for at 
least an entire century. Meanwhile, maritime writers who settled along the coast were 
equally aware of the importance of maritime management at their times. It is therefore not 
convincing enough to say that the sea made no appeal to the Qing and the Chinese literati 
before the outbreak of the First Opium War.  
Even though it had launched expansive campaigns in Inner Asia, the Qing empire 
considered the inner sea space as an essential part of the kingdom, of which negligence was 
unaffordable.543 Such a conception of the sea was generally founded on the observation that 
the country’s stability was tied to various maritime connections: different sea routes yoked 
together the coastal provinces (including Taiwan), Korea, Japan, and Southeast Asia by 
establishing economic and cultural ties between them.544 Therefore, the navy and the 
customs offices were committed to policing and regulating sea lanes across different sea 
zones to facilitate provincial sea trades as well as resolving conflicts across a wide swath of 
domestic seawaters. 
 
From the time of Taiwan’s capture in 1683 to the year when Qianlong passed away 
at the age of eighty-seven (1799), the Great Qing was considered a “golden empire,” whose 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
543 Zhongguo diyi lishi danganguan (ed.), Kangxi chao Hanwen zhupi zouzhe huibian, vol. 3, no. 818, “Min-
Zhe zongdu Fan Shisui zouwei zunzhi yifu Guo Yusen tiao haifang shishi zhe 閩浙總督范時祟奏為遵旨議
覆郭玉森條海防十事折”; Zhongguo diyi lishi danganguan (ed.), Yongzhengchao Hanwen zhupi zouzhe 
huibian, vol. 8, no. 279, “Zhe-Min zongdu Gao Qizhuo zouqing shefa caolian shuishi jiangbing zhe 浙閩總督
高其倬奏請設法操練水師將兵折  [reply on the memorial of Gao Qizhuo’s comments on naval 
management].” 
 
544 It should be noted that a number of sea lanes did not only include those within the China coast, but extend 
into the Sea of Japan, South Asia, the Indian Ocean, and even the Arabian peninsula. For that reason, sea lanes 
connecting China and its neighbors were not only vital to the Great Qing, but to all states with economic and 
security interests in Asia. 
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resources were centered on invasion, occupation, and stabilization. During the “golden 
age,” the aggrandizement of naval strength along the sea front was significant in terms of 
the number of warships and soldiers. Contrary to the conventional views which assume that 
the Qing government paid attention to naval affairs only after the First Opium War,545 the 
Manchu monarchs in the eighteenth century did not ignore the sea. Compared with the 
Ottoman Empire and the Mamluk state in Egypt, who were only occasionally able to send 
major fleets to defend their fellow Muslims,546 the Qing court practically and vigorously 
participated in naval policies to consolidate its control and commercial hegemony in the 
economic space stretching from the Bohai Gulf to the coast of Guangdong. The Qing navy, 
in the eighteenth century, was not a fleet that aimed at high sea expansion, but an avenue by 
which the empire could engage in maritime trade, a military mechanism for protecting the 
exchange of commodities, a transport system, and a force of intimidation in the conduct of 
foreign relations. The existence of the navy enabled the Qing empire to subordinate its 
maritime tributaries such as Korea and other Southeast Asian states to dependency 
relationships. It also provided Chinese merchants along the coast, for example the Bohai 
and the Guangdong merchants, access to avenues of commercial investment and 
accumulation of wealth.  
 
Although the term “sea power” is often related to the naval force of a state organized 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
545 Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy in the Twenty-First Century (Annapolis, Maryland: 
Naval Institute Press, 2010), p.4, 189. 
 
546 A short-lived exception to the general weakness of Muslim mobilization was the effort of a powerful group 
on the Malabar coast to mobilize naval power and mercantile wealth. See Genevieve Bouchon, “Regent of the 
Sea: Cannanore’s Respose to Portuguese Expansion, 1507-1528” (Delhi, 1988), and Bouchon, “Sixteenth 
Century Malabar and the Indian Ocean,” in Ashin Das Gupta and M.N. Pearson (eds.), India and the Indian 
Ocean, 1500-1800 (Calcutta, 1987), pp. 162-184.  
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for the purpose of achieving imperialistic aspirations, it is, in the view of naval historians, 
much broader in scope. P.A. Silburn, for instance, believed that  
 
maritime commerce created by necessity had always 
preceded naval forces……armed fleets were brought 
into being for the protection and security of peaceful 
merchantmen and the merchant marine comprised the 
reserve and the backbone of the fighting service.547  
 
J.R. Hill and Jon Tetsuro Sumida also theorized “sea power” as an actualization which 
employs sea forces to gain control of a particular 
maritime zone for a particular period of time……to 
eliminate potential threats to the friendly side, and 
enable the friendly side to effectively utilize the ocean 
to undertake political, military, and economic action; 
and when necessary, to strip the hostile parties’ 
command of the sea, and stop them from using the 
ocean or cause his maritime activities to be limited.548  
 
By granting economic intentionality to the Qing court, this study allows for the inclusion of 
the Qing empire in the scholarly discussion and comparative analysis of a broader discourse 
of sea power, rather than supporting its exclusion as merely a land, continental power in the 
East. The Qing, at least in the eighteenth century, was conscious participants in the East 
Asian Sea trading networks among which the empire itself emerged. The Qing court in the 
eighteenth century can be compared to other Asian and European powers on the bases of 
naval development, commercial policies, and claims to sovereignty across a specific 
maritime territory. Similar to the Ottoman Empire, for instance, the Qing naval project was 
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548 J.R. Hill, Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1986), p. 229; 
Jon Tetsuro Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer 
Mahan Reconsidered (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). 
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directed to the protection of that wealth and to the provisioning and support of campaigns 
which would consolidate Qing control over its inner sea space. The Qing used their navy to 
dominate a significant part of the East Asian Sea and to effect, without direct military 
engagement, a diplomacy of submission on the part of competing states like Japan and 
Vietnam. All of these efforts show that the empire was able to create, enhance, and further 
its political objectives, which included an absolute control of commercial seawater and 
numerous strategic islands off the China coast.  
 
Nevertheless, starting from the turn of the eighteenth century the Qing court failed 
to maintain herself as a sustainable sea power, while the European states had significantly 
enhanced their maritime aggressiveness with naval machinery and technology. Until the 
dawn of the First Opium War, the Qing navy remained a police force operating to 
exterminate pirates and illegal trading activities. Even though it still aimed at guarding the 
empire from potential enemies, such as Japan and Russia, the navy was technically 
incapable of sailing off to the high sea; and the lack of a regular, professional training 
scheme for the navy rendered its combat capacity insufficient. Unlike Peter the Great 
(1672-1725; r. 1682-1725), who designed a comprehensive naval policy for the Russian 
Empire within a decade,549 the Qianlong government, even though it had heard of Peter’s 
maritime policies, overlooked the importance of specialized naval education and the 
training of marine surveyors. The Qing court at that time was satisfied with its naval power. 
The Qianlong emperor and most of his officials believed that the “well trained” seawater 
troops derived from the Green Standard Army were competent and brave enough to defeat 
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any enemy on the sea. Furthermore, Qianlong held an idea that the growth rate of naval 
strength should be enhanced step by step on a moderate scale. Yet the advent of a new era – 
a period which is full of domestic chaos and imperialistic encroachments – did not allow 
such a “moderate” policy to take place. 
 
In the transition from the Qianlong to the Jiaqing period, the Qing court was marred 
by a torrent of natural disasters, economic crises, and the eruption of two destructive 
rebellions – the Miao Rebellion that started in 1795 and the White Lotus Rebellion a year 
later. During the period of formidable turmoil and disorder, it took a while for the Qing to 
modify its ruling mechanism, from “an extraordinary combination of expansion and 
stability”550 to the one that aimed at resolving the problem of overpopulation, economic 
downturn, and two destructive rebellions. Unfortunately, most policies attempted by the 
Jiaqing government were unsuccessful. As a result, the glorious façade created by Qianlong 
could no longer be maintained in his declining years. 
 
With the death of the Qianlong emperor and his many decorated officials, the Qing 
navy descended into a state of passiveness and incompetence. The Qing court, at the time, 
was no longer as proactive in safeguarding the inner sea space as it had been during the 
previous century. It was strained by prolonged and expensive battles against domestic 
rebellions, so without any concrete threat militarizing the inner sea space seemed 
unnecessary. The naval force was incapable of enhancing its combat powers due to a 
shortage of funding, as well as the problem of corruption and nepotism. The government 
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even had to borrow money from merchants and religious parties to support its military 
operations against the Miao and the White Locus.551  Meanwhile, the Qing could not sustain 
its navy because of its rigid political and strategic culture and the traditional orientation 
among some scholar-officials who remained wedded to land forces as the foundation of 
state power. Over the course of the early nineteenth century, the Qing navy was so decayed 
that it even lacked the ability to check illegal sea crimes along the coast.  
 
The Customs Office grappled with similar challenges and was in decline. Although 
the high Qing leaders had been moving to engage closely in domestic and foreign sea trade, 
the internal crises did not allow the Jiaqing and the later the Daoguang government to 
reform the Customs structure. Unlike the preceding governments, who hold the ultimate 
autonomy to manage Customs issues, the Daoguang court was eventually forced to 
refashion the established customs structure to meet the new circumstances created by the 
Europeans who valued the importance of free sea trade. In the years immediately after the 
First Opium War and the opening of five treaty ports, the British attempted to increase their 
profits and maintain commercial advantages over the trading sphere by taking the autonomy 
to handle the Customs Office. By then, the maritime Customs was managed entirely by 
foreigners in its administrative grade, which arguably toppled the Qing’s inner-outer 
conception in supervising sea trade and maritime business.  
 
 Yet, although the Qing was brought to its knees starting from the mid-nineteenth 
century, it is necessary to avoid the temptation of combining the high Qing story with the 
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one that happened in the following century. In this study, I have illustrated that there was a 
strong maritime consciousness and the naval awareness demonstrated by the Qing court in 
the eighteenth century. The triumph of the high Qing maritime policy was its successful 
ability to act, or at least appear to act, independently and exclusively on its own behalf in 
maritime affairs. Its ability to manipulate the naval force and the maritime customs served 
both to assure the physical security of the empire, with a coastline stretching over 18,000 
kilometers. It also served to legitimate Qing-order across the inner sea space in East Asia. 
As such, the Great Qing never lost sight of the strategic and logistical realities of governing 
its vast maritime landscape in the eighteenth century.  
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Glossary 
 
Bohai 渤海 
canjiang 參將 
Chen Ang  陳昂 
Chen Lunjiong 陳倫炯 
cohong 公行 
cun genben 存根本 
Da Qing yitong zhi 大清一統志 
Daoyi jilüe 島夷志略 
DaQin 大秦 
DaQing Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu 大清
高宗純皇帝實錄 
DaQing guo 大清國 
daxiyang 大西洋 
di bijin waiyang, yicang jianfei……dizai 
neihe, shiwu jianshao 地逼近外洋, 易藏奸
匪……地在內河, 事務簡少 
Dong xi yang kao 東西洋考 
Dongxi yangkao 東西洋考 
fenjie 分界 
fudutong 副都統 
Gong Zizhen 龔自珍 
Gu Yanwu 顧炎武 
Gu Zuyu 顧祖禹 
Guan hai 觀海 
Guangdong haifang huilan 廣東海防彙覽 
Guangdong yanhai tu 廣東沿海圖 
Guangyu jiangli tu 廣輿疆里圖 
Guozhao xianzheng shilüe 國朝先正事略  
Haidao yizhi 海島逸誌 
Haiguo tuzhi 海國圖志 
Haiguo wenjian lu 海國聞見錄 
haiguo 海國 
Hailu 海錄 
haitu 海圖 
haiyang zhi shi 海洋之事 
haiyu 海語 
han bianzu 捍邊陲 
houfu 候服 
Huang Qing zhigong tu 皇清職貢圖 
huangfu 荒服 
jianyou yu Zhonguo xiangsi 間有與中國相
似 
Jinghai 靖海 
jingyu huojiao 精於火駮 
jiuzhou 九州 
Li Wei 李威 
Li Yuandu 李元度 
Lin Zexu 林則徐 
liuzi neiyang xunqi 留資內洋巡緝 
Ma Huan 馬歡 
Mingshi 明史 
nangkuo sihai, bingtun bahuang 囊括四海, 
並吞八荒   
Nantai an zhi sansheng shidao tu 南台按治
三省十道圖 
nanyang 南洋 
neihai 內海 
neihe 內河 
neiting 內廷 
neiyang yiyu kanding 內洋易於勘定 
ouluoba 歐羅巴 
Pidao 皮島 
potao fujing 波濤弗靜 
Qi Ying 耆英 
Qiankun yitong haifang quantu 乾坤一統海
防全圖 
Qishan yanhai quantu 七省沿海全圖 
ren haijiang zhe 任海疆者 
Shanhai jing 山海經 
Shao Yuanping 邵遠平 
shizhi tuzei 矢志圖賊 
shuishi tidu 水師提督 
Sihai huayi zongtu 四海華夷總圖 
Sizhou zhi 四洲志 
Sun Chengze 孫承澤 
tianxia yanhai xingshilu 天下沿海形勢錄 
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tianxia 天下 
wai dasiyang 外大西洋 
waihai 外海 
waiting 外廷 
waiyang yudi 外洋輿地 
waiyang 外洋 
waiyang 外洋 
waiyi bingchuan huoji neiyang, ju diaobing 
jishi quzhu 外夷兵船或寄內洋, 俱調兵立
時驅逐 
Wang Dahai 王大海 
Wang Dayuan 汪大淵 
Wang Liu 王鎏 
Wang Qi 王圻 
Wanli haifang tu 萬里海防圖 
wei haiwai qinshan ye 為海外欽善耶 
Wei Yuan 魏源 
weiru bantu 未入版圖 
weiru bantu 未入版圖 
Wu Shijun 吳士俊 
wufu  五服 
wugui 烏鬼 
xiangjin lüeyuan 詳近略遠 
xiaoxiyang 小西洋 
Xie Qinggao 謝清高 
xinanyang 西南洋 
Xishan zaji 西山雜記 
Xiyu wenjian lu 西域聞見錄 
Xu wenxian tongkao 續文獻通考 
xunshao jiangjie 巡哨疆界 
xuyan 序言 
Yang Bingnan 楊炳南 
yang 洋 
yangren 洋人 
Yanhai quantu 沿海全圖 
Yi yu zhi 異域志 
Yilibu 伊里布 
Yingya shenglan 瀛涯勝覽 
yishang 夷商 
Yiti junzhan 一體均霑 
you Dinghai wei zhi hanwei, shi neihai zhi 
tang ao ye 有定海為之捍衛,寔內海之堂奧
也 
yu zhu waiyang, buru yu zhu neihe 禦諸外
洋, 不如禦諸內河 
Yuanchao diangu bianniankao 元朝典故編
年考 
Yugong 禹貢 
Zhe Tang jianbian tu 浙塘簡便圖 
Zheng He 鄭和 
Zheng Xie 張燮 
Zhou Xuegong 周學恭 
zongbing 總兵 
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